Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—M.D. Ala.: Claims dismissed in Alabama food service bid-rigging case, (Oct 7, 2025)

By Wendy Biddle, J.D.

Restaurant owner's complaint failed to meet heightened pleading standards and adequately allege harm to competition.

The federal district court in Montgomery, Alabama dismissed all federal claims brought by a restaurant owner who alleged that city officials and private parties conspired to rig a competitive bidding process for a summer food service contract. The court found that plaintiff failed to plausibly state claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), federal antitrust laws, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice (Bey v. City of Dothan, No. 1:24-cv-00259-RAH-CWB (M.D. Ala. Oct. 6, 2025)).

The case arose from events in 2022 when Bey, operating as Mama T's LLC, sought to bid on a summer food service contract being awarded by the City of Dothan, Alabama. Unfamiliar with the bidding process, Bey consulted with Stephanie Wingfield, who managed the city's food program. Wingfield recommended that Bey work with LaPortia Pierce to develop a business plan and prepare the bid package. With Pierce's assistance, Bey submitted her bid.

According to the complaint, Wingfield and Pierce improperly shared Bey's confidential bid information with Tammie L. Potter, another restaurant owner competing for the same contract. Armed with this information, Potter was able to submit a lower bid and ultimately won the contract in May 2022. City officials, including defendants Allison Hall and Freddie L. White II, later discovered Wingfield's misconduct and initiated termination proceedings. Although Wingfield was initially terminated, she was subsequently rehired. Bey alleged that city officials conducted the disciplinary proceedings in a manner that shielded Wingfield's conduct from public scrutiny, allowing Potter to retain the contract.

Bey filed suit against Allison Hall, Freddie L. White, II, Stephanie Wingfield and the city of Dothan in April 2024 seeking monetary damages for lost income, stress, and mental anguish. Her third amended complaint asserted claims under RICO, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Antitrust Act, Section 1983 for Fourteenth Amendment violations, and various state law claims including fraud and intentional interference with business relations.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims.

RICO claims. The court first addressed Bey's RICO claim, noting that civil RICO claims must be pleaded with heightened specificity as a breed of fraud claims. To establish a RICO violation, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that defendants operated or managed an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity that included at least two predicate acts causing injury to the plaintiff's business or property.

The court found Bey's allegations regarding a RICO enterprise woefully deficient. The complaint alleged an enterprise between Pierce and city employees to rig the bidding process in Potter's favor but rested entirely on conclusory statements that Pierce acted in concert with city employees. The court emphasized that under Supreme Court precedent, conclusory allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth at the pleading stage.

The court found the alleged common purpose of rigging the bidding process and concealing that conduct failed to rise beyond speculative projection. Critically, Bey offered no factual allegations linking defendants Hall, White, or the city to Potter, nor explained how awarding the contract to another vendor benefited these defendants. The complaint failed to allege that city employees received any financial benefit from the scheme. Moreover, the alleged bid-rigging and subsequent disciplinary proceedings against Wingfield demonstrated dissimilar objectives occurring at different times, undermining the existence of a unified enterprise.

Bey's RICO claim also failed to adequately allege a pattern of racketeering activity. The complaint listed seven predicate acts, but the court found these constituted at best a single alleged fraud—rigging the city's bid process. For pattern allegations, RICO requires continuity demonstrated either through a closed period extending over substantial time or an open-ended threat of repetition. The alleged acts occurred within six months, too brief for closed-ended continuity. The scheme involved a single discrete goal with a natural ending point, precluding open-ended continuity. Significantly, Bey's own complaint acknowledged that the city transferred the feeding program back to Dothan City Schools, eliminating any threat of future repetition.

Antitrust claims. The court next addressed Bey's federal antitrust claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The court found the claims failed to allege harm to competition in the aggregate, as required by antitrust law, rather than merely harm to a single competitor.

The court determined that Bey's alleged scheme constituted a vertical restraint between the City of Dothan as a potential downstream purchaser and Potter as an upstream seller, rather than a horizontal restraint among competitors. This distinction proved crucial because vertical restraints must be analyzed under the rule of reason rather than as per se violations of antitrust law.

Under rule of reason analysis, a plaintiff must prove an anticompetitive effect on the relevant market and that defendant's conduct lacks pro-competitive justification. To show anticompetitive effect, a plaintiff must establish either actual detrimental effects on competition or potential for genuine anticompetitive effects combined with market power. The court found Bey's complaint completely devoid of allegations that competition generally was harmed, containing only conclusory assertions about harm Bey herself suffered. The complaint made no allegations regarding defendants' market power, precluding even a potential theory of harm. Accordingly, the antitrust claims failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Constitutional claims. The court found that Bey's Fourteenth Amendment claims were embedded within other counts in shotgun fashion and failed to state any claim with specificity. The complaint vaguely referenced the Fourteenth Amendment, including Due Process and Privileges and Immunities clauses, within counts labeled as fraud, RICO conspiracy, and antitrust violations. However, beyond categorical labels, Bey provided no factual allegations or legal theory explaining how defendants' conduct violated constitutional protections. The court emphasized that Rule 8 requires more than labels, and plaintiffs must plead enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief.

State law claims. Having dismissed all federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bey's remaining state law claims for fraud, violations of Alabama's antitrust laws, and intentional interference with business relations. Citing principles of comity and judicial economy, the court noted that needless decisions of state law should be avoided and that such issues are best resolved by state courts. The state law claims were dismissed without prejudice, allowing Bey to pursue them in state court if she chooses.

The court declined to grant Bey leave to amend her federal claims, noting she had already amended her complaint twice and repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies. The case was closed with no costs taxed to any party.

The Case is No. 1:24-cv-00259-RAH-CWB.

Judge: Huffaker, R.

Attorneys: Scott Wayne Hunter (Scott W. Hunter, LLC) for Noble Halona Bey. James Hillary Pike (Shealy, Pike & Hornsby) for City of Dothan, Alabama.

Cases: Antitrust RICO AlabamaNews