Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RELIGIOUS—N.D. Ill.: Suit by CTA employee terminated for refusing COVID vaccine survives summary judgment, (Sep 29, 2025)

By Nicholas Kaster, J.D.

Because the CTA appears to have used its discretion to deny religious exemptions on an individual basis, the policy “invites the government to decide which reasons for not complying with the policy are worthy of solicitude.”

A suit by a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) employee, who was terminated for refusing a COVID vaccine, survived the employer’s motion for summary judgment. The employee alleged that the CTA's denial of a reasonable religious accommodation and his subsequent firing violated Title VII, the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The CTA, the federal court in Illinois observed, appeared to have considered only the specific accommodation the employee requested and a reasonable jury could find this was insufficient since it was possible that there were alternative accommodations it could have considered. The CTA also failed to meet its burden to show that it utilized the least restrictive means to achieve its compelling interest of preventing the spread of COVID-19 (Boyd v. Chicago Transit Authority, No. 24 C 2727 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2025)).

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the CTA instituted a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy for all employees, which allowed employees to request a medical or religious accommodation. To obtain a religious accommodation, an employee first had to submit a request to the CTA's Religious Accommodation Review Committee, which would then review each applicant's accommodation request on an individualized case-by-case basis.

The Committee would not make any determination on whether the employee's asserted belief was sincerely held but would instead focus solely on whether the employee substantiated a conflict between a sincerely held religious belief or practice that prohibited them from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. If the Committee determined that there was a conflict with the vaccination policy and an employee's stated religious belief, it would then consult with the employee's department head to determine whether the employee's work location could accommodate allowing them to remain unvaccinated.

Accommodation request. The employee, a Rapid Transit Operator, submitted a religious accommodation request to the Committee. In a letter attached to his request, he stated that he was a practicing Christian and that he objected to vaccination on the grounds that “[t]he presence of and use of immortalized human cell line taken against the will of the person(s) aborted having been used in the development of the vaccinations, cause my firm belief that participation in the vaccination programs is an indirect engagement and participation in abortion.” In addition, he stated, “any coerced medical treatment goes against my religious faith and the right of conscience to control one's own medical treatment, free of coercion or force.”

Termination. He proposed masking and social distancing as a reasonable alternative to vaccination. Because the employee’s job required him to interact with customers face-to-face, the Committee concluded that “social distancing at all times was not feasible.” It also concluded that the CTA would not be able to effectively monitor compliance with any masking or social distancing requirements because the employee worked independently operating trains for the majority of his shift. The Committee ultimately denied the accommodation request. A letter sent to the employee emphasized the denial was final and unappealable. After multiple disciplinary hearings in which the employee repeatedly noted that he was not vaccinated, he was discharged.

The employee filed suit, alleging that the CTA's denial of a reasonable religious accommodation and his subsequent firing violated Title VII, the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The CTA moved for summary judgment.

Failure to accommodate claim. The CTA did not dispute that the employee met most of the requirements for making a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim. He maintained a sincere Christian belief that conflicted with the CTA's vaccination policy and he notified the CTA of this belief through his request for an exemption. The CTA, however, appeared to dispute that this belief was a motivating factor for the employee’s termination. It contended that the employee was fired for failing to comply with its vaccination policy and that this “legitimate business reason” defeated any failure-to-accommodate claim.

The Seventh Circuit has emphasized that an employer must establish more to defend against a failure-to-accommodate claim than to prove only that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee. Terminating an employee for a religious action makes the employee's religion the “basis” for that firing, whether or not legitimate business reasons supported denying an accommodation. Although an employer's legitimate business concerns may indicate that an accommodation would impose an undue hardship, they do not affect whether a prima facie case was shown. Because the employee refused to obtain a vaccination due to his sincerely held religious beliefs and was terminated for that refusal, a reasonable jury could find that the need for a religious accommodation was a motivating factor in his termination. This was sufficient to establish a prima facie case on a failure-to-accommodate claim.

