Products Liability Law Daily Wrap Up, DAMAGES—CHEMICAL PRODUCTS—Pa. Super.: Monsanto not entitled to new trial in Roundup lawsuit that resulted in $177M judgment against it, (May 9, 2025)

By Nicholas Kaster, J.D.

The compensatory damages award was not “plainly and excessively exorbitant” and did not so shock the sense of justice as to suggest that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake, or corruption.

A Pennsylvania state appellate court has denied Monsanto Company a new trial to overturn a jury verdict that resulted in a $177 million award to a claimant who alleged that its product Roundup caused him to develop non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Monsanto challenged the trial court’s denial of its motion for a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on its allegations of improper communications between court staff and jurors, erroneous evidentiary rulings, federal preemption, and claims that the damages award was excessive. The appellate court, however, upheld the trial court’s verdict. The allegedly improper communication between the jury and a court staff member did not unduly influence the jury, the appellate court determined. The court held that the state failure to warn claim was not preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Finally, the appeals court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Monsanto’s challenge to the $25 million compensatory damages award. There was a “sufficient evidentiary basis” for the jury to conclude that the claimant suffered, and continued to suffer, disfigurement, pain and suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, and the loss of the ability to enjoy life’s pleasures—all noneconomic losses recognized under Pennsylvania law (Caranci v. Monsanto Co., No. 993 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. May 8, 2025)).

Background. In June 2021, a claimant sued Monsanto Company alleging that his years’-long use of Monsanto’s product Roundup and its ingredient glyphosate caused him to develop non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (NHL). He alleged claims of negligence, strict liability defective design, and strict liability failure to warn.

The trial court awarded the claimant more than $177 million. The jury found in the claimant’s favor on the negligence claim. With respect to the failure to warn claim, the jury found that Roundup was defective because it lacked proper warnings and instructions for safe use. The jury awarded the claimant $25 million in compensatory damages and $150 million in punitive damages after finding that Monsanto’s conduct was malicious, wanton, willful, or oppressive, or showed reckless indifference to others.

Following the verdict, Monsanto filed a motion for recusal, a post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial, or an evidentiary hearing based on Monsanto’s allegations of improper communications between court staff and jurors, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and federal preemption, and claims that the jury’s damages award was excessive. The court denied each of these motions and the current appeal ensued.

Improper communications. Monsanto contended that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing or grant its motion for a new trial because of allegedly improper communication between the jury and a court staff member during the jury’s deliberations. A juror stated that a court staff member told the jury that it needed ten votes for a verdict and would have to return until it reached a verdict. When an ex parte communication between the court and the jury takes place, a party is entitled to a new trial if the communication unduly influences the jury’s deliberations. The appellate court determined that the court staff member’s statement about the number of jurors needed to reach a verdict and the length of time the court would require the jurors to deliberate before declaring a mistrial did not unduly influence the jurors. The statement pertained to court procedure and did not address any substantive issues. Furthermore, the statement regarding the court procedure was not emotional and could not inflame the jury. Monsanto’s claim, thus, failed to garner relief.

Trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Next, Monsanto claimed that certain of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings resulted in a “one-sided” trial.

First, Monsanto contended that the trial court abused its discretion in preventing it from relying on the result of studies completed by foreign organizations that concluded that glyphosate was not carcinogenic, while permitting the claimant to build a case around a “hazard assessment” of glyphosate prepared by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), an organization under the umbrella of the World Health Organization. In support of this claim, Monsanto cited to places in the record where the trial court precluded its fact witness from testifying about the limitations of the hazard assessment issued by IARC. Monsanto concluded that because the claimant relied on the IARC report to support his claim for punitive damages, Monsanto was entitled to respond by showing that scientists worldwide dismissed IARC’s view. The appellate court, however, found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling. Monsanto’s expert appeared as a fact witness. The rulings that Monsanto challenged were those in which Monsanto attempted to elicit expert testimony from the witness, including opinions regarding the consequences or effects of research conducted by international regulatory organizations. Because the witness was not qualified as an expert witness and did not prepare an expert report on the consequences or effects of the international regulatory organizations, the trial court properly precluded him from testifying in the capacity of an expert.

Next, Monsanto claimed that the court erred in admitting prejudicial testimony and improperly instructing the jury regarding the ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in an administrative appeal in which the Natural Resources Defense Counsel (NRDC) challenged the EPA’s 2020 Interim Registration Review Decision that concluded that “for the most part,” glyphosate does not cause cancer. Monsanto contended that the NRDC holding regarding the EPA Interim Registration Review Decision pertaining to the link between glyphosate and cancer was irrelevant. In particular, Monsanto argued that shortly after the Ninth Circuit decided the case, the EPA reaffirmed its views that glyphosate does not cause cancer. Monsanto further claimed that, even if the Ninth Circuit decision were relevant, its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value because lay jurors cannot be expected to understand nuanced issues of administrative law. Monsanto contended that the trial court compounded its error by not providing a curative instruction about the inaccuracy until two weeks later when the court charged the jury. However, the appeals court upheld the trial court’s judgment. Since Monsanto’s expert testified that Monsanto relied on the EPA’s 2020 Interim Registration Review Decision’s determination that glyphosate was “for the most part” non-carcinogenic, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the claimant to recross-examine him about the NRDC decision. With respect to Monsanto’s claim that the trial court’s curative instruction regarding the court’s interpretation of the NRDC holding was, in essence, too little, too late, the appellate court’s review of the notes of testimony indicated that Monsanto did not place a contemporaneous, specific objection to the court’s inaccurate statement about the holding of the NRDC decision on the record. Because Monsanto failed to place a timely, specific objection to the trial court’s statement about the holding of the NRDC decision on the record, Monsanto waived any claim of error about the timing of a curative instruction.

