Products Liability Law Daily Wrap Up, DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING DEFECTS—MOTOR VEHICLE EQUIPMENT—E.D. La.: Automaker succeeds in dismissing multiple product liability claims in fatal car crash case, (Aug 26, 2024)

By Susan L. Smith, JD, MA

However, the defective design claim will proceed.

A federal district court in Louisiana granted an automobile manufacturer’s request to dismiss claims of negligence, manufacturing defect, inadequate warning, and nonconformity with an express or implied warranty brought by the driver of the manufacturer’s van and the mother of a passenger in the van that was struck by another motorist. The driver and passenger were severely injured while driving in a 2007 Chrysler Town & County Extended Van (van) manufactured by FCA US LLC (FCA). The passenger died from the injuries she sustained when she was ejected from the van after the impact, which allegedly caused the van to spin and flip one and a half times. FCA contended that the women failed to present sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact under their Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) claims. Specifically, the women did not meet their burden to establish any genuine disputes of material fact with respect to their allegations that glass and airbag defects made the van unreasonably dangerous and that the injuries were proximately caused by the unreasonably dangerous characteristics of the vehicle. The court concluded that except for the women’s defective design claim, the women’s claims were either barred by the LPLA or failed to present sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact. The court, however, denied the manufacturer’s request to dismiss the women’s defective design claim (Summers v. FCA US LLC, No. 23-1777 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 2024)).

Background. The driver and the mother of the passenger (women) asserted one claim under the LPLA alleging that the van was defective and unreasonably dangerous because the vehicle’s front and rear side windows were equipped with tempered glass instead of laminated glass (Glass Defect). The women engaged an expert in forensic engineering to provide an engineering analysis regarding the van rollover collision severity, the design of the vehicle’s side windows, and the alternatives FCA could have implemented. The expert’s report raised an additional defect theory premised on the fact that the van was not equipped with rollover activated side curtain airbags (Airbag Defect). The women alleged that the injuries were proximately caused by two characteristics of the van—the Glass Defect and the Airbag Defect—which were unreasonably dangerous as defined by the LPLA in all four ways because of a manufacturing defect, design defect, inadequate warning, and nonconformity to an express warranty.

LPLA. The court explained that the LPLA establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products. The claimant in an LPLA products liability claim has the burden of proving the following elements: (1) the defendant is a manufacturer of the product; (2) the claimant’s damage was proximately caused by a characteristic of the product; (3) this characteristic made the product unreasonably dangerous; and (4) the claimant’s damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or someone else. A product may be unreasonably dangerous within the meaning of the statute in one of four ways: (1) in construction or composition, (2) in design, (3) because of inadequate warning, or (4) because of nonconformity to an express warranty. Whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, and thereby defective, is a question of fact to be made by the factfinder.

Nonconformity, implied warranty, and negligence claims. FCA contended that the women’s negligence claims and claim that the van was unreasonably dangerous due to nonconformity with an implied warranty were barred by the LPLA, which establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products. The LPLA establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products; it does not establish causes of action for negligence or failure to conform to an implied warranty. The court concluded that because the women’s allegations of negligence and nonconformity to an implied warranty failed to state a claim against FCA under the LPLA, FCA was entitled to summary judgment on those claims.

Manufacturing defect. FCA requested that the court dismiss the women’s manufacturing defect claims, arguing that the one-sentence allegation in the women’s petition claiming the van was unreasonably dangerous due to a manufacturing defect was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the women neither showed a specification that was not complied with nor provided any evidence that any manufacturing defect proximately caused the driver and passenger’s injuries. Further, the women only restated the general allegations from their petition that the van was unreasonably dangerous in construction and/or composition.

Under the LPLA, a product is unreasonably dangerous due to a defect in construction or composition if, at the time the product left the manufacturer’s control, the product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer’s specifications or performance standards for the product or from otherwise identical products manufactured by the same manufacturer. A plaintiff is required to prove that a product is defective due to a mistake in the manufacturing process. Because LPLA liability for a manufacturing defect is strict liability, the plaintiff need not show that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the product deviation and could have prevented it. A plaintiff must demonstrate not only what a manufacturer’s specifications or performance standards are for a particular product, but how the product in question materially deviated from those standards so as to render it unreasonably dangerous. The defect may be established by circumstantial evidence.

The court concluded that the women had not identified specific evidence in the record of the manufacturer’s specifications or performance standards; nor had they identified evidence that the van deviated from any particular specification or standard. Both are necessary to prove the product was unreasonably dangerous due to a manufacturing defect. Thus, the court concluded that FCA was entitled to summary judgment on the women’s claims that the van was unreasonably dangerous under the LPLA due to a manufacturing defect.

