Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, EMPLOYEE LEAVE—N.D. Tex.: Paternity leave may have accelerated planned firing, (Sep 11, 2026)
Law Firms Mentioned:Hale & Manicom | Ogletree Deakins | The Law Office of Chris R. Miltenberger
Organizations Mentioned:McKesson Corp. | McKesson Corporation | Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, PC
By George Basharis, J.D.
A senior director received his termination notice two days after requesting paternity leave and months before other employees affected by the same reduction in force were terminated.
A McKesson Corporation senior director can pursue an FMLA retaliation claim based on evidence that the company may have accelerated his termination after learning of his planned paternity leave. Although McKesson had already selected his position for elimination, a jury could find that the timing of his leave request, uncertainty over when the company chose his termination date, and evidence that his work continued afterward supported a finding that the leave prompted McKesson to fire him months earlier than other employees included in the same reduction in force. Consequently, the federal district court in Texas denied McKesson’s motion for summary judgment (Shoemaker v. McKesson Corp., No. 3:25-CV-2558-D (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2026)).
Reorganization planned. The senior director joined McKesson in October 2022 and eventually oversaw operations in the company’s customer-support contact center. McKesson began planning a contact-center restructuring in spring 2024 that company leaders expected would require personnel reductions. In November, the company hired a vice president of contact center services to lead the transformation, evaluate existing positions and continuing work, and identify roles for elimination. The senior director reported to the vice president of contact center services.
Position eliminated. McKesson said that the vice president and another senior executive agreed in December 2024 to eliminate the senior director’s position. A PowerPoint last modified in January 2025 identified his role among those to be transitioned out and described plans to hire a transformation lead. McKesson characterized the presentation as its final reorganization plan. The next day, the senior director began discussing the company’s paternity leave policy with a human resources employee and asked that the conversations remain private because of complications with his wife’s previous pregnancy.
About a month later, the senior director discovered an organizational chart reflecting changes to his role. His supervisor encouraged him to apply for the planned transformation lead position, but he declined. The next day, she prepared another document reflecting the elimination of his position.
Leave request. On March 3, the senior director formally notified his supervisor that his wife was pregnant and that he intended to take paternity leave later that spring. According to McKesson, this was the supervisor’s first notice of his planned leave, and the supervisor and human resources decided in “early March” that he would receive notice of his termination on April 11. McKesson did not identify a more precise date, leaving unclear whether the decision preceded or followed his March 3 disclosure.
The senior director formally requested FMLA leave on April 9. Two days later, McKesson notified him that he would be terminated. Other employees included in the reduction in force remained employed until July.
Termination accelerated. The senior director could not establish that his leave caused McKesson’s initial decision to eliminate his position. The evidence showed that McKesson had been considering his termination as part of the restructuring before he told his supervisor about the planned paternity leave. Documents prepared before March 3 supported McKesson’s position that his role had already been selected for elimination.
However, the timing of his termination presented a different question. An employer may retaliate by accelerating a previously planned termination because of protected conduct, even when the decision to eventually terminate the employee predates that conduct. McKesson asserted that it chose the April 11 termination-notice date in early March, before the senior director disclosed his leave plans to his supervisor. Because the company did not identify a specific date, it remained unclear whether that decision preceded or followed his March 3 disclosure.
McKesson pointed to evidence that company leaders had decided by mid-January to eliminate the senior director’s role before those of other employees. Although McKesson had already selected his position for elimination, the evidence did not establish when his termination would occur. A jury could find that McKesson originally intended to terminate him ahead of the other employees but accelerated the process to April 11 after learning of his planned leave.
The timing provided additional support. The senior director formally requested FMLA leave on April 9 and received his termination notice two days later. Even measuring from his March 3 disclosure, the interval was short enough to establish the causal connection required at the initial stage of an FMLA retaliation claim.
Explanation questioned. McKesson offered a nonretaliatory explanation for terminating the senior director before the other employees in the restructuring. It said that his responsibilities had ended, had a limited lifecycle, or would not continue in the same form. His salary was also needed to fund the new transformation lead position.
That explanation satisfied McKesson’s burden to provide a legitimate reason for the timing of the termination. However, the senior director produced enough evidence to permit a jury to question it. Because temporal proximity alone could not establish pretext or show that retaliation partly motivated McKesson’s decision, he needed additional evidence that his FMLA leave influenced his earlier termination.
Responsibilities continued. Evidence that his responsibilities continued provided the additional support. The senior director pointed to substantial ongoing work when McKesson terminated him and to a transition plan he prepared for his continuing responsibilities. Those duties included contact-center strategy and transformation work, vendor matters, project requests, stakeholder communications, and other ongoing functions.
Moreover, a McKesson employee who worked closely with the senior director testified that the director’s job functions did not cease after his termination and that the newly hired transformation lead effectively stepped into his role. Evidence showed that the co-worker, the senior director’s former supervisor, and an outside firm assumed portions of his responsibilities after he left.
Competing accounts. McKesson disputed that characterization. In McKesson’s view, the senior director’s role differed from those of employees who remained until July. According to the company, their responsibilities continued through their termination dates, while his work had ended or was being phased out.
Resolving those competing accounts would require weighing the evidence and witness credibility, which cannot be done at summary judgment. A jury could determine whether the senior director’s responsibilities sufficiently differed from those of the employees terminated in July to justify ending his employment earlier.
Claim survives. The senior director’s termination notice came two days after his FMLA request, and evidence called into question McKesson’s explanation for terminating him months before the other employees in the reduction in force. A jury could find that the company’s stated reason was pretextual or that his planned leave was a motivating factor in the earlier termination.
That same evidence prevented McKesson from establishing that it would have taken the same action regardless of any retaliatory motive. Determining why the senior director was terminated earlier than the other employees requires weighing competing evidence and assessing witness credibility, matters for the factfinder rather than summary judgment, concluded the court.
The case is No. 3:25-CV-2558-D.
Judge: Fitzwater, S.
Attorneys: John Gregory Hale (Hale & Manicom) and Chris R. Miltenberger (The Law Office of Chris R. Miltenberger) for John Shoemaker. Jamie Brod Ashton (Ogletree Deakins) for McKesson Corp.
Companies: McKesson Corp.
Cases: EmployeeLeave Discharge Retaliation TexasNews GCNNews