IP Law Daily, TRADEMARK—S.D. Ind.: NCAA shoots for TRO against DraftKings and misses in March Madness dispute, (Mar 27, 2026)

By Saurabh Kashyap, B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M.

NCAA likely proved that DraftKings engaged in trademark infringement, false association, and dilution, but its years-long delay undermined any claim of immediate irreparable harm.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has been denied a temporary restraining order (TRO) in its lawsuit against sports betting company DraftKings in a dispute over use of the NCAA’s marks associated with its basketball tournaments, including the “March Madness” name. An Indiana federal court determined that, although the organization demonstrated a likelihood of success on its trademark infringement, false association, and dilution claims under the Lanham Act, it failed to establish irreparable harm due to its delay in seeking relief. The court was also unpersuaded by DraftKings’ nominative fair use defense but concluded that the absence of urgency was dispositive at the TRO stage (National Collegiate Athletic Association v. DraftKings, Inc., No. 1:26-cv-00557-TWP-MG (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2026)).

Background. The plaintiff, the NCAA, is the governing body for collegiate athletics in the United States and organizes the highly popular Division I men’s and women’s basketball tournaments. The defendant, DraftKings, Inc., is a sports betting and digital sports media company that operates an online sportsbook platform allowing users to place wagers on sporting events, including college basketball games.

The NCAA asserted rights in several well-known trademarks associated with its basketball tournaments, including MARCH MADNESS®, FINAL FOUR® (and FINAL 4®), ELITE EIGHT® (and ELITE 8™), and NCAA SWEET SIXTEEN® (and SWEET 16™). The court observed that the NCAA has used these marks continuously for decades and that they have achieved widespread recognition and substantial commercial value.

The dispute centered on DraftKings’ integration of these marks into its sportsbook interface, including as navigation categories, promotional labels, and betting menus tied to the NCAA tournaments. The NCAA filed suit on March 20, 2026, asserting claims for trademark infringement under Section 32 of the Lanham Act, false association and unfair competition under Section 43(a), and trademark dilution under Section 43(c). It simultaneously sought a TRO to immediately halt DraftKings’ use of the marks, arguing that such use created consumer confusion and harmed its reputation, particularly given its longstanding opposition to sports betting.

Likelihood of confusion. The court first analyzed the NCAA’s infringement and false association claims under the Seventh Circuit’s likelihood-of-confusion framework, citing Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001).

On the similarity of the marks, the court found DraftKings’ use nearly identical to the NCAA’s registered marks. It rejected DraftKings’ argument that its use was merely descriptive or necessary, noting that alternative terminology was available.

On the similarity of the parties’ services, the court emphasized that direct competition is not required. Citing Forum Corp. of North America v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1990), it held that confusion may arise where consumers perceive affiliation. Because both parties targeted the same audience, college basketball fans, the court found this factor favored the NCAA.

The court also found complete overlap in the channels of trade and marketing, as both parties operated through digital platforms, social media, and nationwide advertising. This factor strongly supported a likelihood of confusion.

On consumer care, the court rejected DraftKings’ contention that sports bettors exercise heightened scrutiny. Relying on AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2008), it reasoned that inexpensive, widely accessible services reduce consumer attentiveness, thereby increasing the likelihood of confusion.

The strength of the NCAA’s marks weighed heavily in its favor. The court described them as exceptionally strong and widely recognized, supported by decades of use, extensive media exposure, and substantial revenues.

The court treated actual confusion as neutral, noting the limited record at the preliminary stage.

Finally, on intent, the court found that DraftKings deliberately used the NCAA’s marks to capitalize on their commercial appeal. It emphasized that DraftKings could have used alternative descriptors but chose not to do so.

Balancing these factors, the court concluded that the NCAA had established a likelihood of success on its infringement and false association claims.

Trademark dilution. Turning to dilution, the court found that the NCAA’s marks were indisputably famous and that DraftKings’ use postdated that fame. The remaining issue was whether the use was likely to cause dilution. The court focused on dilution by tarnishment, citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000). It held that associating the NCAA’s marks with sports betting, an activity the NCAA publicly opposes, could harm the reputation and distinctiveness of those marks. The court accepted the NCAA’s argument that such an association risked undermining its messaging regarding the integrity of collegiate athletics. Accordingly, the court concluded that the NCAA was also likely to succeed on its dilution claim.

Nominative fair use. DraftKings argued that its use constituted nominative fair use under New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). The court declined to adopt that doctrine. Further, relying on Dwyer Instruments, Inc. v. Sensocon, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (N.D. Ind. 2012), the court noted that the Seventh Circuit has not recognized nominative fair use as a separate defense. Instead, it held that the traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis adequately addresses referential uses. As a result, DraftKings’ fair use defense failed.

Irreparable harm. Despite the NCAA’s strong showing on the merits, the court held that it failed to establish irreparable harm, which is essential for TRO relief.

Although trademark law provides a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing of likely success, the court found that the NCAA’s delay rebutted this presumption. Citing Illinois Tamale Co., Inc. v. LC Trademarks, Inc., 164 F.4th 648 (7th Cir. 2026), it emphasized that delay undermined any claims of urgency. The record showed that DraftKings had used similar terminology for several years. The court found it implausible that the NCAA, which actively monitors its trademarks, was unaware of such use. Even assuming recent awareness, the NCAA still delayed months before seeking emergency relief. Thus, the court concluded that this delay was inconsistent with any claim of immediate and irreparable harm, particularly given the extraordinary nature of TRO relief.

Balance of equities and public interest. The court briefly noted that the balance of equities and public interest likely favored the NCAA, particularly given the strength of its marks and its policy concerns regarding gambling. However, because irreparable harm was not established, these factors did not alter the outcome.

Thus, finally, the court denied the NCAA’s motion for a temporary restraining order, noting that its delay in seeking relief precluded a finding of irreparable harm.

The Case is No. 1:26-cv-00557-TWP-MG.

Judge: Pratt, T.

Attorneys: Christopher J. Schmidt (Bryan Cave LLP) for National Collegiate Athletic Association. David H. Bernstein (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) for DraftKings, Inc.

Companies: National Collegiate Athletic Association; DraftKings, Inc.

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