Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RACE—M.D. Pa.: Coworker’s one-time ‘chinks’ remark did not subject Asian employee to a hostile work environment, (Jan 6, 2026)

By Marjorie Johnson, J.D.

“The matter before the Court is the unfortunate case of an isolated offensive comment over an employee’s seven years of employment that does not rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment.”

An Asian clerk at a county district attorney’s office, who complained that a coworker had made a statement using the term “chinks,” and was fired weeks later following several unrelated complaints of insubordination by her superiors, won’t get a trial on her federal and state law claims of race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. Dismissing the employee’s claims on summary judgment, a federal district court in Pennsylvania held that the isolated racial slur did not create a hostile work environment, the coworker was not a proper comparator for purposes of inferring bias since she did not similarly have a record of insubordination, and there was no evidence suggesting the proffered performance-related reasons for her firing were pretextual (Charles v. County of Lycoming, No. 4:21-CV-00883 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2025)).

The employee was first hired by the county in 2013 as a clerk in its assessment office. In September 2019, she received a written warning while in that role that precipitated a transfer to a position as a full-time clerk in the office of the district attorney (DA). When she joined the DA’s office, she was placed in a probation period for 180 days.

Racial slur. On April 6, 2020, a coworker in the DA’s office made a statement that used the racial slur “chinks.” The employee and another coworker who heard the remark immediately reported the incident to their supervisor. In an email, the employee stated that, “I am Asian and that word is one of the most Racist/demeaning words you could use towards an Asian person. I understand it’s not about me, but it was very inappropriate to hear.”

The supervisor reported the incident to HR and the DA, and also held a meeting with both the employee and the offending coworker. The coworker allegedly “acted as if she did nothing wrong,” and the supervisor stated there was zero tolerance for this type of behavior.

Afterwards, there were no other reported incidents of racist remarks being used in the office.

Performance issues and insubordination. Meanwhile, superiors in the office began to allege performance issues with the employee’s work. On April 30, these allegations came to a head when an assistant DA sent an email to the DA describing four instances in which the employee was insubordinate in refusing to perform tasks and made inappropriate remarks. The superior concluded that he avoided her at this point.

On May 1, the assistant DA sent an email to the employee’s supervisor describing another issue where she had not provided requested documents that were needed for court hearings. That same day, the supervisor sent an email to the DA reporting that the during a meeting to discuss issues with the employee’s work, she “was once again extremely hostile” and had complained that it was “bullsh*t” that she had to come into the office on a day that was outside of her normal weekly rotation. A paralegal also sent an email recounting three separate instances in which the employee sent work to be done elsewhere and questioned her work responsibilities.

Fired. Later that same day, the DA advised the employee that she was being terminated for insubordination, stating that this “was the worst case of insubordination he had ever seen in his 30 year career of being an attorney.”

Lawsuit. The employee brought the instant action alleging the county violated Title VII, Section 1981, and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act (PHRA) by subjecting her to a race-based hostile work environment and discharging her because of her race and/or in retaliation for her protected activity. She also brought an aiding and abetting claim under the PHRA against the DA and her supervisor.

Slur did not create HWE. The employee’s hostile work environment (HWE) claim failed since she could not show that she was subjected to sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment. Significantly, there was only one isolated incident of discriminatory conduct—the coworker’s inflammatory set of statements using a racial slur. “While this is an offensive word to use in any environment, this singular incident is not severe enough to allow for the second element of the hostile work environment standard to be met,” concluded the court.

Moreover, there was no evidence suggesting that the statements interfered with her work performance or injected any hostility or abuse into the work environment. Thus, the isolated remark was not sufficiently severe, nor was it pervasive. In sum, the court found that the matter “is the unfortunate case of an isolated offensive comment over an employee’s seven years of employment that does not rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment.”

No inference of bias. The employee also failed to show that her termination occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. Though she argued that she was treated less favorably than the coworker who made the racial slur, the coworker was not a suitable comparator. While they reported to the same supervisor, held similar job responsibilities, and were subjected to similar standards, the actions leading to their respective punishments for their conduct were not sufficiently similar enough.

If the employee had been fired solely because of the use of the word “bullsh*t,” the coworker who made the racial slur “would be a perfect comparator.” However, the employee’s record also indicated multiple additional infractions based on job performance and insubordination, while the coworker’s record did not. Ultimately, they may have been similarly situated in their job titles and roles, but their conduct was not similar enough to say that they were materially similarly situated and treated differently.

No evidence of pretext. The employee also failed to present any evidence suggesting pretext. Though she argued that her termination was in direct conflict with the county’s own policies, the disciplinary policy plainly allowed for termination upon a singular incident of insubordination. Moreover, while the timing of events was short in duration, timing itself did not alone rebut the adequacy of the evidence supporting termination.

Retaliation claims also fails. While the court found that the short temporal proximity was sufficient to establish causation for purposes of the employee’s prima facie case of retaliation, that claim similarly failed at the pretext stage. She pointed only to the suspicious timing and the fact that the coworker was not fired for use of a racial slur. Yet she failed to fully address the incidents demonstrating insubordination, and the coworker was not similarly situated since she lacked any of the reports of insubordination. “That one was only reprimanded and the other fired cannot serve as the basis to find that discrimination or retaliation was the determinative cause of the termination when the reported misconduct is just of a different nature and kind,” concluded the court.

Aiding and abetting claim tossed. Because the county had not violated state or federal law, the court held that employee’s claims for individual liability under the PHRA also necessarily failed.

The case is No. 4:21-CV-00883.

Judge: Brann, M.

Attorneys: Nathaniel N. Peckham (Freundlich & Littman) for Ruth Charles. J. Michael Wiley (McCormick Law Firm) for County of Lycoming, Pennsylvania, Ryan Gardner and Lisa DiMassimo.

Companies: County of Lycoming, Pennsylvania

Cases: RaceDiscrimination Discrimination Discharge StateLawClaims PennsylvaniaNews