IP Law Daily, TRADEMARK—11th Cir.: Descendants of famous Mexican painter Frida Kahlo must stake their claim in Florida, (Apr 20, 2026)

By Matthew Hersh, J.D.

A federal court finds that it has jurisdiction over the Mexico-based defendants.

A decades-long dispute over the intellectual property of a prominent Mexican painter will have to be heard in a United States forum, the federal court for the Southern District of Florida has held. The court, in dismissing a motion to dismiss by a descendant of the painter and the Mexican company she operates, found that the two defendants subjected themselves to personal jurisdiction in Florida by sending allegedly false cease-and-desist letters into the state and threatening litigation over asserted trademark and other intellectual property claims (Frida Kahlo Corp. v. Mara Cristina Teresa Romeo Pinedo, No. 24-10293 (11th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026)).

The appeal arises out of a bitter family dispute over the rights to the intellectual property of the late Mexican artist Frida Kahlo. A short summary of the Kahlo family tree is necessary to fully understand the dispute. Frida Kahlo had no children, but her sister Cristina had two—Isolda and Antonio. Isolda had a daughter by the name of Mara Cristina Teresa Romeo Pinedo, more commonly referred to as Mara Romeo Pinedo for short. Mara Romeo in turn had a child by the name of Mara de Anda Romeo. (Mara Romeo and Mara de Anda Romeo, the grand-niece and great-grand-niece of Kahlo, are often referred to as “Las Maras,” or “the Maras,” in Spanish-language coverage).

When Kahlo died in 1954, the rights to her intellectual property passed to Cristina’s daughter Isolda as well as Isolda’s daughter Mara Romeo (thus bypassing Cristina’s other child Antonio and his daughter Cristina Kahlo, a renowned photographer in her own right). In the early 2000s, Isolda and The Maras joined with Venezuelan businessman Carlos Dorado to form Panama-based Frida Kahlo Corporation as a means to exploit the intellectual property of the late artist. But the Kahlo descendants and Dorado later had a falling out, leading The Maras in 2016 (by this point Isolda had passed away) to form Familia Kahlo in Mexico.

The two entities that emerged from that complicated chain of events—Dorado’s Frida Kahlo Corporation and The Maras’ splinter company Familia Kahlo—have battled ever since in a wide range of international fora over the rights to the Kahlo intellectual property. (One report describes the dispute as reaching more than 30 countries across North America, South America, and Europe.) One of the most high-profile disputes between the entities emerged in 2018 with the release of a Frida Kahlo Barbie doll by Mattel. The so-called “Frida Barbie” dispute was eventually resolved in Dorado’s favor by the Mexican courts.

The trademark dispute eventually reached a Florida federal court in 2022 when Dorado’s Frida Kahlo Corporation (along with its subsidiary, Frida Kahlo Investments) filed a lawsuit against Mara Romeo Pinedo and her company Familia Kahlo. The lawsuit contended that Familia Kahlo violated the Lanham Act and engaged in tortious interference by sending allegedly false cease-and-desist letters to stop the Dorado companies from exploiting the intellectual property in Florida. (The lawsuit also originally bought a claim of copyright infringement, but the Dorado companies eventually abandoned that claim).

The district court dismissed the complaint in late 2023, finding that it had no jurisdiction over the two Mexico-based defendants. The Dorado-run entities appealed, leading to this opinion.

Florida long-arm statute. The court of appeals found that both defendants were subject to jurisdiction under Florida law. The district court had found that Familia Kahlo was subject to Florida long-arm jurisdiction, but that Mara Romeo Pinedo could not be reached personally because she acted only on behalf of the company. The court of appeals disagreed. Under Florida’s corporate shield law, the court noted, individuals may not be required to defend a suit brought against them personally in a forum where their only relevant contacts are acts performed for the benefit of an employer. But here, the court noted, the complaint adequately alleged conduct by Pinedo in her personal capacity. For example, the court noted, the company’s general manager sent cease-and-desist letters describing “the heiress of the painter Frida Kahlo” as “our represent[ative]” and noting that he was acting “in our capacity as representatives” of Pinedo. “We cannot imagine a clearer way for [that manager] to have indicated that he was representing Pinedo in her individual capacity and was sending the cease-and-desist letters on Pinedo’s behalf as her agent,” the court found.

Due process. The court also found that the exercise of jurisdiction over the two Mexico-based defendants comported with constitutional due process requirements. To satisfy this test, the court noted, a plaintiff must show that (1) the claims “arise out of or relate to at least one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum; (2) the nonresident defendant “purposefully availed” himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” All three factors supported personal jurisdiction here, the court found.

The court first found that the claims at issue arose from contacts with Florida. The central question under this test, the court noted, was whether there was “an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum state and is therefore subject to the state's regulation.” That was clearly the case here, the court found. Taking the claims as true for the purpose of this analysis, the two defendants “sent cease-and-desist letters into Florida that threatened litigation based on allegedly false assertions of trademark ownership,” the court noted. They also “directed their conduct into Florida, and that very same conduct serves as the basis for Plaintiffs’ instant claims.” The first prong of the test was therefore satisfied.

The court next found that the two defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in Florida. For one thing, the court found, purposeful availment could be found on the basis of the so-called “effects test” applicable to intentional torts. Indeed, if the claims in the lawsuit were true, the two defendants sent cease-and-desist letters to Florida entities which caused injury to the Dorado-run entities within Florida “which they should have reasonably anticipated.” And even if the effect test were not satisfied, the court found, the same conduct also satisfied the more traditional “minimum contacts” test for jurisdiction. Indeed, the cease-and-desist letters expressly threatened legal action, the court noted—“enough to constitute purposeful availment, at least where the cause of action directly arises from the contacts with the forum.”

Finally, the court found, exercising personal jurisdiction here would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The two defendants could not complain about having to travel to Florida, the court found, because they had already initiated lawsuits in other countries and were therefore “capable of and undeterred from litigation.” Other traditional due process factors, such as the interest in the parties in having the dispute adjudicated in Florida, also supported jurisdiction.

The Case is No. 24-10293.

Judge: Lagoa, B.

Attorneys: Darlene Barron (Avila Rodriguez Hernandez Mena & Garro, LLP) for Frida Kahlo Corp. and Frida Kahlo Investments, S.A. Joanna Andrade-Lehmann (Interval International, Inc.) for Mara Cristina Teresa Romeo Pinedo.

Companies: Frida Kahlo Corp.; Frida Kahlo Investments, S.A.

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