Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, EVIDENCE, DISCOVERY—S.D. Ind.: Opposing counsel must disclose billing rates after challenging reasonableness of fee petition, (Oct 28, 2025)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

Although discovery had long since closed, the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s response to his fee petition opened the door to comparison with the defendant’s own legal bills.

Granting in part a plaintiff’s motion for discovery on the issue of attorneys’ fees, a federal district court in Indiana found that the defendant’s opposition to the plaintiff’s fee petition—that time entries regarding specific legal tasks were unreasonable and excessive—was not akin to a generic vagueness challenge for which a comparison to the opposing counsel’s legal bills would be only minimally relevant. However, the court denied the request to expand discovery beyond its order to produce time entries showing hours spent on specific tasks in this litigation. Ultimately, it is the fee applicant’s burden to establish their market rate, and hourly rates charged by defendant’s counsel will not bear on the court’s assessment of which party is correct (Lange v. Anchor Glass Container Corporation, No. 4:20-cv-00160-TWP-KMB (S.D. Ind. Oct. 23, 2025)).

This case encompasses a lengthy procedural history, including both an appeal to the Seventh Circuit and a jury trial. Here, the court focused only on the limited facts relevant to the plaintiff’s motion for discovery on the issue of attorneys’ fees.

Fee petition. After obtaining a jury verdict in his favor on a racial discrimination claim, the plaintiff filed a fee petition seeking $416,940.38 in attorneys’ fees and expenses and $9,342.36 in costs. The defendant objected to the petition on several grounds, including that the plaintiff’s lead counsel claimed an unreasonable hourly rate of $595 per hour and that several of plaintiff’s counsel’s “time entries are often unreasonable and excessive.”

Discovery motion. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for discovery on the issue of attorneys’ fees, requesting “the billing rates, staffing, and hours expended by Defendant’s counsel in this litigation.” The plaintiff argued that defendant’s response to his fee petition challenged “both the hourly rates charged by Plaintiff’s counsel and the number of hours billed,” which should “open the door to comparison with Defendant’s own legal bills.”

Opposing the discovery motion, the defendant contended that discovery closed long ago and should not be reopened, that its counsel’s legal bills and hourly rates were irrelevant to the plaintiff’s fee petition, and that the requested discovery was disproportionate to the needs of resolving the fee petition. Still, the defendant submitted a declaration revealing its lead counsel’s hourly rate in this case was $345.

In response, the plaintiff reiterated that the defendant’s legal bills and hourly rates were relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. As to the disclosure of the lead counsel’s hourly rate, the plaintiff noted that this rate was insurance adjusted, and thus he expanded his discovery request to include “the normal and customary rates charged by Defendant’s personnel when insurance is not involved.”

Reopening discovery. First, the court addressed the parties’ dispute over whether discovery should be reopened. Critical to assessing the plaintiff’s diligence as it related to the “good cause” standard is whether the information he now seeks—defendant’s counsel’s legal bills—would have been previously discoverable before discovery closed.

In this instance, defendant’s counsel’s legal bills were not discoverable until after liability was established at the jury trial in August 2024. Further, defendant’s counsel’s legal bills were not relevant until defendant’s specific objections to the fee petition. The defendant made those objections on April 14, 2025, and the plaintiff filed the motion for discovery two days later. This timing demonstrated that the plaintiff moved to reopen discovery as soon as practicable. As such, he had acted diligently and established the good cause necessary to reopen discovery under Rule 16(b)(4).

Discovery sought. Next, the court turned to the specific discovery sought by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was seeking two categories of attorney-fee information: (1) the complete billing records of defendant’s counsel, showing the hours billed for specific legal tasks undertaken during this litigation; and (2) the hourly rates charged by defendant’s counsel in this litigation. The court addressed each category in turn.

Hours billed. According to the defendant, the plaintiff’s requested fees were unreasonable and excessive. The defendant then set forth several specific examples of purportedly unreasonable time entries. “By challenging the reasonableness of the hours that Plaintiff's counsel spent on several specific litigation tasks, Defendant made the time its counsel spent on those tasks relevant,” said the court.

