Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—SEXUAL HARASSMENT—E.D. Pa.: Single denial of support for professor’s grant application didn’t support quid pro quo or retaliation claims, (Oct 7, 2025)

By Marjorie Johnson, J.D.

She “was deprived of an opportunity to seek grant funding rather than the opportunity to seek grant funding—a distinction with a difference for purposes of the Court’s tangible employment action analysis.”

A tenured professor employed by a non-profit cancer research center owned by Temple University Health System won’t get a trial on her Title VII and Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance claims alleging she was subjected to quid pro quo sexual harassment and retaliated against for complaining. While the case presented “a long, complicated history of troubling conduct from an influential male figure and responses to that conduct that are far from exemplary,” a federal district court held that the center’s initial denial of her request for an institutional letter of support for an external grant application did not constitute a tangible employment action for purposes of her quid pro claim or a materially adverse action for purposes of her retaliation claim, and she also failed to show an adverse action for purposes of her retaliatory harassment claim. Thus, the court dismissed all claims on summary judgment (O’Reilly v. The Institute for Cancer Research, No. 24-5315-KSM (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2025)).

Supervisor’s inappropriate emails. The professor had worked for the research center since 2007, and in late 2014 she made an internal sexual harassment complaint against her supervisor based on inappropriate emails he had sent her relating to his having had an affair, amongst other things. During the investigation, the center reprimanded the supervisor after he violated its no-contact order and removed all his supervisory authority over her. He was also prohibited from having any personal communication with her or asking her any direct questions in the work setting, though he did not initially follow the latter directive.

He becomes director. Several years later, in November 2021, he was promoted to be the director of the center, and as such he had supervisory authority over all staff. In January 2023, he attended her annual research presentation and took pictures of her. Five days later, he sent her a personal email seeking to work with her on an important grant resubmission. This made her uncomfortable, so she complained to her supervisors. Afterwards, he agreed that she would not work with him on the grant, and from then on he had no direct contact with her.

Request for institutional letter. In March 2023, she asked her supervisor for an “institutional letter of support” with regard to her application for a Research With Activities Related to Diversity (ReWARD) grant provided by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The center did not provide her the letter, and as a result she was unable to support her application by the initial deadline in June. However, it did provide her the letter in September, and submitted her application for the second funding cycle. After that application was not funded, she resubmitted her application for the grant’s fourth funding cycle in June 2024, but that application was not funded either.

PCHR complaint. Meanwhile, on August 31, 2023, she filed a discrimination complaint with the Philadelphia Commission on Human Rights. Afterwards, the center allegedly denied her the ability to participate in mandatory or “critically important” program activities due to its unwillingness to prohibit the director’s simultaneous participation in those activities.

No “tangible action.” The professor failed to advance her quid pro claim since the center’s denial of her request for an institutional letter of support for her ReWARD grant application—which she claimed resulted from her rejection of the director’s efforts to resume working together—did not constitute a tangible employment action. While grant funding was a critical aspect of her position since she was expected to support half of her salary and benefits, and that support was ordinarily expected to come from external grant funding, most NIH grant applications were not successful. Moreover, if she were unable to secure grant funding, the center would pay 100 percent of her salary for the first 12 months and 50 percent for the next 12 months. Only if she was without funding for 24 months would the employer consider termination was warranted.

One letter, one cycle. The court acknowledged that institutional letters of support were required for all NIH and most other external grant applications, and that most requests are routinely granted. Significantly, however, the record demonstrated that the professor “was deprived of an opportunity to seek grant funding rather than the opportunity to seek grant funding—a distinction with a difference for purposes of the Court’s tangible employment action analysis.” The record did not suggest that the denial of one letter of support for one cycle of grant funding that the professor admittedly did not need to remain employed amounted to a serious enough “quo” to alter the terms of employment.

Indeed, the grant application was not the only funding opportunity that she sought at that time. She had applied for another NIH grant in March 2023, for which she did receive a letter of support from her supervisor. She also received a different grant that same month, which was ultimately renewed for a second year, as well an annual donation from a foundation. She also received a positive annual review in June 2023, including with respect to funding efforts.

Not “materially adverse.” The denial of the letter of support also not amount to a materially adverse action for purposes of her retaliation claim. The court again emphasized that she inaccurately framed that denial as being deprived of the opportunity to seek grant funding, when the record established that she was deprived of an opportunity to seek grant funding. Moreover, while the grant funding would have contributed to her professional advancement, there was no guarantee that a letter of support would have guaranteed that she would have received that grant funding, thus any alleged harm was only speculative.

Retaliatory harassment claim fails. Her retaliatory harassment claim also failed due to the lack of an adverse action. First, insofar as she alleged the center failed to adequately respond to her PCHR complaint, courts have held that failure to investigate a harassment complaint does not constitute an adverse employment action. Moreover, she failed to show that the employer “excluded” her from three mandatory program meetings and faculty retreats after she voiced her concerns about having the director present. There was no evidence the center required her to participate in those activities with him present. Rather, she decided to either not participate at all or participate remotely because the employer would not agree to prevent him from participating.

The case is No. 24-5315-KSM.

Judge: Marston, K.

Attorneys: Julie A. Uebler (Uebler Law) for Alana M. O'Reilly. Benjamin L. Shechtman (Cozen O'Connor) for The Institute for Cancer Research, Temple University Health System, Temple University and Jonathan Chernoff.

Companies: The Institute for Cancer Research; Temple University Health System; Temple University

Cases: SexualHarassment SexDiscrimination Discrimination Retaliation PennsylvaniaNews