IP Law Daily, TRADEMARK—E.D. Pa.: Wine education company denied injunction in ‘Philly Wine School’ trademark dispute, (May 29, 2026)

By Saurabh Kashyap, B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M.

The court found the plaintiff unlikely to prove protectable rights in the descriptive mark or establishing sufficient evidence of consumer confusion.

A federal district court in Pennsylvania has denied a preliminary injunction sought by a Philadelphia wine education business in a trademark dispute over the phrase “Philly Wine School,” finding that the company failed to demonstrate likely success on its Lanham Act claims. The court held that the plaintiff did not establish protectable trademark rights because the disputed phrase was descriptive and lacked sufficient secondary meaning associated with the plaintiff’s services. The court also concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove ownership, priority, and likelihood of confusion, despite some overlap between the parties’ markets and branding. Although the plaintiff demonstrated likely irreparable harm stemming from the disruption of its online accounts and digital marketing channels, the court ruled that those harms could not overcome its failure to satisfy the threshold merits requirement (PhillyWine LLC v. KSWCO, LLC, No. 2:26-cv-01268-JDW (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2026)).

Background. PhillyWine LLC, the plaintiff, operated a Philadelphia-based wine education business offering wine courses, tastings, and Wine & Spirit Education Trust (WSET) certification programs. The defendants, KSWCO LLC, affiliated entities, and wine educator Keith Wallace, operated competing wine education services under the “Wine School of Philadelphia” brand. The parties had operated in the same geographic market for years while targeting somewhat different audiences.

In November 2024, Wallace applied to register “PHILLY WINE SCHOOL” for wine education services, asserting first use dating back to August 15, 2016. After the United States Patent and Trademark Office initially refused registration because the mark was geographically descriptive, Wallace sought registration under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act by claiming acquired distinctiveness through use in commerce. The USPTO ultimately issued the registration on December 9, 2025. PhillyWine, however, claimed earlier common-law rights based on its prior use of “PhillyWine,” “phillywine.com,” and “Philly Wine School.”

The conflict escalated after PhillyWine LLC acquired the business previously operated by Neal Ewing, whose wine education program had operated since the late 1980s and used the domain phillywine.com since 2001. The court noted, however, that the business historically marketed itself primarily as “Neal Ewing Wine Services.” Following the ownership transition, PhillyWine expanded its operations, entered institutional partnerships, and began using “PhillyWine School” more prominently in social media and outward-facing branding during 2024 and 2025.

After obtaining the federal registration, Wallace submitted trademark complaints to Instagram, Google, and Squarespace, asserting infringement of the “PHILLY WINE SCHOOL” mark. Instagram suspended PhillyWine’s @phillywineschool account, which the plaintiff described as a central tool for promoting courses and communicating with students. PhillyWine filed suit on February 26, 2026, and moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to bar the defendants from using “Philly Wine School” and from pursuing further enforcement actions against its online accounts and business listings.

Descriptive mark. The court first concluded that “Philly Wine School” was descriptive rather than inherently distinctive. Applying the framework articulated in A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000), the court held that the phrase directly described the geographic location and nature of the services provided. According to the court, “Philly” denoted Philadelphia, “Wine” described the subject matter, and “School” identified the nature of the service. Because the phrase immediately conveyed the nature of the business without requiring imagination or inference, the court found it descriptive and therefore protectable only upon proof of secondary meaning.

No secondary meaning. Further, the court determined that PhillyWine failed to demonstrate that consumers associated “Philly Wine School” specifically with its business. Citing Commerce Nat’l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 438 (3d Cir. 2000), the court explained that secondary meaning exists only when consumers recognize a phrase as identifying a particular source rather than merely describing a category of services.

The record showed that the business historically operated under the “Neal Ewing Wine Services” name, while the plaintiff’s evidence largely demonstrated recognition of “PhillyWine” or “phillywine.com,” not “Philly Wine School.” The court emphasized that PhillyWine itself admitted it “did not regularly use ‘Philly Wine School,’” undermining its assertion of longstanding marketplace recognition. The court also noted that similar terminology appeared widely within the wine industry, further weakening the plaintiff’s claim to exclusivity.

No ownership or priority. Next, the court rejected PhillyWine’s argument that it possessed superior common-law rights in the disputed phrase. Although trademark rights arise from use rather than registration, the court found insufficient evidence that PhillyWine used “Philly Wine School” publicly and consistently before the defendants’ use.

Further, the court explained that ownership depends on sufficiently public use capable of identifying services in consumers’ minds. The plaintiff’s evidence instead showed that its goodwill and business growth attached primarily to “PhillyWine” and “phillywine.com,” not the specific phrase at issue.

The court also rejected PhillyWine’s “family of marks” theory under J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1991), finding no evidence that consumers perceived “Philly Wine School” as part of a unified family of “PhillyWine” marks.

Likelihood of confusion. Applying the Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1983), factors, the court held that PhillyWine failed to establish likely consumer confusion. Although the parties marketed similar services in the same geographic area and used overlapping online channels, the court found that the mark's descriptive weakness substantially limited the scope of protection available.

The court also found the evidence of actual confusion minimal and recent. The isolated examples cited by PhillyWine arose only after the plaintiff began using “Philly Wine School” more prominently in its branding in late 2025. Meanwhile, the parties had coexisted for years without documented confusion.

In addition, the court found no evidence that the defendants adopted the phrase in bad faith. Third-party publications had referred to Wallace’s business as “Philly Wine School” or similar variations since the mid-2000s. The court concluded that the dispute reflected competing claims over a descriptive phrase rather than an effort to trade on another company’s goodwill.

Irreparable harm. While the court agreed that PhillyWine demonstrated likely irreparable harm arising from the suspension of its Instagram account and the threatened disruption of its online presence, it found that irreparable harm alone could not justify injunctive relief absent likely success on the merits. The court further concluded that the balance of equities favored the defendants because the requested injunction would interfere with rights arising from a presumptively valid federal trademark registration that had not been invalidated.

Therefore, the court denied PhillyWine’s motion for a preliminary injunction in its entirety.

The Case is No. 2:26-cv-01268-JDW.

Judge: Wolson, J.

Attorneys: Barry R. Horwitz (Greenberg Traurig, LLP) for PhillyWine LLC. David Rodkey (Dilworth Paxson LLP) for KSWCO LLC.

Companies: PhillyWine LLC; KSWCO LLC

Cases: Trademark PennsylvaniaNews