Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—DISABILITY—M.D. Pa.: Former university secretary’s request to work from home during COVID surge unreasonable, (Jul 8, 2025)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

Her request to work from home was “more akin to a request for an exemption from an essential duty, rather than a request for an accommodation.”

Granting summary judgment against the ADA, PHRA, Rehabilitation Act, and FMLA claims asserted by a former Shippensburg University psychology department secretary, a federal district court in Pennsylvania found that the secretary’s assertion that others could perform her in-person duties to be an unreasonable accommodation, and because her physical absence required various other people to perform those functions, no reasonable jury could conclude that being physically present was not an essential function of her position. As to her FMLA retaliation claim, there was no evidence of a causal link between her request for FMLA leave and her subsequent termination (Sheehan v. Shippensburg University, No. 1:22-CV-1871 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2025)).

Hired in 2018 as the psychology department secretary, the employee’s duties included greeting and interacting with office visitors, handling physical mail, supervising student employees, and data entry.

Flexible work policy. In March 2020, the campus shut down because of the COVID-19 pandemic. All employees were permitted to work remotely. In the fall of 2020, the campus reopened, and students were given the option of attending classes in person or remotely. Employees were also given the option of a flexible work policy, which allowed them to work in person or remotely. The secretary requested and was granted the ability to work remotely until May 2021, at which time the flexible work policy ended.

While working remotely, the secretary could not perform the in-person tasks of her job. Sometimes, student workers would cover those tasks, those duties would simply go unperformed or were covered by other secretaries working overtime.

When the flexible work policy ended in May 2021, the secretary returned to work in person. In the fall of 2021, the entire psychology department also returned to work.

Work from home request. On December 15, 2021, the secretary requested that she again be allowed to work from home due to a new COVID variant. She was told she would have to apply for an accommodation under the ADA.

ADA request. According to the secretary’s accommodation request form, she suffered from a condition that affected her cardiovascular and digestive systems, and that if she were to contract COVID her life would be endangered due to her high risk of complications. A note provided by her doctor stated essentially the same thing.

While engaging in the ADA process, the secretary also inquired about using FMLA leave, among other options. In response to this inquiry, the director of HR advised her that “[c]oncern of contracting Covid is not a disability under the ADA which would require the university to accommodate your work from home request.” The HR director went on to suggest plexiglass barriers around the secretary’s work station and that because her job was student facing, remote work might not be an option. The secretary rejected the offer of barriers and completed a request for FMLA leave on January 3, 2022.

Requests denied. On January 10, the secretary’s ADA request was denied, and her FMLA leave request was denied the following day. She was directed to return to work on January 18. She did not do so. Her employment was terminated the following month and this lawsuit followed.

Reasonable accommodations? First addressing the secretary’s ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and PHRA claims, the court only considered whether the secretary’s requested accommodation was reasonable, as this was dispositive of her claims.

According to the university, the secretary’s suggested accommodation of working from home while others covered certain in person duties was unreasonable on its face because being present in person was an essential job function. The secretary argued that the in person components of her job were not “essential” and thus her requested accommodation was reasonable.

Essential function. Turning to the question of whether being present in person was an essential job function, the court looked to the secretary’s job description. Although there was no specification in the description as to what would be considered “essential,” it did outline several in person functions, including screening visitors and phone calls, and collecting keys from faculty and staff.

In addition, the secretary’s supervisor testified that the secretary was “the focal point of the office” and completed various in person tasks such as directing students and visitors and posting flyers and notes on office doors.

There was some debate over how much time the secretary spent performing these various tasks. She approximated that these tasks took no more than four hours, while the university contended that this was only the amount of time it would take to post flyers.

Opinions and conclusions. Taking all of the factors into consideration, the court determined that no reasonable jury could find that being present in the office was not an essential function of the secretary’s job. The secretary’s evidentiary support for her argument that this was not an essential function consisted of her opinion that she successfully fulfilled her job remotely and her conclusion as to how much time she spent performing certain in person tasks.

“At this juncture, a plaintiff must provide more than her own opinions and conclusions, but rather, must provide evidentiary support,” said the court.

For its part, the university presented evidence that the secretary was the focal point of the office and her physical absence required other people to fulfill those functions. Based on this evidence and not mere unsupported conclusions, no reasonable jury could conclude that being physically present was not an essential function of the position, explained the court. Thus, her proposed accommodation of having others cover her in person tasks was not reasonable because it required making accommodations for an essential function of her position, said the court. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate against her disability discrimination claims.

FMLA retaliation. Next, the court considered the secretary’s FMLA retaliation claim. Here, the court found that she had failed to produce evidence showing that her termination was causally linked to her request for FMLA leave.

The temporal proximity between her leave request and subsequent termination was about one month, observed the court, which was not unusually suggestive. Further, there was no evidence suggesting a pattern of antagonism or any other discriminatory purpose in the termination of the secretary’s employment. The secretary pointed to one email chain in which HR personnel expressed frustration in the context of her request for ADA leave and questions regarding her use of annual leave. However, these emails occurred prior to the request for FMLA leave and could not be said to be discriminatory against the secretary for requesting FMLA leave. As such, summary judgment was granted against this claim.

The case is No. 1:22-CV-1871.

Judge: Wilson, J.

Attorneys: Jason Eric Piatt (Law Offices of Jason Eric Piatt) for Ann V. Sheehan. Francis H. Pryzbylkowski, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, for Shippensburg University.

Cases: Discrimination DisabilityDiscrimination Discharge EmployeeLeave PublicEmployees Retaliation Covid19 PennsylvaniaNews