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    IP Law Daily, TRADEMARK—TTAB: Refusal to register 'MUSIC.AI' mark for downloadable and SaaS music software affirmed, (Dec 4, 2025)

    Law Firms Mentioned:Workman Nydegger
    Organizations Mentioned:Moises Systems, Inc.

    By Saurabh Kashyap, B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M.

    The Board found the term MUSIC.AI to be merely descriptive of the applicant's software goods and services for artificial intelligence (AI) applications in music creation and editing.

    In a non-precedential opinion, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ...

    By Saurabh Kashyap, B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M.

    The Board found the term MUSIC.AI to be merely descriptive of the applicant's software goods and services for artificial intelligence (AI) applications in music creation and editing.

    In a non-precedential opinion, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed a Trademark Examining Attorney’s refusal to register the mark MUSIC.AI for downloadable and non-downloadable software for audio and music applications. The Board held that the term was merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), concluding that the combined terms “MUSIC” and “AI” immediately conveyed the nature and purpose of the software: using artificial intelligence to generate or modify music. The Board rejected arguments that the period in “MUSIC.AI” transformed the mark into a source-identifying term (In re Moises Systems, Inc., No. 98142204 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 26, 2025)).

    Background. The applicant, Moises Systems, Inc., is a technology firm focused on AI-based audio solutions. It filed the application for “MUSIC.AI” (standard characters) on August 21, 2023, under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, based on an intent to use the mark in commerce. The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration on the ground that the mark was merely descriptive. After a request for reconsideration was denied, Moises appealed.

    Descriptiveness. The TTAB reiterated that a mark is merely descriptive if it “immediately conveys knowledge of a quality, feature, function, or characteristic” of the goods or services, citing In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012) and In re Bayer AG, 488 F.3d 960, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Referencing In re Stereotaxis Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Board noted that even if the descriptiveness applies to a single item in a class, the refusal extends to the entire class.

    The Board found that the average consumer for applicant’s goods—software developers, music producers, and audio engineers—would view “MUSIC” and “AI” as descriptive of the software’s function: using artificial intelligence to create and manipulate music. The TTAB relied on dictionary definitions and online evidence showing wide industry usage of “AI” in conjunction with music applications.

    Meaning of “MUSIC.” The Board found “MUSIC” to be highly descriptive, citing dictionary definitions and its recurrence in the goods description. Applicant’s own identification of goods—software for use with “music, songs, sounds, and audio recordings”—confirmed the term’s direct reference to the nature of the software. In In re NextGen Mgmt., LLC, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 1, the TTAB had similarly held that terms appearing in the identification of goods are inherently suspect of being descriptive.

    Meaning of “AI.” The term “AI” was identified as the common abbreviation for “artificial intelligence.” According to In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017), commercial context and consumer perception are vital in determining descriptiveness. The Board cited examples from platforms such as Loudly, Jen Music, and Sounddraw, all of which offered AI-generated music services. These third-party uses demonstrated that "AI" is widely understood to denote software that mimics human cognition in musical contexts.

    Combination of “MUSIC” and “AI.” Citing In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the Board held that when two descriptive terms are joined, the resulting mark is likewise descriptive unless it creates a separate, non-descriptive meaning. The Board reviewed numerous references in which "music AI" appeared in academic papers, product descriptions, and trade show materials. One such example was a 2024 MIT Technology Review article that mentioned "music AI" startups such as Suno and Udio. Another was a conference on “Music and AI Creativity,” indicating broad recognition of “music AI” as a product category.

    Punctuation and the dot “.” between terms. Moises argued that the period rendered the mark a unique domain name or double entendre. The Board disagreed, citing Peterson v. Awshucks SC, LLC, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 520, which held that punctuation typically does not alter the commercial impression of a term. Furthermore, Moises’s own website and LinkedIn page featured both “MUSIC.AI” and “Music AI” interchangeably, undermining its claim of distinctive perception.

    Third-party registrations and the Supplemental Register. The applicant submitted examples of registered marks containing "AI" to argue against descriptiveness. The TTAB rejected this, noting that many of the cited registrations either featured stylization, had distinct word elements, or were issued on the Supplemental Register. In line with In re ActiveVideo Network, Inc., 2014 TTAB LEXIS 283, the Board emphasized that AI-related terminology evolves rapidly, and descriptiveness must be assessed in the current market context.

    Notably, the Board pointed to sixteen recent registrations on the Supplemental Register featuring similar “.AI” constructions (e.g., TOOL.AI, COMMERCE.AI, BEAUTY.AI), supporting the conclusion that such constructions are commonly viewed as descriptive of AI-based software.

    Double entendre and first use. Moises also argued that the mark was a double entendre, referring both to AI music and its domain name, MUSIC.AI. The Board rejected this, citing In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394 F.2d 549 (CCPA 1968), which permits registration of double entendres only if both meanings are readily apparent and at least one is non-descriptive. Here, both meanings were descriptive. The Board also reaffirmed that being the first user of a descriptive term does not render it registrable, citing In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150.

    Conclusion. Thus, the TTAB affirmed the refusal to register the mark MUSIC.AI under Section 2(e)(1), holding that the term is merely descriptive of AI-driven music software.

    The Case is Serial No. 9814204.

    Judge: Dunn, E.

    Attorneys: David P. Johnson (Workman Nydegger) for Moises Systems, Inc. Cindy Nguyen for the USPTO.

    Companies: Moises Systems, Inc.

    Cases: Trademark AINews TechnologyInternet USPTO

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