Express warranty. FCA asked the court to dismiss the women’s claim that the van was unreasonably dangerous due to its nonconformity with an express warranty, stating that the women did not point to evidence of an express warranty made by FCA or any evidence that raised a genuine dispute that the van did not conform with a particular express warranty. The women only restated the general allegations from their petition. Under the LPLA, a product is unreasonably dangerous when it does not conform to an express warranty made at any time by the manufacturer about the product if the express warranty has induced the claimant or another person or entity to use the product and the claimant’s damage was proximately caused because the express warranty was untrue. The Louisiana Supreme Court has emphasized the LPLA makes it clear that for the manufacturer to be liable, there must be a specified stated warranty.

Because the women did not identify specific evidence in the record to create a genuine dispute as to the existence of an express warranty made at any time by FCA as required by Louisiana statutes, the court concluded that FCA was entitled to summary judgment on the women’s claims related to the express warranty.

Defective design. Under the LPLA, a product is defective in design if, at the time it left the manufacturer's control: (1) there existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant’s damage; and (2) the likelihood that the product’s design would cause the claimant’s damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the product. The women claimed that alternative designs existed for both characteristics of the van they alleged were unreasonably dangerous: the Glass Defect and the Airbag Defect. FCA contended the women had not presented through expert testimony an alternative design that would have prevented the injuries in this case, and thus, their LPLA claims failed as a matter of law because there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to the essential element of their design defect claims. The women argued that their burden on summary judgment was not to prove that an alternative design would have prevented ejections or injuries, as asserted by FCA. Instead, they claimed they need only prove that the alternative designs would have significantly reduced the plaintiffs’ damages, which they contended they were able to meet regarding both design defect claims.

The court agreed that the women did not need to prove that an alternative design would have prevented their damages at this stage. The court stated that the women only needed to identify evidence in the record concerning the extent of the risk that the alternative design would have avoided, the economic costs entailed by the accidents, or the extent of the reduction in frequency of the accidents that would have followed on the use of the proposed alternative design. The court stated that the alternative design must be reasonably specific and not based on mere speculation. In this case, the women’s alternative designs existed for both characteristics of the van they alleged were unreasonably dangerous. Further, the women claimed they need only prove that the alternative designs would have significantly reduced the plaintiffs’ damages, not prevented them. The court concluded the women sufficiently identified evidence in the record concerning the extent of the risk the alternative designs would have avoided and the FCA’s financial burden of switching to the alternative designs. The court concluded that FCA did not meet its burden of showing there were no material facts in dispute related to the women’s defective design claim; therefore, it denied FCA’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.

Inadequate warning. Under the LPLA, a product is unreasonably dangerous due to inadequate warning if, at the time the product left its manufacturer’s control, the product possessed a characteristic that may cause damage and the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care to provide an adequate warning of such characteristic and its danger to users and handlers of the product. A court must first determine what risk, if any, the product created. A court must then determine whether a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product. Under a risk-utility analysis, a plaintiff must show evidence concerning the frequency of accidents like his own, the economic costs entailed by those accidents, or the extent of the reduction in frequency of those accidents that would have followed on the use of his proposed alternative design.

FCA argued that the women’s inadequate warning claims failed as a matter of law because they offered no expert testimony regarding warning defects and did not provide an alternative, adequate warning that would have prevented the alleged injuries to carry the burden of proof for those claims under the LPLA. Moreover, the deposition testimony of the women’s only design expert conceded he did not opine as to any claim of defect based on inadequate warning, and the women had not disclosed any other expert to offer testimony as to defects in the van. The women did not identify any evidence in the record to support the elements of their inadequate warning claims, except for the van sales brochure and owner’s manual, which were devoid of any warning of the dangers imposed by not having side curtain airbags in the second and third rows or by using tempered glass in the side windows. The court found that the women did not identify specific evidence in the record of a proposed adequate warning, nor any expert testimony that opined on the frequency of accidents, the economic costs of those accidents, or the extent an alternative warning would reduce the frequency of those accidents to prove the van was unreasonably dangerous due to inadequate warning. Thus, the court concluded that FCA was entitled to summary judgment on the women’s claims that the van was unreasonably dangerous under the LPLA due to inadequate warning.

The case is No. 23-1777.

Judge: Morgan, S.

Attorneys: Craig Stephen Sossaman (Law Offices of Craig S. Sossaman) for Cynthia Summers, Kimberly Washington and Dirk Summers. Charles Spencer Smith (Bush Seyferth PLLC) for FCA US LLC f/k/a Chrysler LLC f/k/a Chrysler Group, L.L.C.

Companies: FCA US LLC f/k/a Chrysler LLC f/k/a Chrysler Group, L.L.C.

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