Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, WAGE-HOUR—CLASS ACTIONS—11th Cir.: Employer lawfully deducted transportation costs from wages of employees who used car-pooling arrangements, (Dec 8, 2025)

By Ronald Miller, J.D.

The rule is not that expenses can never be deducted from wages—it is that expenses cannot be shifted to employees when they are “for the employer’s benefit.”

An employer was entitled to summary judgment against employee claims it violated the FLSA and Florida Minimum Wage Act by deducting transportation costs from their paychecks, and that it should pay them for travel time, tool-collection time, and waiting time, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Because the transportation offered was optional and provided for the benefit of employees, the employer could deduct the costs for those employees who choose to use it. As for the three categories of time, none were integral and indispensable to the core activities of the jobs, so the FLSA did not require that employees be paid for that time. Further, the district court acted within its discretion in not certifying a transportation subclass for claims under the Florida Labor Pool Act (Villarino v. Pacesetter Personnel Service, Inc., No. 23-10645 (11th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025)).

Day laborers. The employer provides temporary labor to clients in various industries across the Southeast. Would-be employees known as “daily ticket workers” gather at a labor hall and sign in to say that they are available to work that day. Any employee who receives a job offer is given a ticket that includes a start time, the worksite’s location, and any suggested or required equipment.

The employer’s transportation agreement advises the daily ticket workers that it is their responsibility to arrive at assigned jobs on time. The agreement also provides several options for getting to and from worksites—the employee’s own vehicle, public transportation, employer vans, or carpools in coworkers’ cars. The employer deducts $3.00 per day from the paychecks of those employees who ride in a carpool or van and pays carpool drivers $1.50 for each person driven per leg of the trip.

Many jobs require tools, and here too employees have options. They can either bring their own or use the employer’s. In most cases, at day’s end, the employees return to the labor hall, give back the equipment, and get paid. Employees who fail to return the equipment after work are eventually charged for it.

Working time claims. A group of daily ticket workers brought a hybrid collective and class action lawsuit against the employer in 2020. They alleged that the employer violated the FLSA and the Florida Minimum Wage Act for two reasons. First, they argued that the employer’s deductions for transportation charges meant employees were ultimately paid less than the minimum wage. Second, they asserted that the employer should have paid employees for their travel time to and from jobsites, as well as for the time spent waiting at the labor hall and returning tools. Further, they alleged that the employer violated the Florida Labor Pool Act by charging employees above the statutory limit for transportation to and from labor sites.

Summary judgment. While several class-certification motions were pending, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the named plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety and granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the FLSA and Florida Minimum Wage Act claims. The employee appealed those decisions, as well as the district court’s earlier refusal to certify a subclass of plaintiffs bringing excessive-transportation-charge claims under the Florida Labor Pool Act.

Transportation deduction. The employee first argued that the employer wrongfully deducted arranged transportation from the daily pay of employees who used those services. According to the employee, those deductions “resulted in pay of less than the applicable minimum wage.” The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.

The rule is not that expenses can never be deducted from wages—it is that expenses cannot be shifted to employees when they are “for the employer’s benefit.” Whether the employer’s transportation deductions were allowed under the FLSA depended on whether the transportation it provided for employees was “primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer.”

Transportation agreement. To start, the employer’s transportation agreement tells employees that once they are assigned to a job—and accept it—it is their own “responsibility to arrive at that job/customer/work site by the time designated in [their] Time Ticket.” The agreement also provides that employees have several “options” to get to jobsites, including their own vehicles, public transit, employer vans, or a carpool. Employee disposition testimony confirmed that they were aware that they had options and that they used them.

The fact that the employer benefitted from the options it offered employees did not mean that the company’s system was built to serve its own interests rather than those of the employees. Because the transportation was an optional benefit distinct from the “free and clear” minimum wage that workers already received, the employer could lawfully deduct the employees’ transportation costs from their wages without running afoul of the FLSA and the Florida Minimum Wage Act.

