IP Law Daily, TRADEMARK—TTAB: HALO MACHINE confusable with HALO for additive manufacturing, 3D printing, (Apr 14, 2026)

By Jonathan Anderson

Registrant’s mark is subsumed entirely within Applicant’s mark, which the Board found increases the similarity of the two marks.

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the USPTO’s examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark HALO MACHINE for display stands created with 3D printing and additive manufacturing because the mark is likely to cause confusion with the mark HALO for various additive manufactured products. The Board found that Applicant’s and Registrant’s services are in-part legally identical, and that the trade channels for such services are presumed the same. The Board also found that Applicant’s mark and the cited marks are similar in appearance, sound, meaning, and commercial impression (In re Halo Machine, No. 98672491 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 6, 2026)).

Background. Applicant, Halo Machine, sought registration on the principal register of the standard-character mark HALO MACHINE for “3D printing of firearm display stands and wristwatch display stands for others; 3D printing services of firearm display stands and wristwatch display stands for others; Additive manufacturing of firearm display stands and wristwatch display stands for others; Machine shop services, namely, machining parts for others; Custom 3D printing of firearm display stands and wristwatch display stands; Custom 3D printing of firearm display stands and wristwatch display stands for others; Custom additive manufacturing of firearm display stands and wristwatch display stands; Custom additive manufacturing of firearm display stands and wristwatch display stands for others” in International Class 40.

The examining attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C § 1052(d), on the ground that when used in connection with the identified services, Applicant’s mark was likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive because it resembles the registered standard-character mark HALO for “Manufacture of general product lines in the field of automotive, aerospace, medical devices, and mechanical components to the order and specification of others; Manufacturing services for others in the field of automotive, aerospace, medical devices, plating, and coating parts; Additive manufacturing for others; Additive manufacturing of automotive, aerospace, medical devices, and mechanical components for others; Biomanufacturing for others, namely, manufacturing of surgical implants using biological organisms in the manufacturing process; Custom manufacturing of doors; Custom manufacturing of prosthetics; Custom additive manufacturing; Custom additive manufacturing for others; Custom additive manufacturing of automotive, aerospace, medical devices, and mechanical components; Custom aircraft manufacturing; Custom airplane manufacturing; Research in the field of manufacturing processes” in International Class 40.

The examining attorney also refused registration of applicant’s mark under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), on the ground that Applicant’s mark is merely descriptive of the identified services. The Board did not address this basis for refusal.

Applicant sought reconsideration, which was denied, and appealed pro se.

Evidentiary issues. The examining attorney asserted that third-party registrations submitted by applicant were not properly entered into the evidentiary record. The Board found that because applicant submitted the electronic equivalent of certificates of registration with its request for reconsideration, the third-party registrations were properly in the record.

Likelihood of confusion. The Board analyzed all probative evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion and considered each DuPont factor for which there was evidence and argument.

Services and trade channels. The Board held these factors favor a likelihood of confusion, finding that the services of Applicant’s application and the cited registration are in-part legally identical. Specifically, Registrant’s cited services of “additive manufacturing” subsume the narrower services identified in the application of “additive manufacturing” of various displays. The examining attorney also submitted a dictionary entry for “additive manufacturing,” which identified “3D printing” as an equivalent term. Further, the Board found that the trade channels for the legally identical services and classes of consumers are presumed to the same.

The marks. The Board found this factor favors a likelihood of confusion. The applicant's mark and the cited mark are similar in appearance and sound because they share the identical lead word HALO, and the cited mark contains additional wording. The fact that Registrant’s mark is subsumed entirely within applicant’s mark increases the similarity of the two marks. Further, the Board said the term “HALO” is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered because of the term’s position as the first word in Applicant’s mark. The applicant also conceded that the term “MACHINE” may be considered descriptive in connection with manufacturing and machining services, which diminishes the distinctiveness of that element and reinforces “HALO” as the dominant element, thereby reducing the weight of the word “MACHINE” in the likelihood-of-confusion analysis. In addition, the Board concluded that the marks are similar in meaning and commercial impression. The services are in part legally identical, and Applicant’s addition of “MACHINE” does not materially alter the marks’ shared commercial impression.

Actual confusion or lack thereof. The Board found this factor neutral, dismissing Applicant’s argument that there was no evidence of actual confusion for nearly five years of concurrent use.

Strength or weakness of the cited mark. The Board found this factor neutral. Because the cited mark is issued on the principal register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness, the Board said it must presume the cited mark is inherently distinctive for Registrant’s services. Although the applicant submitted third-party registration evidence to show that HALO is not exclusive to a single source or industry, the Board concluded that such evidence was insufficient to demonstrate conceptual weakness.

The Case is Serial No. 98672491.

Judge: Stanley, L.

Attorneys: Dennis Mitchell Landrum (Finley & Cook PLLC) for Halo Machine. Edward Fennessy for the USPTO.

Companies: Halo Machine

Cases: Trademark USPTO