Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—6th Cir.: New trial denied in sexual and racial harassment suit, (Apr 11, 2025)

By Thomas K. Lauletta, J.D.

The district court dismissal of the Ford Motor Company employee’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim was also affirmed.

Affirming a district court’s decision denying a Ford Motor Company’s employee motion for a new trial and dismissal of the employee’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, the Sixth Circuit held that the jury verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence sufficient to grant a new trial. The employee’s quid pro quo harassment claim failed because she did not meet the requirements of proof under Michigan law (Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 24-1550 (6th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025)).

The plaintiff is an African-American woman who was hired by Ford in June 2018 as a process coach at Ford’s Dearborn Truck Plant. While working in her position, she reported to a senior process coach who reported to a team manager. In July 2018, the team manager assigned the employee to train with a coworker.

Unwanted advances. According to the employee, the coworker made unwanted and inappropriate sexual advances toward her. These advances, made verbally and by text messages, also contained offensive racial comments, and demanded pictures of the employee’s breasts and vagina. She testified that she reported the coworker’s inappropriate sexual comments to the senior process coach and team manager within two weeks of first shadowing the coworker. However, there was no written evidence showing that she had made these complaints and both supervisors denied knowledge of the coworker’s alleged misconduct.

Sexual assault. In November 2018, the employee alleged that the coworker sexually assaulted her by pushing his hand down her shirt and grabbing her breast. When this allegation was brought to the attention of the Human Resources department, an investigation led to the termination of the coworker.

Lawsuit. Subsequently, the employee sued Ford, alleging: (1) sexual harassment/quid pro quo and hostile work environment under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act; (2) racial harassment/racially hostile work under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and (3) sexual assault and battery. The district court granted Ford’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the racial harassment claim, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, and struck portions of the employee’s declaration. The Sixth Circuit (in “Johnson I”)”) found that the district court abused its discretion in striking the employee’s declaration and erred in granting summary judgment on the racial harassment claims.

The employee’s second amended complaint included the dismissed state-law claims. The district court thereafter granted Ford’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the employee’s quid pro quo harassment, sexual assault, and battery claims, but denied the motion with respect to the sexual and racial harassment/hostile work environment claims. The case proceeded to trial and on September 25, 2023, the jury found in Ford’s favor. The district court denied the employee’s subsequent motion for a new trial and this appeal followed.

Appeal for new trial. First, the court noted that it could set aside a jury verdict and grant a new trial only if it determined that the verdict was “against the clear weight of the evidence.” A trial court reviewing a motion for a new trial could act in the role of a “thirteenth juror,” and could consider the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In contrast, an appellate court’s review of a district court ruling is limited to determining if the district court had committed a “clear error of judgment.”

Sexual harassment claims. Both the employee and Ford agreed that the employee’s sexual harassment claims turned on a finding of Ford’s responsibility for the hostile work environment. To show this, the district court’s jury instructions stated that Ford must have had adequate notice that the employee was subjected to sexual harassment. The jury was instructed that the employee had to “prove that she made a report of sexual harassment to someone in higher management—meaning someone with actual authority to effectuate change in the workplace with respect to hiring, firing, and disciplining the offending employee.” Finding in favor of Ford on this claim indicated that the jury believed that Ford had no actual notice of the alleged conduct.

The court noted that the jury verdict turned on its judgment of whether it believed the employee’s or Ford’s side of the story. The role of the appellate court is not to substitute its view of the evidence, only to determine if the district court committed a clear error of judgment. Concluding that the district court had not committed such an error, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial with respect to the sexual harassment claim.

Racial harassment claims. Similar to the sexual harassment claim, proof of the racial harassment claim required the showing that Ford had adequate notice that the employee was subjected to racial harassment. In finding for Ford on this claim, the jury accepted its argument that it did not have such notice. The court concluded that it could not be said that the jury’s determination was against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial with respect to the racial harassment claims.

Motion to amend complaint. In her second appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the employee now appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to amend her complaint to add a new claim for retaliatory termination. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the law-of-the-case doctrine bars challenges to a decision made at a previous stage of the litigation which could have been challenged in a prior appeal but were not. The employee’s effort to overturn this ruling is based on the appellate court’s first decision in this case (Johnson I).

In her second appeal, the court noted that when it considered the employee’s first appeal it did not discuss the retaliatory termination claim because the plaintiff did not raise the issue in her brief on appeal. Stating that the findings in Johnson I did not apply to the instant determination and that there was no reason why the employee could not have raised this issue in her first appeal, the court ruled that the employee’s current effort to overturn the district court action was procedurally barred.

Quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. As to the district court’s grant of summary judgment against her quit pro quo sexual harassment claim, the appellate court noted that to prove a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment under Michigan law, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that she was subject to any of the types of unwelcome sexual conduct or communication described in the statute, and (2) that her employer or the employer’s agent used her submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as a factor in a decision affecting her employment.” With respect to the second element, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that an employer’s agent “is limited to persons with supervisory powers.”

The appellate court examined whether the coworker was Ford’s agent who had supervisory powers over the employee, and whether the coworker’s advances played a role in a decision affecting her employment. The court determined that the employee’s arguments in this regard were unavailing. She did not present evidence showing that there was either a decision concerning her employment or that such a decision was tied to her rejection of the sexual advances. Further, the court seemed unconvinced that the coworker being the employee’s trainer meant that he had supervisory powers over her.

Law of the case. The employee argued that in granting summary judgment on the quid pro quo harassment claim, the district court violated the law-of-the-case doctrine. The employee noted that the district court had allowed her to add the quid pro quo harassment claim, finding that the claim was not futile. In doing so, the employee contended that the district court’s review converted its analysis into a summary judgment determination.

Rejecting this argument, the court stated that in evaluating whether the employee’s claim was futile, the district court did not apply the summary judgment standard, but rather the Federal Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Accordingly, the law-of-the-case doctrine was inapplicable, and the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper.

The case is No. 24-1550.

Judge: Clay, E.

Attorneys: Carol Laughbaum (Sterling Employment Law) for DeAnna Johnson. Elizabeth Phelps Hardy (Kienbaum Hardy Viviano Pelton & Forrest) for Ford Motor Co.

Companies: Ford Motor Co.

Cases: Discrimination RaceDiscrimination SexualHarassment Procedure StateLawClaims KentuckyNews MichiganNews OhioNews TennesseeNews