Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, WAGE-HOUR—WORKING TIME—D. Idaho: Employees’ travel time to the site of the work not compensable, (Jul 24, 2025)

By Ronald Miller, J.D.

The law is clear that simply meeting at a designated meeting place to travel to a worksite is not enough to make travel time compensable if the employees do not “receive instructions, perform other work, or to pick up and carry tools.”

An employer was entitled to summary judgment in part against wage claims of employees regarding travel time compensation, ruled a federal district court in Idaho. The employees worked across a state line, which required more than two hours of travel to the job site. They brought suit for failure to pay wages under the FLSA and state law. With respect to activities such as driving the work vehicle, hauling tools, and picking up and driving temporary employees, the court held that the travel time was not compensable. However, activities such as “studying code books,” “preparing for tests and studying flashcards,” “planning the day’s activities,” “filling out smart sheets,” “communicating with other employees” about the job and logistics, and “looking at plans for the job” may be sufficiently integral to their principal activities to be compensable. Thus, summary judgment was denied for either party as to those activities (Howes v. Phoenix Fire Protection, LLC, No. 1:23-cv-00512-BLW (D. Idaho July 22, 2025)).

Travel time. The employer Fire installs fire protection systems across several states including Idaho and Wyoming. Employees working out of its Idaho Falls location were often required travel to worksites in and around Jackson, Wyoming. The drive from Idaho Falls to Jackson takes at least two hours. To account for the length of travel time, the employer increased the pay of employees working in the Jackson area by 20 percent.

When the employees worked a job in Jackson, they would usually meet at the employer’s shop in Idaho Falls and drive together to the jobsite. If they had to load up the truck with supplies, all of the employees would clock-in at the shop and remain clocked in the rest of the day. If the employees did not need to load anything from the shop, the crew did not clock-in until 6 am. This meant employees were not compensated for most, if not all, of the drive to Jackson.

During the drive, employees would “look over plans for the job,” study code books, organize job logistics, sleep, or perform other tasks. Three employees alleged the failure to compensate employees for the time spent driving to and from Jackson violates the FLSA, and the Idaho Wage Claim Act (IWCA). Additionally, two of the three employees claim they were wrongfully terminated in retaliation for complaining about the drive time policy. The employer moved for summary judgment and the employees moved for partial summary judgment.

Failure to pay overtime claims. Both the employees and the employer moved for summary judgment on the employees’ failure to pay wages claims under the FLSA and IWCA. The employees sought unpaid overtime wages. They alleged that the travel time from Idaho Falls to Jackson, Wyoming was work and they should be compensated for the travel time.

The Portal-to-Portal Act clarified the FLSA to make clear that the Act does not require an employer to compensate an employee for travel “to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform,” and for “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to” the employee’s principal activities. Preliminary and postliminary activities are compensable “if those activities are integral and indispensable part of the [employee’s] principal activities” provided these activities are not de minimis.

Compensable work. For the commute time to be compensable, the plaintiffs must have “perform[ed] additional legally cognizable work while driving to their workplace.”

The employees offered several activities they believe constituted legally cognizable and compensable work: (1) driving the work vehicle, (2) hauling tools, (3) picking up and driving temporary employees, and (4) other work-related tasks.

Driving work vehicle. The employees first argued all of their commute time is compensable because the employer required the foreman of the job to drive a work-provided vehicle to Jackson and required all other employees working at that site to drive with the foreman. In Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc., 596 F.3d 1046 (2010), the Ninth Circuit concluded that requiring an employee to use a work-provided vehicle did not render that commute time compensable, even where the employer placed restrictions on the employee’s use of the vehicle.

Hauling tools.Rutti similarly foreclosed the employees’ argument that hauling tools to the worksite, in the work vehicle, made the commute time compensable. The tools at issue were those that stayed on the work truck and those belonging to the individual employees. Congress specifically contemplated that “the transportation of tools and supplies, would not change the noncompensable nature of the travel. Thus, hauling tools, without more, does not transform noncompensable travel time into compensable travel time.

Picking up temporary employees. The employees next argued that for a period of time, the foreman was required to pick up temporary employees and drive them to Jackson. Here, there was a factual dispute as to whether the foreman was required to pick-up these workers or whether he volunteered. If he was required to pick up and drop off the temporary employees, that may render his commute compensable. If, on the other hand, he volunteered to pick up the temporary employees, then that time likely would not be compensable. Accordingly, summary judgment for either party was inappropriate.

Work-related tasks. Finally, the employees argued that they were required to perform a range of tasks during the commute that they believe made the time compensable. Tasks such as “filling the truck with fuel”, “washing windshields”, “checking tire pressure,” and “removing snow from truck” were not integral to the employees’ principal activities of installing fire protection systems. Accordingly, such incidental activities could not form the basis of the employees’ FLSA claim.

However, other activities such as “studying code books”, “preparing for tests and studying flashcards”, “planning the day’s activities”, “filling out smart sheets”, “communicating with other employees” about the job and logistics, and “looking at plans for the job,” may be sufficiently integral to their principal activities to be compensable.

Studying. With respect to “studying code books”, “preparing for tests”, and studying flash cards could be compensable, but more information was required to make that determination. Here, there was not enough information to conclude whether the employees’ studying was mainly for the benefit the employer or if it also benefited the employees.

Planning activities. Assuming that activities such as filling out smart sheets, communicating with other employees about logistics, and making plans for the job are principal activities related to the employees’ work, a question remained as to whether these tasks were de minimis. Because there was nothing in the record for the court to determine whether this time was de minimis, summary judgment for either the employer or the employees was inappropriate.

The case is No. 1:23-cv-00512-BLW.

Judge: Winmill, B.

Attorneys: Jacob S. Wessel, I (Thomsen Holman Wheiler) for Joshua Howes. Sam L. Angell (Hall Angell & Associates) for Phoenix Fire Protection, LLC.

Companies: Phoenix Fire Protection, LLC

Cases: WageHour WorkingTime Overtime Discharge Retaliation IdahoNews