Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RACE—6th Cir.: African-American truck drivers, subjected to racial epithets, revive hostile work environment claims, (Sep 26, 2025)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

They were repeatedly subjected to the terms “monkey” and “monkey ass,” which the court noted had an extensive history as a racial slur against African-Americans.

Reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment against the Title VII and Section 1981 hostile work environment claims asserted by two African-American truck drivers, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court’s determination that the drivers’ testimony about the use of racial pejoratives did not constitute evidence of race-specific and derogatory terms to be “plainly incorrect.” It further found that the district court erred when it mused that the drivers had failed to prove their prima facie case in part because their proffered comparators were identified as merely “white,” which the district determined was not necessarily synonymous with “non-African-American,” effectively imposing a heightened burden beyond what Title VII and Section 1981 requires (Smith v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc., No. 24-5549 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025)).

The plaintiffs in this case worked as truck drivers for a transportation company out of its Nashville, Tennessee location.

Disparate treatment. According to the drivers, the employer required them to work more hours than their non-African-American counterparts for the same pay.

Pejorative comments. In addition, the drivers asserted that their supervisors often targeted them with pejorative remarks, frequently using the terms “monkey” and “monkey ass.” This was accompanied by other forms of negative treatment, including criticisms, threats, and screaming. The drivers did not hear about or witness non-African-American employees receiving similar treatment.

One of the drivers voluntarily resigned his position and left in good standing, while the other was eventually terminated.

Lawsuit. Subsequently, the employees filed this lawsuit. One driver initially asserted claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, Section 1981, and state law. The other driver brought his claims under Section 1981 only.

Ultimately, the district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on all of the drivers’ claims. On appeal, they challenged only the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to their hostile work environment claims.

Racial epithets. First, the court addressed the drivers’ testimony that their supervisors called them “monkey” and “monkey ass.” The lower court held that the use of these terms did not constitute evidence of racial harassment, finding that they were not plainly racist and any conclusion that they were used in a racially motivated manner “can be drawn—if at all—only by inference.” The lower court further held that the drivers failed to point to any evidence tending to show that their supervisors used the terms only to refer to African-American employees, and that any potential racism attached the terms was diminished by the fact that one of the alleged perpetrators was African-American himself.

History as a slur. Here, the court explained that the term “monkey” has an extensive history as a racial slur used against African-Americans, noting that other circuits have been forthright about the term’s racial valence. Consequently, other circuits, along with the Sixth Circuit, have overwhelmingly held that the use of the term “monkey” against an African-American employee constitutes evidence of race-based harassment sufficient to support a hostile work environment claim.

In holding otherwise, in part on the ground that the terms’ racist nature “can be drawn only by inference,” the district court misread Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, explained the court, noting that it had previously stated that a “plaintiff may prove that harassment was based on race” by pointing to “direct evidence of the use of race-specific and derogatory terms.” Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2011).

“The term ‘monkey’ and its derivatives, while not overtly racial in isolation, have a long and well-understood history as racial slurs when directed at African Americans,” said the court. Here, two African-American employees testified that their supervisors directly and repeatedly referred to them by this term, and the use of these terms in that context raised a reasonable inference of discrimination on the basis of race. Thus, the district court was “plainly incorrect” in holding otherwise.

African-American supervisor. As to the district court’s assertion that the racist nature of the terms was minimized because one of the supervisors was African-American, the court here observed that it has previously recognized that Title VII can be violated by members of the same race, and on the record before it could see no reason why the supervisor’s race undermines the conclusion that a reasonable jury could find his use of the terms derogatory.

Other employees. Further, the drivers were not required to adduce evidence tending to show that the supervisors used the terms only to refer to African-American employees, as the district court had suggested. The drivers testified that the supervisors directly called them the terms in question and nothing in the record indicated that non-African-American employees were subject to the same language. As such, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they experienced racial harassment.