Unpaid time claims. The employees next claimed that they should have been paid for the time they spent (1) traveling to and from worksites, (2) collecting tools for their respective jobs, and (3) waiting for transportation. The employees’ contention was true only if traveling, collecting tools, or waiting was part of the core work that the workers were hired to perform—that is an “integral and indispensable part of the principal activities” of the job. An activity is “integral and indispensable” if it is “an intrinsic element” of the principal activities—something that an employee must perform to carry out her primary duties.

Travel-time claim. The Portal-to-Portal Act amended the FLSA to exempt from compensation the time workers spend “traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities.”

Ordinary commutes do not become compensable just because an employer provides the transportation. The Labor Department’s Field Operations Handbook—in a section addressing temporary labor firms—explained that travel from a central location to a customer’s establishment and back is not compensable. The appeals court found the DOL’s guidance persuasive and concluded that the time the employees spend traveling to and from worksites is not compensable.

Employer issued tools. The employees next argued that because employer-issued tools were “integral and indispensable” to their principal job duties, they must be paid for the time spent collecting and returning those tools to the labor hall. The Portal-to-Portal Act once again governed.

Referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc v. Busk, the appeals court noted that to qualify, an employee’s activities must be integral, which means that they must form an “intrinsic portion or element” of her principal activities. The activities must also be indispensable, which means that they “cannot be dispensed with, remitted, set aside, disregarded, or neglected.” Just because “certain preshift activities are necessary for employees to engage in their principal activities” does not mean they qualify.

On this record, tool collection and return were not an indispensable part of the daily ticket workers’ duties. Some jobs do not require tools, and for others the clients will supply tools at the jobsite. Moreover, the employer also allows employees to bring their own tools if they wish.

Because daily ticket workers may bring their own equipment, and not all jobs require tools, the appeals court could not say that some employees’ collection and return of equipment on some days for some jobs is a constituent duty that “cannot be dispensed with, remitted, set aside, disregarded, or neglected” if employees are to perform their principal activities.

Waiting-time claim. The appeals court next turned to the employees’ waiting-time claim. Here, the employees argued that the employer needed to compensate workers “for all time after receiving their daily work ticket,” because they were compelled to wait for the coordination of transportation to take them to the job site. Again, the appeals court rejected this contention.

The compensability of the workers’ wait time hinges on whether it was integral and indispensable to their principal activities. Again referring to the Labor Department’s Field Operations Handbook, the appeals court noted that time spent “waiting for assignments” at a central location is noncompensable. The appeals court concluded that based on various Supreme Court decisions, the employees’ waiting time is a noncompensable preliminary activity.

To start, the employees did not need to wait for transportation—under the transportation agreement, they could proceed directly to the jobsite if they wished. And the daily ticket workers themselves decide “when, if, and for what days they wish to seek and accept assignments.” Further, the employees typically used their waiting time doing as they pleased.

Accordingly, because the employees’ wait time was neither “the principal activity or activities” that they were hired to perform nor “integral and indispensable” to their job duties, it was not compensable under the FLSA.

Class certification decisions. Finally, the appeals court considered the employees’ argument that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to certify the excessive-transportation-charge subclass under the Florida Labor Pool Act. Here, the employees alleged that some workers were charged more than the $1.50 each way that Florida law permits for transportation.

The district court determined that this class failed under Rule 23(b)(3), because resolving the transportation-subclass claims would “require extensive amounts of individualized proof that would predominate.” While some employees were charged more than $3.00 for transportation on certain days, and the records specify that an excess charge was for a work-related bus pass, others lacked any explanation. Thus, the district court would have to scrutinize each overcharge or transportation credit, which would in essence involve a series of mini-trials for countless individual plaintiffs. Thus, on this record, the appeals court could not conclude that the district court abused its broad discretion in refusing to certify this subclass of plaintiffs.

Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The case is No. 23-10645.

Judge: Grant, B.

Attorneys: Andrew R. Frisch (Morgan & Morgan) for Shane Villarino. Derek E. Leon (Leon Cosgrove Jimenez) for Pacesetter Personnel Service, Inc.

Companies: Pacesetter Personnel Service, Inc.; Pacesetter Personnel Service of Florida, Inc.; Florida Staffing Service, Inc.; Tampa Service Company, Inc.

Cases: WageHour WorkingTime ClassActions MinimumWage AlabamaNews FloridaNews GeorgiaNews