Monsanto then asserted that the court should have precluded the claimant from introducing evidence that Monsanto produced—and removed from the market around the same time it introduced Roundup—the chemicals Agent Orange, PCBs, and DDT because it was irrelevant and suggested a propensity to disregard safety. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) prohibits admission of evidence of “other … wrong[s] or act[s]” to show a propensity to act in accordance with a certain trait. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. The appellate court noted that Monsanto did not object to the admission of this evidence on Rule 404(b) grounds. Rather, Monsanto invoked Rules 401 and 403 as grounds for exclusion of this evidence. Monsanto’s failure to preserve this specific objection resulted in its waiver.

Finally, Monsanto contended that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Monsanto failed to establish a foundation for its alternative theory of causation, i.e., that it was the claimant’s exposure to benzene that caused his NHL. Monsanto failed to provide any evidence to support its position that an expert toxicologist would use or had used the same methodology to calculate the effect of benzene exposures as it would glyphosate exposures or that benzene and glyphosate carry the same risk of cancer. Furthermore, there was nothing in the record to support Monsanto’s attorneys’ speculation as to the number of instances of exposure in his time as a painter. Monsanto was, thus, not entitled to relief on this claim, the appellate court concluded.

Federal preemption claim. Monsanto contended that the failure to warn claim was preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). FIFRA provides that a “state shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under” FIFRA.

Among the requirements that FIFRA imposes on a manufacturer of pesticides is that they include adequate warnings on its containers of pesticides to protect health and the environment. Otherwise, the product is “misbranded,” and the manufacturer is prohibited from selling it. Since a Pennsylvania failure to warn claim imposes a requirement on manufacturers of pesticides to provide a label that warns of health risks and FIFRA requires manufacturers of pesticides to include on their labels a “warning or caution statement [that is] adequate to protect health and the environment,” the court found that the requirements are similar and that the Pennsylvania failure to warn claim does not impose any requirement that is in addition to the requirements imposed by FIFRA. Thus, the appellate court held that FIFRA does not preempt a Pennsylvania failure to warn claim.

Causation evidence. In its fourth issue, Monsanto challenged the sufficiency of the claimant’s evidence that Roundup caused his cancer. Monsanto claimed that, rather than testify how much Roundup the claimant actually inhaled or absorbed, the claimant’s causation expert merely extrapolated from the alleged “positive association” between glyphosate and cancer to conclude that, because the claimant used Roundup for a number of years, it was the specific cause of his cancer. Monsanto assailed the expert’s “conclusory guesswork” based on alleged use as “unrelated to any actual absorption or alleged effect of glyphosate.” For these reasons, Monsanto contended the claimant’s evidence was “deficient” and required entry of JNOV. The appellate court disagreed. The claimant’s expert did not conclude that he suffered from NHL based solely on the “alleged positive association between glyphosate and cancer.” Rather, he provided extensive testimony explaining how he developed his conclusion regarding causation. He also explained that he developed a differential diagnosis to determine the cause of the claimant’s NHL. The expert concluded Roundup caused the claimant’s NHL only after considering that cause as one of many possible causes and, by process of elimination, ruling out the unlikely or impossible causes. This evidence, which the jury was free to credit, was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Roundup caused the claimant’s NHL, the appellate court concluded.

Compensatory damages award. In its final issue, Monsanto claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for a new trial, JNOV, or a substantial remittitur because the non-economic compensatory damages awarded were manifestly excessive and punitive. However, the appeals court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Monsanto’s challenge to the amount of compensatory damages awarded. There was a “sufficient evidentiary basis” for the jury to conclude that the claimant suffered, and continued to suffer, disfigurement, pain and suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, and the loss of the ability to enjoy life’s pleasures—all noneconomic losses recognized under Pennsylvania law. The claimant testified extensively about the physical and emotional toll NHL has had on him. The appellate court concluded that the jury—acting as the impartial voice of the community—fairly and adequately valued the claimant’s non-economic suffering. The award here was not “plainly and excessively exorbitant” and did not so shock the sense of justice as to suggest that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake, or corruption, the appellate court stated. Accordingly, it found that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Monsanto relief from the compensatory damages award.

In conclusion, the appellate court found that none of the issues raised by Monsanto entitled it to relief.

The case is No. 993 EDA 2024.

Judge: Dubow. A.

Attorneys: Thomas R. Kline (Kline & Specter, PC) for Ernest Caranci and Carmela Caranci. Robert C. Heim (Dechert LLP) for Monsanto Co.

Companies: Monsanto Co.

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