Undue hardship. The CTA did not offer the employee any accommodation beyond the one he proposed, which it rejected. Absent a reasonable accommodation, the employer is required to demonstrate that any accommodation would have caused it undue hardship. This is a highly context-specific inquiry, the court noted. Courts must consider all relevant factors, including the particular accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, size, and operating cost of an employer. Significantly for purposes of this case, the Supreme Court has further emphasized that an employer's consideration of only the employee's requested accommodation may be insufficient. Title VII requires that an employer reasonably accommodate an employee's practice of religion, not merely that it assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or accommodations.

That said, the court observed, Seventh Circuit precedent suggests that an employer is not required to search the ends of the earth to find a reasonable accommodation. Specifically, an employer “must engage in a dialogue with an employee seeking an accommodation.” The CTA contended that it did engage the employee in such a dialogue. It emphasized that it asked the employee to clarify what specific accommodation he was requesting and that the Committee then consulted with his work location to determine if they could accommodate him. However, said the court, a reasonable jury could find that this was insufficient.

In particular, the CTA appeared to have considered only the specific accommodation the employee requested. An employer typically must do more than merely assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or accommodations. It is at least possible, said the court, that there were alternative accommodations the CTA could have considered that went beyond the employee’s work location and the specific parameters of his request. For example, the CTA might have considered a transfer to another position with less face-to-face interaction. The court thus denied the CTA's motion for summary judgment on the employee’s failure-to-accommodate claim.

Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. But the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that one's religion prescribes (or proscribes). A neutral law of general applicability is constitutional if it is supported by a rational basis, meaning the law must only be “rationally related to a valid government purpose.” A law is not “generally applicable” however, if it “invites the government to consider the particular reasons for a person's conduct by providing a mechanism for individualized exemptions” or if it “prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar way.”

This was the case here: The CTA's policy provided a mechanism for individualized exemptions. Thus, it was not a neutral law of general applicability. Failing either the neutrality or general applicability test is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. A policy survives strict scrutiny only if the government demonstrates its course was justified by a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest.

The CTA contended that subjecting the application of its exemption policy to strict scrutiny would lead to “a topsy-turvy outcome” in which “a vaccine mandate that seeks to reduce intrusion upon religion by way of a religious exemption would by virtue of that exemption be made subject to strict scrutiny.”

But it is not the availability of any religious exemption that subjects the CTA's vaccination policy to strict scrutiny, said the court. Rather, the salient point is that the CTA retained discretion in determining who did and did not qualify for an exemption. Policies that offer nondiscretionary religious exemptions—such as those that grant exemptions automatically or across-the-board—remain subject to rational basis review. But because the CTA appeared to have used its discretion to deny religious exemptions on an individual basis, the policy “invites the government to decide which reasons for not complying with the policy are worthy of solicitude.” The policy's application to the employee was therefore required to be justified under strict scrutiny.

The employee did not dispute that the CTA had a compelling interest in stopping the spread of COVID-19. Still, for the CTA to prevail on summary judgment, it had to further establish that its application of its mandatory vaccination policy onto the employee was the least restrictive means for achieving this compelling interest. A reasonable jury could find otherwise, said the court. As discussed above, other options may have been available, such as transfer to another position with less face-to-face interaction.

The record did not indicate that the CTA considered alternative options (other than keeping the employee at his current position) when it came to evaluating his religious accommodation request. The CTA had the burden to show that it utilized the least restrictive means to achieve its compelling interest of preventing the spread of COVID-19. A reasonable jury could find that the CTA's apparent failure to consider apparently available options other than keeping the employee at his current position meant that it did not meet its burden, said the court. The court therefore denied the CTA's motion for summary judgment on the employee’s Free Exercise Clause claim.

Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim. The Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. As discussed above, the CTA failed to meet its burden in demonstrating, on summary judgment, that its application of the vaccination policy to the employee was the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling governmental interest of preventing the spread of COVID-19. The court therefore denied the CTA's motion for summary judgment on his Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim.

The case is No. 24 C 2727.

Judge: Kennelly, M.

Attorneys: Joseph Peter DiPasquale (Anthony J. Peraica & Associates) for Emmanuel Boyd. Christine Marie Dadourian, Chicago Transit Authority, for Chicago Transit Authority.

Cases: ReligiousDiscrimination Discrimination Covid19 PublicEmployees IllinoisNews