Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, WORTH NOTING—Recent developments involving the Family and Medical Leave Act, (Aug 8, 2025)

By WK Editorial Staff

A roundup of recent FMLA decisions of interest to the labor and employment law community.

N.D. Ill.: Employee was terminated for unauthorized absences, AWOL charges. A former medical support assistant at a VA health care center sued the VA alleging FMLA interference and retaliation under the FMLA and Rehabilitation Act. The employee, who had disabilities including hearing loss and anxiety, had been granted FMLA leave but was marked absent without leave (AWOL) on multiple occasions, and was eventually terminated. The employee had previously filed two complaints with the EEOC alleging denials of leave, denials of accommodation, discrimination, and retaliation, among other things. The VA moved for summary judgment. The court found that the employee failed to demonstrate that the VA interfered with her FMLA rights, noting she did not provide evidence “she invoked her FMLA benefits in accordance with VA policy.” Furthermore, the court found no evidence of pretext in the VA's decision-making process. The motion was granted (Sprosty v. Collins, No. 22 CV 3651 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2025)).

D. Md.: Hairdresser’s ADEA, MFEPA retaliation claims survive dismissal. A hairdresser with 30 years of experience alleged she was subjected to derogatory comments about her age and unfair treatment by younger colleagues and supervisors at her workplace. After she was terminated, she filed an EEO charge alleging age discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, and she subsequently sued the hair salon alleging discrimination and retaliation under the ADEA and Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA), violations of the FMLA, and wrongful discharge. The employer sought dismissal of the retaliation claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the FMLA and wrongful discharge claims for insufficient pleading. The court found that the retaliation claims were sufficiently related to the EEO charge to survive dismissal, as the charge reasonably alerted the employer to the age-based retaliation claim. However, the court dismissed the FMLA claim, as the facts did not support FMLA interference. The wrongful discharge claim was also dismissed. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, allowing the hairdresser to amend her complaint to cure pleading defects (Washington v. Hair Cuttery Family of Brands, No. 8:24-cv-02542-PX (D. Md. July 24, 2025)).

E.D.N.Y.: Premature right-to-sue letter in FMLA suit was defective. A financial aid counselor for a university was terminated after exhausting her FMLA leave following a kidney transplant, and she filed a complaint with the EEOC claiming she was fired because of a disability. She received a right-to-sue (RTS) letter 57 days later, and she sued the university under the ADA. The university moved to dismiss the ADA claim, arguing that the employee “failed to satisfy the statutory precondition that her charge of discrimination be pending with the EEOC for the required 180-day period,” and that therefore, the RTS letter was defective. The court agreed, finding that the EEOC exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the RTS letter, and that the letter was defective. The court dismissed the ADA claim without prejudice, directing the EEOC to reopen the charge, and allowed for the possibility of refiling once a valid RTS letter is obtained (Prichard v. Long Island University, No. 23-CV-09269(EK)(LB) (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2025)).

E.D. Wis.: Amendment to complaint alleging FMLA interference, termination did not prejudice bank. A former bank employee alleged that she was fired for requesting FMLA leave to manage her rheumatoid arthritis. The employee filed a class action suit against the bank, alleging it “interfered with, restrained, and denied her attempts to exercise her right to leave under the FMLA.” The employee later amended her complaint to remove class allegations and revise factual assertions. The bank moved to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice, arguing that the employee failed to allege she provided sufficient notice of her FMLA leave request, that she “consulted [the bank] to schedule appointments,” and that she “disclosed the anticipated duration of her leave.” In response, the employee sought leave to file a second amended complaint, providing additional factual allegations. The court found that the employee's proposed second amended complaint was not futile, as it sufficiently stated a plausible claim for relief under the FMLA. The court emphasized that at the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not required to specify legal theories. Additionally, the court determined that the bank would not be “unduly prejudiced” by the amendment. The court denied the bank’s motion to dismiss and granted the employee’s motion for leave to amend the complaint (Pescheck v. BMO Bank, N.A., No. 23-CV-1376-SCD (E.D. Wis. July 29, 2025)).

Cases: EmployeeLeave Discharge Discrimination AgeDiscrimination DisabilityDiscrimination ClassActions Retaliation Procedure EvidenceDiscovery StateLawClaims