Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—NDCal: Motions of Objectors to TFT-LCD Panel Antitrust Settlements Denied, (May 15, 2013)

By Tobias J. Gillett, J.D., LL.M.

The federal district court in San Francisco has denied the motions of objectors seeking to alter or amend a judgment granting approval of settlements of antitrust litigation against manufacturers of thin film transistor-liquid crystal display panels, to obtain reconsideration, clarification, or rehearing of it, or to enjoin disbursement of fees to the co-lead counsel for the indirect purchaser plaintiffs. The objectors claimed the counsel had engaged in illegal fee splitting with a non-lawyer loan company (In Re: TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, May 14, 2013, Illston, S.).

On April 3, 2012, the court issued an order granting final approval to combined class, parens patriae, and governmental entity settlements with AU Optronics, LG Display, and Toshiba. Shortly thereafter, an objector filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment, to reconsider, clarify, or rehear the order, and/or to enjoin the disbursement of fees to the co-lead counsel for the indirect purchaser plaintiffs. Two other objectors later filed a motion for relief from the judgment under FRCP 60(b)(3), joining the objector’s motion and raising additional arguments. The counsel filed a motion to strike the Rule 59(e) motion, alleging that the objector had engaged in an act of extortion and blackmail.

The attorney had a loan agreement with a third party company, which had filed a letter in the case seeking payment to it of a part of any fee awarded to the attorney. The attorney had filed a letter challenging the company’s appearance in the case and the amount owed, but not the existence of the loan agreement. The objectors’ motions claimed the loans constituted illegal fee splitting between a lawyer and a non-lawyer.

Rule 59(e). The court denied the Rule 59(e) motion, concluding that it had not been filed "within a reasonable time" after the objectors became aware of the allegedly improper loan agreement. The judgment the objectors challenged had not been issued until almost eight weeks after the loan company had filed its letter, and the objectors did not provide any reason for failing to raise their arguments prior to the judgment.

Rule 60(b)(3). The court also denied the Rule 60(b)(3) motion. The court observed that the Rule only applied to fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by "an adverse party," and the attorney was not a party to the litigation or the judgment.

In addition, the court denied the motion for reconsideration, clarification, and rehearing, because such a motion could only be filed with the leave of the court, and the objectors had failed to obtain leave from the court. The court denied the motion to enjoin disbursement of fees to the attorney as unsupported, and denied the attorney’s motion to strike the Rule 59(e) motion as moot.

The case is No. M 07-1827 SI, MDL No. 1827.

Attorneys: Joseph M. Alioto (Alioto Law Firm) for Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs. Joseph Bernard Woodring (Cooley LLP) for LFG National Capital, LLC.

Cases: Antitrust CaliforniaNews