IP Law Daily, TRADEMARK—E.D. Pa.: MEDDPICC sales method trademark invalidated as generic, (Apr 23, 2026)

By Justin Marcus Smith, J.D.

The defendant trademark owner’s attempt to distinguish between business or education services and the MEDDPICC sales method itself failed.

A defendant trademark holder’s own use of the sales acronym MEDDPICC supported a strong inference that sales professionals would primarily understand the acronym in its sales-methodological sense, rather than as a designator of the origin of consulting services, held the federal district court in Philadelphia. Under trademark law and the facts of the case, there was ultimately no issue with the plaintiff’s framing of the primary significance test because the business or education services and the MEDDPICC sales qualification method itself were “functionally equivalent” in accord with the genericness doctrine. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff because a reasonable jury would find that sales professionals understand the MEDDPICC acronym to be generic. Whether the plaintiff had its own U.K. trademark registration was immaterial because trademark standards do not cross international borders. The court held the plaintiff was entitled to its request for declaratory relief ordering the cancellation of the defendant’s mark on the principal register. However, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to tortious interference because there was no dispute that the defendant’s attempt to enforce his trademark was privileged. Some aspects of the plaintiff’s proposed testimony were improper legal testimony (Meddicc Ltd. v. 01 Consulting LLC, No. 2:24-cv-01836-WB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2026)).

Background. Plaintiff MEDDICC Ltd., a U.K. consultancy, found it increasingly hard to refer to the subject of its consulting services, a multi-step sales qualification framework known as “MEDDPICC,” after defendant Darius Lahoutifard secured a federal registration of the term as his own trademark.

In the early 1990s, non-party Parametric Technology Corporation (PTC) coined “MEDDICC” as an acronym for “Metrics, Economic Buyer, Decision Criteria, Decision Process, Identify Pain, and Champion.” In 2005, former PTC employees coined the variant acronym “MEDDPICC” to add “Paper Process and Competition” as conceptual components.

Although Lahoutifard acknowledged the MEDDPICC acronym he trademarked designates a sales method, he simultaneously claimed it as the name for the related consulting services provided by his firm, defendant 01 Consulting LLC. Plaintiff MEDDICC Ltd. and Lahoutifard’s 01 Consulting LLC were head-to-head competitors in the business training services market.

Plaintiff MEDDICC Ltd. sued seeking a declaration of non-infringement and cancellation of Lahoutifard’s trademark registration. MEDDICC Ltd. also brought common law claims for tortious interference with contractual and prospective contractual relations and for trade libel.

Defendant Lahoutifard counterclaimed for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114(1); counterfeiting under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117; unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); Pennsylvania common law trademark infringement and unfair competition; and, violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), 73 Pa. C.S.A. § 201-1 et seq. However, the court granted MEDDICC Ltd.’s motion for summary judgment.

Infringement claims. The plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment declaring non-infringement and summary judgment on Lahoutifard’s counterclaims for trademark infringement and federal and state unfair competition all implicated the same legal standard, i.e., whether Lahoutifard had a valid trademark; whether he owned the mark; and whether the plaintiffs’ use of it was likely to cause confusion as to origin. However, it all turned on whether MEDDPICC was a valid mark, and the court held it was not a valid mark for business education services and content. The mark was too generic for that purpose.

Each party appeared to regard sales professionals as the target audience for their respective training services. The test, therefore, would be whether sales professionals primarily understand MEDDPICC to refer to a genus of consulting services or to a specific producer of them.

Most compellingly, the plaintiff pointed to numerous instances in the record, including public-facing materials, in which Lahoutifard acknowledged that MEDDPICC designates a sales qualification method. This was a strong indication that the acronym is generic. According to the court, his website even described MEDDPICC as the result of sales and qualification techniques developed at PTC. Course titles conveyed that MEDDPICC was the underlying sales framework subject matter. Lahoutifard also authored a book that characterized MEDDPICC as a sales method. Other examples of more or less this same characterization abounded in the record.

The inference that sales professionals would primarily understand MEDDPICC in its methodological sense was reinforced by testimony of the plaintiff’s expert. The expert’s report described the breadth of MEDDPICC’s adoption, especially by software firms. The expert cited that large companies like IBM and Microsoft sometimes have dedicated internal “MEDDPICC” teams. The expert also reviewed job postings in the Boston area that suggested MEDDPICC is in widespread generic use, and that competitors have a need to use the acronym. There was no suggestion in the record of any other alternative term for it. The acronym was, according to the plaintiff’s expert, inseparable from the sales method. Public use on Twitter only reinforced the conclusion of genericness.

Lahoutifard maintained that the question should be whether MEDDPICC is generic as to business education services and content. Under trademark law and the facts of the case, there was ultimately no issue with the plaintiff’s framing of the primary significance test because the business or education services and the MEDDPICC method itself were “functionally equivalent” in accord with the genericness doctrine.