Comparators’ race. Next, the court considered the drivers’ comparably unfavorable treatment. The district court had rejected this evidence at the outset, deeming it inadequate as a matter of law. The district court mused that the drivers had failed to prove their prima facie case in part because their identified comparators were merely “white,” which it determined “is not synonymous” with “non-African American.” The district court cited no caselaw or other legal authorities supporting its reasoning or these requirements.

“This reasoning is deeply flawed,” said the court here, noting that courts have often used “African-American” and “Black” interchangeably and compared “African-Americans” with “whites.” Further, caselaw reflects the basic reality that color-based language denotes race in common parlance.

Although the district court had attempted to justify its additional evidentiary requirements by pointing to Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on skin color, reasoning that “discrimination based on color is distinct from discrimination based on race,” that distinction does not obviate well-established caselaw recognizing “Black” and “white” as racial identities, explained the court. By relying on this narrow conception of racial identity, “unadorned by legal precedent,” the district court effectively imposed a heightened burden beyond what Title VII and Section 1981 require, said the court, finding that the district court erred by disregarding the drivers’ comparative evidence based on its own narrow conception of racial identity.

Verbal mistreatment. Turning to the substance of the comparative evidence, the court began with the alleged verbal mistreatment of the drivers. One of the drivers testified that he consistently overheard one of the supervisors speak to non-African-American drivers in a “more professional” manner. This testimony was grounded in the driver’s personal interactions and observations, rendering it admissible under FRE 602, and based on that testimony a reasonable jury could find the supervisor subjected the drivers to verbal abuse while sparing non-African-Americans from similar treatment.

In addition, the supervisors’ alleged criticisms, cursing, threats, and shouting must be considered in conjunction with their purported use of racial slurs, explained the court. Given the alleged use of racial slurs, a reasonable jury could infer that the accompanying verbal abuse by both supervisors was, in fact, also racially motivated, without regard to the drivers’ testimony that non-African-American employees received more favorable treatment. This alleged verbal abuse constituted an additional piece of evidence of racial harassment, and the district court erred in rejecting it, said the court.

Employment-related actions. With regard to the drivers’ assertions that they experienced unfavorable employment-related actions, including working longer hours for the same pay and being assigned to more damaged vehicles, the court found that such discrete acts may be considered as part of a hostile-work-environment claim.

The district court’s determination that one of the driver’s allegations of unfair treatment was “plainly contradicted” by other portions of his testimony was “inaccurate,” said the court. Specifically, the district court saw an apparent discrepancy between the driver’s concession that he was not “sure” whether all drivers at his job were paid the same and his testimony that other, non-African-American drivers told him they were paid the same as him despite doing less work.

These two portions of testimony are not clearly contradictory, explained the court. The driver could retain some uncertainty about his colleagues’ exact pay, even if certain coworkers indicated to him that they made the same amount of money despite working fewer hours. By disregarding the driver’s testimony on this basis, the district court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the drivers. As such, the drivers had adduced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on this issue.

Severe and pervasive. Having established the second and third elements of their prima facie case, the court directed its attention to whether the alleged racial harassment was severe or pervasive. Answering this question in the affirmative, the court noted that one needs to consider the work environment as a whole, and in refusing to consider the use of slurs in conjunction with the accompanying verbal abuse, the district court relied on an incomplete picture of the harassment the drivers allegedly experienced. Thus, the district court erred in concluding the racial harassment was insufficiently severe or pervasive.

Liability. Finally, the court addressed the question of employer liability. Rejecting the employer’s affirmative defense that it was not responsible for the actions of the supervisors, the court noted that although it provided employees copies of its anti-discrimination and harassment policy, it failed to make any argument that this policy was, in fact, effective.

Based on the foregoing, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The case is No. 24-5549.

Judge: Stranch, J.

Attorneys: Douglas B. Janney, III (Law Office of Douglas B. Janney III) for Thomas Michael Smith and Monaleto Sneed. Morris Reid Estes, Jr. (Dickinson Wright) for P.A.M. Transport, Inc.

Companies: P.A.M. Transport, Inc.

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