Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCHARGE—M.D. Ga.: Probationary security guard fired for performance issues day after seeking time off for anxiety advances ADA claims, (Apr 24, 2025)

By Marjorie Johnson, J.D.

While the suspicious timing supported her ADA claims, there was no evidence suggesting the proffered reasons for her discharge were pretext for sex or religious discrimination.

A female security guard fired during her probationary period ostensibly due to a myriad of undisputed performance issues failed to survive summary judgment on her Title VII claims of sex and religious discrimination since the employer undisputedly granted her religious accommodation request and there was no evidence that she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated comparator or that the alleged reason for her firing was pretextual. However, while her retaliation claim also failed, a federal court in Georgia held that a jury would decide whether the employer violated the ADA by terminating her the day after she disclosed to her supervisor that she suffered from anxiety and sought a temporary leave of absence (Eason v. Master Security Company, LLC, No. 5:23-cv-00461-MTT (M.D. Ga. Apr. 17, 2025)).

Probationary status. On October 25, 2021, the employer hired the employee as a security guard. Pursuant to the employee handbook, all new hires served a 120-day probation period, during which time they could be “terminated immediately” if they were “unable to adapt successfully to the requirements of the position, the department, or the Company as a whole.”

Upon hire, she signed a pre-hire “Voluntary Self-Identification of Disability Form” where she checked a box indicating that she did not have a disability and wrote “none” when asked if she needed accommodations. However, she testified that she was diagnosed with PTSD around 2011.

She also requested not to work on Sundays and Wednesday nights after 6:30 p.m. because of church, and the employer granted her request and did not schedule her for those days.

EEO inquiry. At some point, her male cousin allegedly told her he was getting paid more than she. On November 24, she submitted an initial inquiry to the EEOC citing race, sex, and religion as reasons for her claim. On the inquiry, she wrote “I do not have a disability.”

Performance issues. The employee did not dispute that throughout her employment, she was frequently tardy, absent, abandoned post, failed to properly patrol, failed to follow call out protocol, failed to make proper rounds, and took excessive smoke breaks in violation of company policies.

Fired day after text message. On December 9, she sent a text message to her supervisor that stated in relevant part: “Hey, I need to take a couple weeks for my mental health. My anxiety has started attacking a lot since working at the Security company. I'm not a confrontational person so even this is hard for me, but I would like the pay that you all start at which is $14 per hr, and my hours that I was guaranteed upon hire without Sundays… If you could let me know your answers on these matters at your earliest convenience that would be great.” The employer fired her the next day.

No bias as to shift assignments. The employee alleged that the employer engaged in sex and religious discrimination when it “took away” her Thursday shift and gave it to her cousin so that he could work more hours. However, she failed to cite to any evidence that any comparator—including the cousin—was similarly situated to her in terms of poor job performance.

Moreover, the alleged reassignment of shifts did not constitute an adverse action since she did not claim her hours were reduced as a result of the reassignment. The mere fact that she was not assigned to work Thursdays was not evidence of that she was subjected to a “disadvantageous” change in the terms or conditions of employment, particularly because there was no evidence that, during her short tenure, she was entitled to work, or could reasonably expect to work, on any particular day of the week. “Shift assignment does not constitute an adverse employment action,” concluded the court.

No pretext. She also failed to present any evidence to suggest that the performance issues identified by her supervisors as the reason for her discharge were a pretext for sex or religious discrimination. Thus, she failed to defeat summary judgment on her claims of sex and religious discrimination related to shift assignments and termination.

Wage discrimination. Her claim that she was paid less than her male cousin also failed since his alleged statement that he received higher pay was contradicted by the employer’s unrefuted payroll records. Moreover, even if he was paid more, she did not attempt to show that he was similarly situated to her in any respect.

Religious discrimination. Her claim that the employer failed to accommodate her religion fared no better. First, she did not dispute that the employer granted her request not to be scheduled to work Sundays or Wednesday nights. And, as discussed, “simply assigning different shifts to different employees without reducing [her] scheduled hours is not an adverse employment action.”

No known protected activity. She also failed to advance her Title VII retaliation claim. First, she failed to refute the employer’s contention that it was unaware of her initial inquiry to the EEOC. Moreover, her text message to her supervisor did not constitute protected activity since, although she claimed the message opposed the employer’s “discriminatory hiring and pay practices based on sex,” she did not mention or even insinuate any form of discrimination.

ADA claims. She also failed to advance her ADA claims insofar as she pointed to her PTSD as a disability since she did not dispute that she failed to disclose her condition when she was hired or when she filed her initial EEOC inquiry. However, a triable issue existed as to whether the employer violated the ADA by firing her immediately after she disclosed to her supervisor that she suffered from anxiety and sought a temporary leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation. Though the employer argued that she “never made a specific request for a reasonable accommodation,” she responded that she never had the chance since she was almost immediately fired. “[G]iven the temporal proximity of [her] last minute anxiety accommodation request and her termination, the court cannot, at this point, say as a matter of law that her ADA claims fail.”

The case is No. 5:23-cv-00461-MTT.

Judge: Treadwell, M.

Attorneys: Michael Devlin Cooper (Cooper Barton & Cooper) for Audrey Eason. Jasmine Chandler (Hall Booth Smith) for Master Security Co. LLC.

Companies: Master Security Co. LLC

Cases: Discharge Discrimination DisabilityDiscrimination ReligiousDiscrimination SexDiscrimination PayDiscrimination Retaliation GeorgiaNews