Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—DISABILITY—11th Cir.: Appeals court denies epileptic former HHS employee’s request to proceed anonymously, (May 12, 2025)

By George Basharis, J.D.

An epilepsy diagnosis alone does not meet the high bar for anonymous proceedings despite potential stigma concerns.

The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed a district court’s denial of a former Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) employee’s motion to proceed anonymously in her employment discrimination lawsuit. The plaintiff had sought to use a pseudonym to shield her epilepsy diagnosis from public disclosure, arguing that the social stigma associated with the condition warranted privacy protection. In a decision that helps clarify when medical conditions reach the threshold of “utmost intimacy” required for anonymous proceedings, the court found that epilepsy does not qualify for such exceptional treatment (Tessa G. v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, No. 24-11764 (11th Cir. May 8, 2025, unpublished)).

The plaintiff originally filed her complaint against HHS in June 2023, alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, illegal disclosure under the ADA, and denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment. She alleged that she has suffered from several disabilities, including epilepsy, for most of her life. Following surgical intervention that successfully treated her seizures, she earned a law degree and began working for HHS in June 2013.

About a year into her employment, she disclosed her epilepsy diagnosis to request medical leave and inform her supervisor that she required accommodation to be driven to off-site meetings. She alleged that soon after this disclosure, HHS hired someone to replace her, reduced her workload, and ultimately terminated her employment in November 2014. She maintained that following her termination, she had trouble finding new employment and developed several new health conditions.

The plaintiff had previously filed an EEOC complaint against HHS challenging her demotion and termination, and alleging that HHS disparaged her to others in her field. Though an administrative law judge ultimately entered default judgment in her favor, her recovery was limited due to the nature of her fixed-term contract with HHS, prompting her to pursue the current case for additional relief.

Request for anonymity. Along with her complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion to proceed anonymously, requesting to use the same pseudonym as in her EEOC proceeding and asking that filings be redacted to conceal personal identifying information. She argued that her complaint concerned confidential medical information, the disclosure of which had already negatively impacted her professional and personal life.

In her appeal, she contended that the district court erred in denying her motion for three primary reasons: (1) the court failed to consider her evidence of social stigma associated with epilepsy, (2) the court incorrectly found that her epilepsy diagnosis was not information of “utmost intimacy,” and (3) the court failed to evaluate the totality of circumstances demonstrating that her privacy rights outweighed the public interest in open judicial proceedings.

The plaintiff characterized epilepsy as “among the most highly-stigmatized diseases and disabilities,” citing scholarly research and historical 20th-century laws that limited the rights of epileptics. She argued that the social stigma associated with epilepsy was comparable to conditions like HIV and developmental disabilities, for which courts have previously granted anonymity.

Lower court rulings. The magistrate judge who initially reviewed the motion acknowledged that the plaintiff. was challenging a government action, which weighed in favor of anonymity, but noted this factor alone was not determinative. The judge found that while her arguments regarding stigma and confidentiality reflected the “utmost intimacy” factor, the potential embarrassment or diminished job prospects referenced in her motion were insufficient to outweigh the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.

The district court, reviewing her objections, rejected her argument that the magistrate judge failed to employ the proper totality-of-circumstances standard. The court noted that “other than general empirical evidence about stigma associated with epilepsy,” she did not identify any factual circumstances omitted from the analysis.

In affirming the district court’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit applied the abuse of discretion standard, finding that the lower court had not applied the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner. The appellate court explained that it has never held that epilepsy carries a stigma sufficient to warrant anonymity and was “not now persuaded that having epilepsy status is sufficiently sensitive to warrant anonymity.”

The court distinguished epilepsy from HIV, to which the plaintiff repeatedly drew comparison, noting that HIV “differs significantly from epilepsy, as it is a communicable disease, is significantly more likely to be fatal, and can be associated with stigmatized statuses for which courts have permitted parties to proceed anonymously.”

Anonymity analysis. The Eleventh Circuit outlined the framework for evaluating anonymity requests, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a), which requires that complaints name all parties. This rule “protects the public’s legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved, including the identities of the parties” and “creates a strong presumption in favor of parties’ proceeding in their own names.”

To overcome this presumption, a party must show a substantial privacy right that outweighs the presumption of openness. Courts consider several non-exhaustive factors, including whether the plaintiff: (1) challenges government activity; (2) must disclose information of the utmost intimacy; (3) must admit intent to engage in illegal conduct; (4) is a minor; (5) would face threats of violence or physical harm; and (6) whether anonymity poses a unique threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant.

The appellate court emphasized that these factors are not a rigid test, and the presence of one factor is not dispositive. Rather, courts should review all the circumstances of a given case before deciding whether the presumption of disclosure is overcome.

In its analysis, the court acknowledged that disability discrimination suits regularly involve personal medical information and allegations that disclosure led to discrimination. However, the court noted that rather than granting anonymity, courts typically protect sensitive information through redaction, sealed filings, or protective orders while maintaining the plaintiff’s identity in public records.

The Eleventh Circuit also found that the district court properly evaluated the totality of circumstances in concluding that anonymity was unwarranted. While the plaintiff argued that the court should have further evaluated her privacy interests, potential harm from online disclosure of her epilepsy status, and the connection to her EEOC proceeding, the appellate court found that “existing caselaw does not suggest that these are necessary or mandatory considerations.”

The case is No. 24-11764.

Judge: Per curiam.

Attorneys: Tessa G., pro se. Melanie Dyani Hendry, U.S. Department of Justice, for Secretary of Health and Human Services.

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