Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—DISABILITY—8th Cir.: Court upholds hospital’s termination of physician assistant who could not work required shifts, (Jan 6, 2026)

By Tulay Turan, J.D.

Reassignment was not a reasonable accommodation where there was no vacant alternative position.

Affirming a district court’s grant of summary judgment in a hospital’s favor on a physician assistant’s state and federal disability discrimination claims, the Eighth Circuit ruled that working three 24-hour shifts per pay period and weekend shifts were essential functions of her position that she could not perform. She also failed to identify any reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform these essential functions. In addition, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her FMLA retaliation claim because there was no causal connection between her leave and termination (Siebrecht v. Mercy Health Services—Iowa Corp. dba MercyOne Siouxland Medical Center, No. 24-3159 (8th Cir. Jan. 5, 2026)).

The employee, who had multiple sclerosis, worked as a physician assistant in the emergency room at Mercy’s facility in Hawarden, Iowa. During the relevant time, Mercy usually staffed the ER with four providers, which it referred to as advance practice providers. APPs were required to work three 24-hour shifts and weekends.

Employment contracts. APPs worked under employment contracts that provided that at the end of the initial term, the hospital and providers could extend the contract by written agreement. Otherwise, the contracts would continue month to month for up to 90 days. This 90-day period was known as the Temporary Renewal Period. If no extension agreement was reached during that period, the contract terminated after either 30 days’ written notice or the end of the TRP.

FMLA leave. Due to her MS, the employee took FMLA leave from June 3, 2021, to August 1, 2021. She also took FMLA leave from January 31, 2022, to March 14, 2022.

Renewal of contract. The employee’s contract was set to expire on February 28, 2022. About a month prior to that date, the CEO at the Hawarden facility presented her with a proposed contract extension. She declined the offer and never made a counteroffer. Neither party ever raised the issue of negotiating a new contract with the other.

Accommodations. While still on her second leave, the employee’s doctor evaluated her and cleared her to return to work by the middle of March. He limited her to no more than one 24-hour shift per week and no weekend shifts. The employee’s doctor informed Mercy that her restrictions were expected to last through December 31, 2022. An HR specialist at Mercy stated the hospital could accommodate her restrictions but could not confirm that the accommodation could be made through that date.

Termination. In April 2022, Mercy decided to terminate the employee’s employment. The Hawarden facility CEO emailed a Mercy executive that the one 24-hour shift was not working out. Mercy notified the employee via a written letter, which stated that because the parties had not renewed her employment contract, her employment was terminated effective May 30, 2022, the day after her TRP would end.

Lower court proceedings. The employee filed a lawsuit against Mercy in Iowa state court alleging violations of the ADA, the Iowa Civil Rights Act, and the FMLA. She claimed Mercy discriminated against her because of her disability and retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave.

Mercy removed the case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. The district court granted summary judgment in Mercy’s favor on all claims. The employee filed this appeal.

Qualified individual. Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Mercy’s favor on the employee’s disability discrimination claims, the court found the district court correctly concluded she was not a qualified individual because she could not perform the essential functions of her job. The appeals court first affirmed the district court’s conclusion that working three 24-hour shifts per pay period and weekend shifts were essential functions of the employee’s position.

The court then turned to whether she could have worked the shifts with reasonable accommodation. It found that she could not. She argued that a reduced work schedule constituted reasonable accommodation. However, because the ability to work three 24-hour shifts and weekend shifts were essential job functions, the court found the inability to work those shifts prevented performance of those essential functions.

Reassignment. Likewise, the employee failed to meet her burden of establishing that reassignment to a new position was a reasonable accommodation. She did not identify an alternative position that was vacant during the relevant period. “The absence of an available position forecloses reassignment to an alternative position,” the court wrote. Thus, there was no genuine dispute about whether reassignment would have been a reasonable accommodation.

Interactive process. The court also found there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding Mercy’s actions with respect to the interactive process. Even assuming Mercy failed to make a good-faith effort to assist the employee in seeking accommodation, she had not met her burden of showing that she could have been reasonably accommodated but for Mercy’s lack of good-faith effort. As previously discussed, she failed to identify any reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform the essential functions of her job.

Retaliation claim. Turning to the employee’s FMLA retaliation claim, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Mercy’s favor because there was no causal connection between her leave and Mercy’s termination of her employment.

To show causation, which was the only element of her prima facie case that was in dispute, the employee relied on the Hawarden CEO’s deposition testimony. He testified that he believed her employment should be terminated because of her “unreliability” and referred to the “blocks of situations.” She argued the “blocks of situations” were the two times that she took FMLA leave. Thus, she contended the CEO believed that she was unreliable because she took leave twice.

The court found the employee unreasonably construed the CEO’s testimony. The CEO’s reference to “blocks of situations” made no statement that her FMLA use played a role in her termination. It was the medical restrictions following the FMLA leave that prevented her from fulfilling the job requirement of 24-hour shifts. The CEO’s testimony made clear that when he said she was unreliable, he was only referring to her restriction on 24-hour shifts. He did not reference FMLA leave in connection with her unreliability. “Considering the CEO’s testimony in the context of his entire deposition makes clear that his comments about [the employee’s] unreliability were unrelated to his comments about ‘blocks of situations,’” the court wrote.

No pretext. Finally, the court concluded that even if it were to find she established a prima facie FMLA retaliation claim, she did not carry her burden to show that Mercy’s reason for terminating her employment was pretext for discrimination. The court rejected her argument that Mercy used her inability to perform the essential functions of her job as a pretext for her termination. She asserted that Mercy previously gave a different reason for her termination, namely, the expiration of her employment contract.

Although having multiple reasons for termination may be indicative of pretext, particularly if the reasons are contradictory, the court found that was not the case here. Mercy could have terminated her employment for her inability to perform the essential functions of her job and because her employment contract expired. The inability to perform work functions and her contract lapsing were not necessarily conflicting reasons, the court said.

Employment contract. In addition, the employee’s employment contract expressly stated that if the parties did not agree to extend the contract, it would terminate after either 30 days’ written notice or at the end of the TRP. Here, the parties did not extend her contract, so Mercy gave her 30 days’ written notice that her contract would be terminated at the end of the TRP.

Not similarly situated. The court also rejected the employee’s argument that Mercy’s decision to terminate her employment after her TRP expired created an inference of pretext because Mercy did not terminate another APP’s employment after that employee’s TRP expired. The employee, the court said, failed to show the other APP, who signed a new contract after her TRP expired, was similarly situated to her in all relevant respects. The employee did not show that the other APP made no counteroffer to Mercy’s proposed contract extension or allowed her TRP to expire. Rather, the other APP verbally accepted Mercy’s proposed contract extension before her TRP expired. “These are distinguishing circumstances that make the other APP an inapposite comparator,” the court wrote.

Thus, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in Mercy’s favor on all claims.

The case is No. 24-3159.

Judge: Smith, L.

Attorneys: Melissa Hasso (Hasso & Wilson Law Firm) for Michelle Siebrecht. Kelsey J. Knowles (Belin McCormick) for Mercy Health Services - Iowa Corp. dba MercyOne Siouxland Medical Center.

Companies: Mercy Health Services - Iowa Corp.; MercyOne Siouxland Medical Center

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