Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—PAY—6th Cir.: School psychologist, offered less pay than male colleague, did not establish discrimination, (Apr 3, 2025)

By Ronald Miller, J.D.

The director testified it was all he could do to squeeze $60,000 out of the annual budget to create the fifth psychologist position for which the employee applied.

Budget constraints and market forces each provide an independent basis to uphold a jury’s verdict that a school district offered a female school psychologist less money than a male counterpart for legitimate reasons having nothing to do with her sex, ruled the Six Circuit. Accordingly, the school district’s affirmative defense, that it offered the employee less money for a reason other than sex, survived the employee’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The appeals court also concluded that a magistrate judge presented the jury with a general verdict on her retaliation claims and a general verdict with interrogatories on her discrimination claims and concluded that the jury’s answers to the interrogatories on the discrimination claims were consistent with each other but inconsistent with the general verdict. Despite rejecting the magistrate’s classification of these verdicts as special verdicts, the court determined that he properly reconciled the verdicts by throwing out the award of damages and finding for the school district on all the claims. Judge Griffin filed a separate concurring opinion (Debity v. Monroe County Board of Education, No. 24-5137 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025)).

School psychologist position. The employee was a longtime, tenured educator for the school district. In 2018, she entered a postgraduate program to become a school psychologist while continuing to work full-time for the school district. In 2020, she interned for the district as part of her postgraduate program. Upon graduation, however, she learned that the district already had its four full-time psychologist roles filled. Nevertheless, an executive director was able to add a fifth position, and the employee applied for the new school psychologist position.

The only male employee employed in a school psychologist position had negotiated a higher salary when he was hired commensurate with his five years of experience working in a different capacity in the district. Like the employee, he applied to for the position after completing an internship with the district. Similarly, he had no other experience as a school a school psychologist.

According to the director, the hiring environment changed significantly from 2019 to 2021, when the employee applied. The school district needed four psychologists to meet students’ needs. When the male employee was hired, the district was “desperate” to hire a school psychologist. By contrast, in 2021, the district already had four full-time psychologists on staff. The director testified it was all he could do to squeeze $60,000 out of the annual budget to create the fifth psychologist position for which the employee applied.

On May 13, 2021, the director offered the employee the new school psychologist position, but they failed to agree on the salary. The employee had received competing offers from other school districts. The employee requested a starting salary, comparable to the male employee’s starting salary. On May 26, the superintendent made the employee a final offer of $61,077.56. Thereafter, the employee accepted a $64,000 offer from another school district.

Equal pay claim. The employee brought claims against an employer for sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA), Title VII, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). The employee alleged that the employer offered her a lower salary than it had paid a male employee for the same job two years earlier. According to the employee, when she asked for the same salary as her male counterpart, the employer withdrew her job offer in retaliation.

Jury verdict. Following a jury trial, the jury found that the school district did offer the employee less money for equal work, but for legitimate reasons having nothing to do with her sex. It also found that the Board did not retaliate against the employee. Based on these findings, she had no claim to damages. Nevertheless, the jury awarded the employee slightly more than $195.000.

After the jury was dismissed, a magistrate judge explained that there was an inconsistency in the stipulated verdict form. The employee filed motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial due to the inconsistent verdict. The magistrate judge denied these motions.

On appeal, the employee asked for a new trial under Rule 49(b)(4). She also moved for judgment as a matter of law on the Board’s affirmative defense, which applies to the discrimination claims only.

Verdict forms. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide three types of verdicts: general verdicts, special verdicts, and general verdicts with interrogatories. Each iteration gives the judge distinct responsibilities. The magistrate judge ruled that she presented only special verdicts to the jury. If so, then the court had discretion to reconcile inconsistent verdicts per Rule 49(a). However, the employee argued that verdicts fall under Rule 49(b)(4). If she is correct, the magistrate judge had no discretion to reconcile inconsistencies and should have ordered a new trial. Therefore, it matters how the appeals court classifies the verdicts.

A court asks for a general verdict when it asks the jury to declare the ultimate result of a claim. A court asks a jury to find a special verdict or interrogatory in scenarios short of that, like when the court poses questions of evidentiary or ultimate fact. And when the judge only asks for answers to questions, we call them special verdicts.

General verdict. Here, the appeals court determined that the magistrate judge called for a general verdict on each of discrimination and retaliation. The jury instructions here were written to be paired with general verdicts.

The appeals court noted that it was obvious that the general verdict conflicted with the interrogatories. By awarding damages, the jury found in the employee’s favor on its general verdict.

Discrimination questions. Because the Sixth Circuit held that the district court asked the jury for general verdicts on both the discrimination and retaliation claims, it analyzed whether the court asked for general verdicts only or general verdicts with interrogatories per Rule 49(b) for each of discrimination and retaliation.

The magistrate erroneously classified these verdicts as special verdicts. Despite classifying these verdicts differently than the magistrate, the appeals court nevertheless affirmed the judgment on the discrimination claims.

Retaliation question. Next, the appeals court addressed whether a question was an interrogatory or part of a general verdict. The appeals court held that the question was part of the general verdict because question asked the jury to declare the winner of the claim in whole. Properly understood, this question asks the jury to decide the retaliation question in whole—the mark of a general verdict.

Affirmative defenses. With regard to the employee’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the question of whether the school district made a successful affirmative defense to the discrimination claims, the appeals court affirmed the magistrate’s denial of the motion because a reasonable juror could find that the school district offered her a lower salary than her male counterpart’s for a reason other than sex.

The director pointed to two reasons for offering the employee less than her male colleague: budget constraints and a different supply and demand for the times in which they applied for their jobs. Finding that either of these was a legitimate business reason to offer employee less than her male colleague, the appeals court determined that either was sufficient to uphold the jury’s verdict.

Concurrence. Judge Griffin concurred in the judgment of the court, not because the jury rendered a general verdict that was inconsistent with interrogatories, but because the magistrate appropriately reconciled the jury’s special verdicts under Rule 49(a).

The case is No. 24-5137.

Judge: Bush, J.

Attorneys: Jesse D. Nelson (Law Offices of Jesse D. Nelson) for Marina Debity. Arthur F. Knight, III (Taylor & Knight) for Monroe County Board of Education.

Companies: Monroe County Board of Education

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