Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RELIGIOUS—D. Md.: Health care center in the clear as threat of discipline is not adverse employment action, (Mar 11, 2026)

By Jeffrey H. Brochin, J.D.

Merely questioning employee regarding her commitment to providing abortion information did not qualify as discipline or adverse employment action, which was necessary to maintain employee’s discrimination claims.

A federal district court in Maryland has dismissed a religious discrimination lawsuit filed by an Employee of Chase Brexton Health Services (CBHC or Employer) who claimed that CBHS did not accomodate her legitimate religious beliefs. Although Title VII (and the corresponding Maryland MFEPA) makes it unlawful for covered employers to discriminate with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of an individual’s religion, a claim only arises where the employment action has brought about some ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition, which the Employee failed to allege (Trautwein v. Chase Brexton Health Services, No. 1:24-cv-03650-ABA (D. Md. Mar. 3, 2026)).

Requirement to provide abortion information. The Employee, a devout Christian and member of the Roman Catholic religion, possessed a sincerely held religious belief that human life is sacred and to be protected from the moment of conception. She therefore could not participate in any medical procedure that involves the termination of the life of an unborn child (i.e., abortion). She began working for the Employer on December 18, 2018, in positions that required her to ‘serve many pregnant patients.’

The Employee alleged that on August 28, 2023, she requested a religious accommodation seeking to be exempted from CBHC’s ‘Pregnancy Test Workflow’ which included the requirement to provide patients with additional information about pregnancy termination services. CBHC denied the accommodation request. The next day she was questioned at work regarding her beliefs and was allegedly pressured to ‘affirm her commitment to execute a workflow task’ that violated her sincerely held religious belief, and to do so by the end of the day. She requested--but was denied--additional time to reply, and was also told that ‘unless she capitulated, that she would need to give a two-week notice of her resignation or else be subject to disciplinary measures. She was then directed to take unsolicited time off that deviated from her established work schedule for the remainder of the day, and thereafter she was off duty on unsolicited time off for the remainder of August 29th, and thereafter on previously scheduled personal time off until September 5, 2023. On August 30, 2023, CBHC reaffirmed in writing the denial of the request for a religious accommodation and further wrote that her failure to timely respond to the ‘close of business ultimatum’ constituted her agreement to follow the workflow that violated her sincerely held religious belief.

Title VII and related claims. The Employee filed a five-count lawsuit against CBHC alleging: a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count 1); a violation of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act or MFEPA (Count2); a violation of the Maryland Code, Health-Gen. § 20-214 or ‘Conscience Clause’ (Count 3); a violation of the Baltimore County Code (Count 4); and a violation of the Public Health Service Act, (the ‘Sen. Frank Church Amendments’) in Count 5. Presently before the court was the Employer’s motion to dismiss all five counts, which, for the reasons cited below, the court granted.

Title VII and MFEPA. Title VII makes it unlawful for covered employers ‘to discriminate against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s religion.’ In the context of the instant case, that means that such employers must make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees whenever that would not work an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. However, a discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) of Title VII arises only where an employment action has brought about some ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition, meaning that the employee must have suffered some harm respecting an ‘identifiable term or condition of employment.’

Here, the court found that the only acts that arguably could affect the terms and conditions of her employment were being forced to take off time and being threatened with discipline. But she failed to allege that such leave was without pay or that such (presumably paid) leave caused any detriment to the terms and conditions of her employment. Accordingly, the partial-day paid leave did not constitute an adverse employment action. As to the allegations that she was told that ‘unless she capitulated, she would need to give a two-week notice of her resignation or else be subject to disciplinary measures’, she did not allege that she was in fact terminated or placed on unpaid leave, or that she resigned, or that she suffered any other adverse consequence. The court observed that ‘the mere threat of discipline is not an adverse action’ unless it actually leads to alterations in the terms and conditions of employment, which did not occur here. Therefore, her Title VII and MFEPA claims were dismissed.

Conscience Clause. The court next turned to the claim under the Conscience Clause (under which a person may not be required to refer to any source for termination of pregnancy, and such refusal may not be the basis for disciplinary or other recriminatory action). Again, the court found that the Employee was not in fact subjected to any “disciplinary or other recriminatory action” for the same reasons noted above that she was not subjected to an adverse employment action. Therefore, Count 3 was also dismissed, without prejudice.

‘Church amendments.’ The Church Amendments provide in relevant part that ‘no entity that receives a grant under the Public Health Service Act may discriminate in the employment of any physician or other health care personnel because he or she refused to perform or assist in the performance of a sterilization procedure or abortion on the grounds that it would be contrary to religious beliefs.’ However, the Court agreed with the Employer that 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 does not confer a private right of action, and they therefore dismissed Count 5.

The case is No. 1:24-cv-03650-ABA.

Judge: Abelson, A.

Attorneys: Paul R. Rivera (Paul R. Rivera, Attorney at Law) for Theresa L. Trautwein. Karla Grossenbacher (Seyfarth Shaw LLP) for Chase Brexton Health Services, Inc.

Companies: Chase Brexton Health Services, Inc.

Cases: ReligiousDiscrimination Discrimination MarylandNews