Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, WORTH NOTING—Appeals court cases of note, (Jul 18, 2025)

By WK Editorial Staff

A roundup of recent federal and state appeals court decisions of interest to the labor and employment law community.

5th Cir.: Comment about final report did not create protected property interest. A law enforcement officer, on the job for less than a year, who failed to report that his spouse, in addition to filing a police report against him alleging domestic abuse, had over the prior month made several calls to emergency services, was fired after an investigation. Subsequently, an ALJ ordered that his discharge status be changed to honorable because the other incidents had not involved family violence or allegations of criminal activity. He filed an EEOC charge and later sued. He appealed dismissal of his claims. The appeals court affirmed. He had waived his ADEA timeliness argument. Regarding his Section 1983 due process claim, his lieutenant’s alleged assertion that his claims would be investigated (specifically, the lieutenant said all he needed was a “final report”) did not create a protected property interest. His other arguments also failed, and the district court’s decision was affirmed (Amstutz v. Harris County, No. 24-20286 (5th Cir. July 17, 2025)).

8th Cir.: Anticipated promotions did not constitute protected property interests. A group of firefighters who were named acting fire chiefs or acting battalion chiefs sued the City of St. Louis under Section 1983 for failure to promote them to full fire captains or battalion chiefs, positions for which they were the highest scoring candidates. The firefighters argued that the city's actions violated the due process and takings clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the city. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that “the firefighters had no property interests in their desired promotions,” and that their expectations were based solely on the fire chief’s customary practice of promoting the highest scorers, which did not bind the city. The fire chief’s intention to follow his customary practice did not create a binding obligation, nor did it “limit his discretion to promote different candidates or no candidates” (Eveland v. City of St. Louis, No. 24-2646 (8th Cir. July 8, 2025)).

11th Cir.: Second stint as Acting Commissioner was supported by FVRA. A disability benefit applicant challenged the denial of her benefits, contending that a Deputy Commissioner’s second term as the Social Security Administration’s Acting Commissioner was unauthorized under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). The applicant argued that the Acting Commissioner's acting service violated the FVRA, rendering the appointment of the administrative law judge who denied her benefits application improper. The applicant sued the Social Security Administration through the Commissioner, “insist[ing] that the ALJ had no constitutional authority to issue a decision concerning her benefits application.” The issue revolved around the interpretation of FVRA Section 3346, which dictates the time limits for acting officers. The applicant asserted that “[the Acting Commissioner’s] ratification of the ALJ’s appointment was ineffective because her second stint as Acting Commissioner contravened the FVRA’s time limits on acting service.” After the district court ruled in favor of the Social Security Administration, the applicant appealed. In line with previous decisions by other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plain text of the FVRA supports an independent “spring-back” function for acting officers under Section 3346(a)(2), validating the second term as Acting Commissioner. The court affirmed the district court's judgment (Gorecki v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, No. 23-13863 (11th Cir. July 14, 2025)).

4th Cir.: Arbitration provision was unenforceable against limited liability company’s agent. An independent contractor, who had his own LLC, contracted with a staffing company to work for a Texas-based oil and natural gas company. When his placement with the company ended, the contractor sued the oil and gas company, alleging the company violated the FLSA “by paying him a day rate without paying him overtime wages.” The oil and gas company attempted to compel arbitration, arguing that the individual was personally bound by an arbitration agreement contained in the contract between his LLC and the staffing company. The district court denied the motion, determining that the contractor was not a party to the agreement. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision. The court held that the contractor signed the agreement solely in his capacity as an agent for his LLC, not in his personal capacity, noting that “[u]nder Texas law, ‘a person who signs a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal is not a party to the contract and is generally not liable under it.” The court found that both the contract's language and the signature block indicated the individual acted as a representative of his LLC, rather than in his individual capacity. The arbitration provision could not be enforced against the contractor (Luna v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC, No. 24-1281 (4th Cir. July 1, 2025, unpublished)).

Md. Sup. Ct.: De minimis doctrine applies to claims under Maryland wage laws. A former Amazon employee, who worked as a Fulfillment Associate at the company’s Baltimore Fulfillment Center, sued the company on behalf of herself and a putative class of employees to recover “wages associated with the time between when she stopped getting paid each day and when she swiped out to exit the facility after completing the post-shift security screening process.” After certifying the class, the district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether “the de minimis doctrine applies to claims under the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Law and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law.” The court, after reviewing the statutory language, legislative history, and the relationship between Maryland wage laws and the FLSA, concluded that the de minimis doctrine does apply. While the court noted that neither the phrase “de minimis” nor similar language are mentioned in Maryland’s wage laws, the FLSA is also silent as to the de minimis rule, and the U.S. Supreme Court “recognized the doctrine's application to the FLSA.” The dissent contended that “the federal de minimis doctrine has not been adopted or incorporated into either the MWHL or the MWPCL,” and that “[t]here is no background or common law de minimis principle in Maryland that applies to all Maryland statutes…” (Martinez v. Amazon.com Services LLC, Misc. No. 17 (Md. Sup. Ct. July 3, 2025)).

Cases: IndividualRights StateLawClaims Discrimination WageHour Arbitration Overtime PublicEmployees ContractClaims Procedure ClassActions