Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—SEX—S.D. Ind.: Female county employee passed over for executive director position moves forward with suit, (Sep 19, 2025)

By Nicholas Kaster, J.D.

The court declined to take judicial notice that the position description on Hamilton County's website today was the same one in effect when the employee applied for the Executive Director position in 2024.

A sex discrimination suit brought by a female Hamilton County employee, who was director of pretrial services at the time she was rejected for the position of Executive Director of Community Corrections for the county, even though the advisory board had selected her for the position, survived the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the employer failed to show that there were no disputed issues of material fact regarding whether the Executive Director was an “appointee on the policymaking level” and thus not considered an employee under Title VII. Its argument was reliant upon the court taking judicial notice of a current job description as being the same one in place when she was up for the position, which the court declined (Ruggles v. Hamilton County, No. 1:25-cv-01000-JMS-CSW (S.D. Ind. Sept.17, 2025.))

Advisory board recommended her. The employee had worked for the county for over 22 years when she applied for a position as Executive Director of Community Corrections. At the time of her application, she was Director of Hamilton County Pretrial Services. The Community Corrections Advisory Board eventually selected her for the position and forwarded her name to the county commissioners for approval.

Passed over. However, the commissioners rejected her candidacy, along with that of another female candidate, and instead eventually approved a male candidate for the position.

She filed suit against the county, asserting a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII. The county filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Whether position was an “appointee.” Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees based on their sex. It defines “employee” as: “[A]n individual employed by an employer, except that the term 'employee' shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision.” (emphasis added).

Here, the county argued that the Executive Director position fit squarely within the exception for “an appointee on the policy making level,” while the employee argued that it did not fit because the position did not constitute an appointee appointed by an elected official and was not policymaking in nature.

An “appointee.” Specifically, the county asserted that the Executive Director is an appointee because Indiana statute provides that the Advisory Board shall appoint a director of Community Corrections, subject to the approval of the county executive (which is the County Commissioners). This point was well taken, the court said. The Indiana Code provides that the County Commissioners are the “county executive,” and that the county “may establish and operate a community corrections advisory board for the purpose of coordinating or operating community corrections programs,” and gives the Advisory Board the power to “appoint a director of the community corrections program, subject to the approval of the county executive.” This statutory language indicates that the Advisory Board appoints the Executive Director, subject to the approval of the County Commissioners, making him or her an “appointee.”

But “on the policymaking level?” Additionally, the county asserted that the Executive Director is an appointee on the policymaking level, relying on the definition of “community corrections program” provided in the Indiana Code and arguing that the Executive Director position “has meaningful input into governmental decision-making on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation.”

In a prior decision, the Seventh Circuit found that an individual is considered an appointee on the policymaking level “if the position held by the individual authorizes, either directly or indirectly, meaningful input into governmental decision-making on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation.” The Seventh Circuit stated that courts should consider “the powers inherent in a given office, as opposed to the functions performed by a particular occupant of that office,” and that when “the duties and responsibilities of a particular position are clearly outlined by law, the court may make the determination, as a matter of law, that a certain position involves policymaking.” When, however, the duties and responsibilities are not clearly defined by statute, a factual analysis of the individual's actual job duties is necessary.

Duties and responsibilities? The court found that the duties and responsibilities of the Executive Director position were not clearly outlined by Indiana law, and thus went on to analyze the Executive Director's job duties in view of the facts set forth in the complaint.

Job description. Here, the county sought to rely on the Executive Director job description, which it argued provides that the individual is “responsible for planning, developing, and implementing the Hamilton County Community Corrections program,” and must, among other things, supervise and direct personnel; monitor and oversee program activities for compliance with departmental policies; prepare periodic reports and annual budgets; and pursue additional sources of funding like grants.

The county submitted a declaration from its current Human Resources Administrator, in which she stated that the job description for the Executive Director position that currently appears on Hamilton County's public website is substantially the same description of the position that was in effect when the employee applied in 2024. The county requested that the court take judicial notice of the Executive Director job description.

The employee argued that the court should not take judicial notice of the job description because the county did not incorporate it into its Answer and because there was nothing in the record at this stage of the litigation to show that this was the position description in effect at the time she applied for the role. The description was written in January 2000 and revised in July 2013, which raised the question of whether the position description was applicable to the Executive Director role that she applied for in 2024. She asserted that without the benefit of discovery to prove these issues, the position description was not capable of “accurate and ready determination,” as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), and should not be judicially noticed.

Generally, the court explained, a court must convert a motion for judgment on the pleadings to a motion for summary judgment if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.” However, a court may take judicial notice of documents outside of the pleadings, such as public records, without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.

Court did not accept as the same. Here, the court took judicial notice that the Executive Director position is currently described on Hamilton County's website. However, it declined to take judicial notice that the position description on the website today was also in effect when the employee applied for the position in 2024—a leap in logic that was integral to the county’s reliance on the job description to show that the position was a policymaking one. The court said that it would not consider the HR Director’s Declaration to that effect because whether the current job description matches the 2024 job description is not “generally known within the court's territorial jurisdiction” and cannot “be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably questioned.”

Further, said the court, the employee “has not had a chance to develop facts on that issue at this stage of the litigation, which is focused only on the pleadings.” Simply taking the Director’s word for it was not permissible, the court said.

Because it was not clear that the Executive Director job description that currently appears on the website is the description that was in effect when the employee applied for the position, the court did not consider whether the description indicates that the position was one involving policymaking. Rather, it determined that the count failed to show that there were no disputed issues of material fact and it denied the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The case is No. 1:25-cv-01000-JMS-CSW.

Judge: Magnus-Stinson, J.

Attorneys: Kimberly D. Jeselskis (Jeselskis Brinkerhoff and Joseph) for Stephanie Ruggles. Adam Scott Willfond, Hamilton County Legal Department, for Hamilton County.

Companies: Hamilton County

Cases: SexDiscrimination Discrimination PublicEmployees IndianaNews