After all, continued the court, defendant’s counsel’s time entries will include time spent on some of the same or similar tasks that defendant argued plaintiff’s counsel spent excessive or unreasonable time completing.

In this instance, the defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s fee petition—that time entries regarding specific legal tasks were unreasonable and excessive—was not the type of generic vagueness challenge for which a comparison to the opposing legal counsel’s legal bills would be only minimally relevant, explained the court.

“Because Defendant put this at issue in opposing Plaintiff's fee petition, the Court finds that under the specific circumstances presented in this case, the information Plaintiff seeks regarding those time entries is relevant and discoverable,” concluded the court on this issue.

Proportionality. Although the parties primarily disputed the relevance of the defendant’s counsel’s time entries, the defendant also argued that, even if the entries are relevant, allowing discovery of them is disproportionate to the needs of the case. In response, the plaintiff argued that he was only seeking an electronic copy of defendant’s counsel time entries, redacting privileged content where needed, which was a “simple task.” He further contended that this task was not disproportionate given that he was seeking approximately $500,000 in attorneys’ fees incurred during this lengthy case. The court agreed.

“Applying straightforward privilege redactions and then electronically producing counsel’s time entries is not an overly burdensome task when compared to their relevance on the issues presented,” said the court. Further, the defendant was asking the court to reduce the plaintiff’s fee award by more than $90,000. As such, the court concluded that permitting discovery of defendant’s counsel’s time entries were proportional to the needs of the case, and it must produce its counsel’s time entries that show the specific hours expended on the various litigation tasks in this case.

Hourly rates. As to the plaintiff’s request for defendant’s counsel’s billing rates in this litigation, the defendant submitted a declaration by its lead counsel that the hourly rate he billed throughout the litigation was $345 per hour. In response, the plaintiff changed the nature of his discovery request, contending that this rate was irrelevant because it was insurance adjusted, and instead he should be entitled to the normal and customary rates charged by defendant’s counsel. The court was not moved.

Here, the defendant opposed the hourly rate requested by plaintiff’s counsel on three grounds: (1) there was no evidence that $595 per hour was the actual rate plaintiff’s counsel charges to paying clients; (2) evidence showed that plaintiff’s counsel actual rate in 2024 was $395 per hour; and (3) the declarations of other attorneys used to support plaintiff’s counsel’s requested hourly rate did not establish $595 per hour as an appropriate market rate.

“Defendant's counsel’s hourly rate is not relevant to these specific objections,” said the court. The first two objections focused entirely on plaintiff’s counsel’s actual rate—a subject on which defendant’s counsel’s hourly rates have no bearing. The third objection focused solely on the sufficiency of the declarations of other attorneys to establish $595 per hour as an appropriate market rate for plaintiff’s counsel, and defendant’s counsel’s hourly rates would not be useful in determining the sufficiency of the affidavits submitted by other attorneys in support of plaintiff’s counsel’s requested hourly rate, explained the court.

Establishing market rate. Ultimately, it is the fee applicant’s burden to establish their market rate, observed the court, and the hourly rates charged by defendant’s counsel will have no bearing on the court’s assessment of which party is correct on this issue. Accordingly, the court opted not to permit discovery regarding defendant’s counsel’s hourly rates in this litigation to the extent not already disclosed by the defendant.

Normal and customary rates. Finally, the plaintiff, for the first time in his reply, changed the nature of his discovery request with respect to defendant’s counsel’s hourly rates. Instead of only focusing on defendant’s counsel’s hourly rates in this litigation, he was now seeking discovery regarding “the normal and customary rates charged by Defendant’s personnel when insurance is not involved.” Because this request was raised for the first time in his reply brief, the court deemed it waived, and would not permit the request for discovery into defendant’s counsel’s customary rates.

The case is No. 4:20-cv-00160-TWP-KMB.

Judge: Barr, K.

Attorneys: Grant E. Swartzentruber (Swartzentruber Brown, Attorneys at Law) for Cory B. Lange. Christopher C. Murray (Ogletree Deakins) for Anchor Glass Container Corp.

Companies: Anchor Glass Container Corp.

Cases: EvidenceDiscovery AttorneysFees Procedure RemediesDamages IndianaNews