Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—S.D.N.Y.: LIBOR antitrust case concludes with disposal of all remaining claims, (Oct 7, 2025)

By Steven D. Cole, J.D.

A previously certified class was decertified.

In this long-running, consolidated multidistrict litigation (MDL) alleging that several major banks manipulated the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) to the detriment of investors and speculators, a federal district court in New York granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all remaining claims and decertified a class of Plaintiffs that it had certified in a previous decision. Ultimately, Plaintiffs were unable to show that the banks in question had coordinated to make artificially low LIBOR submissions in order to project financial strength to the market during the financial crisis and prevent the threat of contagion should one bank appear to experience financial turmoil (In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:11-md-02262-NRB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025)).

This consolidated MDL, commenced in 2011, arose from allegations that 16 major banks conspired to suppress LIBOR, an interest-rate benchmark used in trillions of dollars’ worth of financial instruments. More specifically, Plaintiffs, a class of over-the-counter (OTC) purchasers of certain LIBOR-based financial instruments, contended that from 2007 through 2009, the banks engaged in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy, with each LIBOR submission reporting an artificially low cost of borrowing in order to drive LIBOR down. Under the auspices of the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), the 16 major banks, referred to as “Panel Banks,” allegedly submitted an answer each day to the LIBOR question for “loans of various durations (called loan ‘tenors’)—typically ranging from overnight to one year—in each of the world’s major currencies.” United States v. Connolly, 24 F.4th 821, 824 (2d Cir. 2022). The LIBOR question asked: “‘At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am’ London time?” In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d 430, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (LIBOR VII). Thomson Reuters, an agent of the BBA, “received the panel banks’ rate submissions and eliminated from consideration, for each tenor, the four highest and the four lowest,” and published the “arithmetic average of the middle eight submitted rates,” which “constituted the LIBOR daily ‘fix’ … for that tenor.”

Pending before the court were: (1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to all remaining claims, to which Plaintiffs did not cross-move for summary judgment; (2) a motion to certify the OTC class against additional defendants by extending the class that was previously certified in LIBOR VII, and Defendants’ motion seeking decertification of that OTC class; and (3) three Daubert motions by Defendants to exclude the testimony of four of Plaintiffs’ experts.

Conspiracy. Plaintiffs failed to present direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to tend to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Their circumstantial evidence was entirely speculative, requiring several inferential leaps, or relied upon the fundamentally flawed analyses of their experts. In consideration of the entire record, a factfinder could not reasonably infer that the conspiratorial explanation was more likely than not. “Accordingly, despite nearly a decade spent building an evidentiary record, plaintiffs have not proffered evidence sufficient to create any dispute of material fact as to the existence of a multi-year, sixteen-bank conspiracy to suppress LIBOR.”

Suppression. Plaintiffs alleged that LIBOR was lower than it otherwise would have been absent the alleged conspiracy. Their experts’ analyses were inadmissible because the data upon which their models depended was unreliable and incomplete; their methodologies improperly failed to account for other non-conspiratorial causes for the alleged suppression—namely, the financial crisis; and their opinions exceeded the bounds of what could be concluded from a reliable application of their methodologies. As for Plaintiffs’ citation of documentary and record evidence, the communications they cited were too infrequent to support claims of persistent suppression throughout the relevant period.

Sherman Act claims. Plaintiffs failed to support a genuine issue of material fact as to a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy in which the Panel Banks colluded to depress LIBOR. Moreover, Plaintiffs did not establish any actual injury whereby the Panel Banks placed them in a worse position as a consequence of the alleged price-fixing conduct.

Common law fraud claims. As an initial matter with regard to the fraud-based claims, Plaintiffs did not put forward sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to infer that the LIBOR rates submitted by Defendants were rates that Defendants “could not have requested, been offered, and accepted.” The false data fraud claims failed because Plaintiffs did not identify sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Panel Banks set their LIBOR contributions at rates that were not truthful answers to the LIBOR question. Fannie Mae’s claim asserting fraudulent inducement of a contract could not proceed due to not having established the existence of a material misrepresentation. Plaintiffs’ failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact establishing suppression by Defendants, in conjunction with the lack of evidence establishing the falsity of Defendants’ submissions, doomed their claims of aiding and abetting liability, each of which was premised on the manipulation and suppression of LIBOR. The finding that Plaintiffs failed to sustain their underlying fraud claim necessitated the granting of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the civil conspiracy claim.

Other common law claims. In light of Plaintiffs’ failure to establish the existence of a misrepresentation or omission by Defendants regarding their alleged manipulation of LIBOR, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent misrepresentation. Given the court’s holding that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently establish suppression or injury, and in the absence of any additional evidence demonstrating Defendants’ intent to harm, or reckless disregard for the risk of harm, to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to Defendants’ alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation failed to establish the existence of any breach of contract by Defendants, its surviving claim for tortious interference with a contract could not proceed. Given the court’s determination that Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the suppression of LIBOR, Plaintiffs similarly failed to provide evidence demonstrating that Defendants engaged in any misconduct sufficient to support a claim for unjust enrichment.

Certification-related motions. In LIBOR VII, the court certified a class limited to Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims against Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase. Plaintiffs moved to certify this same OTC class against Credit Suisse AG, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, Royal Bank of Scotland plc, and UBS AG. Having found that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims, the court similarly found that Plaintiffs failed to provide common evidence of either conspiracy or suppression. Thus, the court decertified the OTC class of plaintiffs.

Daubert motions. Within the court’s analysis of the conspiracy and suppression claims, it made findings with regard to Defendants’ Daubert motions—granting the motion to exclude the testimony of two of Plaintiffs’ experts with regard to the suppression claim, and granting in part and denying in part the motion as to two of Plaintiffs’ experts concerning the conspiracy claim.

The Case is No. 1:11-md-02262-NRB.

Judge: Buchwald, N.

Attorneys: Christopher Lovell (Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP) for FTC Capital GmbH. Jessica Lillian Brach (Wharton & Garrison LLP) for Deutsche Bank Financial LLC.

Companies: FTC Capital GmbH; Deutsche Bank Financial LLC

Cases: Antitrust NewYorkNews GCNNews