The court noted here that the policy interest behind the genericness doctrine is to prevent individuals from taking out of the language a word that competitors need or will need to use to identify their own goods or services. The court continued that the generally proper focus of the genericness inquiry on the description of services in the trademark registration certificate should not be myopic.

The first principle is that if a term is generic for a good, it is also deemed generic for services that sell or provide the good as a key aspect of business. The second principle is that a term is generic if the relevant public understands the term to refer to part of the claimed genus of goods or services, even if the public does not understand the term to refer to the broad genus as a whole. For example, “pizzeria” would be generic for restaurant services even though the public understands the term to refer to a type of restaurant rather than all restaurants.

The court said it could grant judgment as a matter of law where, as here, the plaintiff’s evidence indicated MEDDPICC is generic for the sales method good. Under the first principle, the evidence showed that MEDDPICC was generic for MEDDPICC-focused training services and content. Under the second principle, the evidence also showed MEDDPICC to be a generic name for the genus of business education services and content as well as for the MEDDPICC-specific sub-genus.

With the burden shifted, Lahoutifard did not show a triable dispute. Much of his evidence showed that he recognized MEDDPICC’s “intrinsic methodological meaning.” Brand use evidence did not reflect public understanding of the term or actually undercut the defendant’s argument. Reliance on the plaintiffs’ use of the term was misplaced because it further underscored the methodological significance of the term.

Whether the plaintiff had its own U.K. trademark registration was immaterial because trademark standards do not cross international borders.

The court also held the plaintiff was entitled to its request for declaratory relief ordering the cancellation of Lahoutifard’s mark on the principal register.

Tortious interference. The plaintiff did not show entitlement to summary judgment on its contractual interference claims. There was no dispute that the defendant was privileged in attempting to enforce his trademark registration. Nothing in the record supported the plaintiff’s assertion that Lahoutifard knew or should have known that MEDDPICC was generic. The plaintiff also failed to provide legal support for its second theory that over-enforcement was unprivileged.

Expert testimony. Before addressing MEDDICC Ltd.’s motion for summary judgment, the court granted in part and denied in part Lahoutifard’s motion to exclude the expert report and testimony of a MEDDICC Ltd. expert.

The parties’ claims turned on whether Lahoutifard’s registered trademark is valid, but that depended on whether the public recognizes the mark as having a function that indicates origin. Lahoutifard principally contended that the plaintiff’s expert offered legal testimony by opining that MEDDPICC is either a generic term or a descriptive term that lacks secondary meaning. The court cited that, in the Third Circuit, questions of generic or descriptive meaning or acquisition of secondary meaning are questions of fact appropriate for expert testimony.

Moreover, the court found nothing wrong with the expert’s recitation of legal definitions of the terms “generic,” “descriptive,” and “secondary meaning” as underlying assumptions that did not render the proposed testimony inadmissible.

However, the court did agree with Lahoutifard that some aspects of the proposed testimony were improper legal testimony. The elaboration of when a term is eligible for trademark protection strayed too close to explaining the law to the jury. Similarly, the expert could not offer testimony about the validity of Lahoutifard’s trademark claims because they went to the legal implications of the expert’s factual determinations about genericness and secondary meaning.

Narrowing the scope of the expert’s testimony essentially mooted Lahoutifard’s objections to the expert’s qualification. The expert was a sales professional of forty years who was personally involved with the inception of both the MEDDIC and MEDDPICC methods.

As for Lahoutifard’s reliability objections, the court found the expert based his conclusion about genericness on a reliable combination of permissible sources, even if the expert did not conduct a survey. Personal knowledge or experience is not always reliable, but the instant expert’s evidence of MEDDPICC genericness, keyed to the fact that it originated and evolved as a sales qualification method for years before Lahoutifard began using it, were “undoubtedly reliable” in light of the expert’s extensive sales experience. Evidence of widespread adoption of the acronym was based on more than just personal experience. The expert cited 155 pages of third-party documentary evidence and job postings seeking sales professionals with proficiency in MEDDPICC. Other Lahoutifard arguments about reliability went to the weight of the expert’s testimony, not admissibility.

Lastly, the court rejected Lahoutifard’s argument that the expert was biased because nothing in Fed. R. Evid. 702 suggests an expert must be neutral to offer an opinion. The Third Circuit also discourages district courts from considering expert credibility when assessing reliability. Any bias would only go to weight, not admissibility.

The Case is No. 2:24-cv-01836-WB.

Judge: Beetlestone, W.

Attorneys: Cali R. Spota (Fox Rothschild LLP) for Meddicc Ltd. Andrew R. Nelson (Salient PC) for 01 Consulting LLC d/b/a Meddic Academy.

Companies: Meddicc Ltd.; 01 Consulting LLC d/b/a Meddic Academy

Cases: Trademark PennsylvaniaNews