Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—N.D. Ill.: School district employee’s removal from one of two positions not related to age or sex, (May 12, 2025)

By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

The employee failed to provide any evidence of pretext regarding the board’s decision to remove her from her assistant supervisor position.

A school district employee who was hired as a principal and assistant superintendent but later removed from the assistant superintendent role, purportedly because of her undermining behavior among other things, failed to show her removal was based on her gender or age, a federal district court in Illinois ruled. Nor was she able to show the lesser principal salary she was offered was based on discriminatory animus, said the court, granting summary judgment against her Title VII and ADEA claims (Baker v. Board of Education of Lyons Elementary School District 103, No. 23 C 4645 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2025)).

Rehired. Less than three years after she was hired as district superintendent, the employee resigned for unrelated “political reasons.” A few years later, she returned to the district and was rehired, under a two-year contract, as a middle school principal and an assistant superintendent, a position created specifically for her, at a salary of $135,000.

Performance concerns. Though the employee performed well in her principal role during her first year, there were issues in her second year regarding how she handled a dress code violation with a transgender student and a student bringing a knife to school. Further, after a year in her second role, the superintendent felt she was undermining him and not supporting him.

During her second year, the district received complaints about the employee from parents, teachers, and staff and HR was informed that she had trouble executing initiatives. As a result, the superintendent recommended eliminating her assistant superintendent position at the expiration of her contract. The board agreed and the employee was told she could stay on as a principal at a salary of $104,743. She instead refused and retired at the age of 55. She was replaced in the principal role by a 47-year-old male who also accepted an athletic director position.

Sex discrimination. Addressing the employee’s claim she was subjected to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII when her assistant superintendent role was eliminated and she was offered a non-negotiable principal-only position at a reduced salary, the court assumed she met her prima facie burden and skipped to pretext. Here, the court observed, the board offered a nondiscriminatory reason for eliminating the assistant superintendent position and the employee admitted that after she was rehired, the board received complaints about her in that role, the superintendent felt she undermined him, and her behavior was viewed as detrimental to the district.

Further, said the court, gender was never mentioned as a reason for her nonrenewal. Instead, there was evidence the assistant superintendent position was not working out as expected, the superintendent recommended its elimination, and the board agreed.

Salary difference. In addition, the court stated, the board had nondiscriminatory reasons for paying the employee less in the principal-only contract. She was offered a standard principal contract for the school year at a salary of $104,743, which was based on 206 days of employment. That was less than the employee’s prior contract, which was based on 260 days, because the board had passed a resolution to change all principal contracts to 206 days to save money based on summer down time.

Once again, the court pointed out, gender was not mentioned as a reason for the decreased salary. Instead, her new salary was calculated by taking her daily rate for her prior dual position and applying it to a new 206-day principal-only contract.

Performance. As to the employee’s contention that basing the adverse actions on her performance was pretextual, the court agreed she was told she was performing well as middle school principal after her first year. There was, however, a valid concern about whether she was meeting legitimate expectations for both positions throughout the course of her contract. Though the board pointed to the transgender student dress code violation and the student knife incident, the employee countered that she was never disciplined for these issues or put on a performance improvement plan.

She did not, however, show the board’s reasons were dishonest, said the court, noting abundant evidence regarding her difficulties in performing the assistant superintendent position and her lack of cohesion with the superintendent. There was also evidence that eliminating the assistant superintendent position would save the district money.

Inability to negotiate. And while she also argued that her inability to negotiate the principal-only contract was evidence of pretext, there was no evidence that she was told not to negotiate based on her gender, that she even attempted to negotiate, or that the lesser principal salary was based on discriminatory animus. In fact, the court noted, her contract salary for that school year was in the top quartile of other principal salaries and her speculation of pretext, without any other evidence, was not enough to preclude summary judgment.

Age discrimination. Regarding her claim the board’s actions were based on age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, the court found she failed to raise a genuine dispute that similarly situated individuals not in her protected class received more favorable treatment. She pointed to the individual who replaced her in the principal position but he was only eight years younger than her and thus there was no presumption he was substantially younger.

Nor was there any evidence the assistant superintendent position was eliminated based on her age. As already explained, said the court, the position was eliminated because there was a lack of cooperation between the employee and the superintendent. As to the reduced pay in the principal contract, the evidence showed it was because of the board’s resolution for all principal contracts rather than the employee’s age.

Even had the employee been able to make out a prima facie case, she failed to provide evidence of pretext. There were no statements that could be construed as exhibiting age bias, and she raised no new or additional arguments besides what the court had already addressed in her gender discrimination claim. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment against this claim as well.

The case is No. 23 C 4645.

Judge: Harjani, S.

Attorneys: Diana C. Servos (S.T. Legal Group) for Carol Baker. Karin Anderson (IFMK Law) for Board of Education of Lyons Elementary School District 103, County of Cook and State of Illinois.

Companies: Board of Education of Lyons Elementary School District 103

Cases: Discrimination SexDiscrimination AgeDiscrimination IllinoisNews