IP Law Daily, TECHNOLOGY/INTERNET—9th Cir.: Claims against Meta over Rohingya-related Facebook content properly dismissed, (Apr 29, 2026)

By Saurabh Kashyap, B.A., LL.B., LL.M.

The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ claims sought to treat Meta as a publisher of third-party content and were therefore barred by federal immunity.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of a putative class action lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc. and held that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 barred all claims because they attempted to impose liability on the platform for third-party content. The court determined that Facebook’s algorithmic recommendation and content amplification systems constituted protected publishing activity, and that Meta did not materially contribute to the alleged unlawful content. It further concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish the applicability of Myanmar law to displace federal immunity and held that federal law governed the dispute (Doe v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 24-1672 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2026)).

Background. The plaintiffs/appellants, identified as members of the Rohingya community, are individuals who alleged harm arising from violence and displacement in Myanmar. The defendant/appellee, Meta Platforms, Inc., is a multinational technology company that owns and operates Facebook, a global social media platform enabling users to create, publish, and interact with user-generated content at scale.

The dispute arose from allegations that Facebook amplified anti-Rohingya content, including hate speech and misinformation, which allegedly contributed to real-world violence and persecution in Myanmar. One of the plaintiffs filed a putative class action in California state court, asserting claims for strict product liability, negligence, negligent design, and aiding and abetting tortious conduct, seeking substantial damages. Meta removed the case to the Northern District of California, which dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice on timeliness grounds. The plaintiffs appealed.

Section 230 applicability. The Ninth Circuit first addressed whether Section 230 applied in light of the plaintiffs’ contention that Myanmar law should govern certain aspects of the dispute. Applying California’s governmental interest test, the court evaluated whether a true conflict existed between U.S. and Myanmar law and which jurisdiction’s interests would be more impaired if its law were not applied. The court found that the United States had a strong, clearly articulated interest in applying Section 230 to promote the development of the internet and to protect platforms from liability arising from third-party content. In contrast, although Myanmar had a general interest in protecting its citizens from harm, that interest was not sufficiently embodied in its statutory or common law framework governing liability for social media platforms. The court therefore held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that foreign law should apply and concluded that Section 230 governed the claims.

Publisher status. The court next applied the three-part framework established in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) to determine whether Section 230 immunity applied. It found that Meta operated an interactive computer service, and that the plaintiffs’ claims sought to hold Meta liable as a publisher of third-party content. The court emphasized that the proper inquiry focuses on the nature of the duty allegedly breached, rather than the formal designation of the claims. Although the plaintiffs framed their allegations as defects in product design, the court concluded that the claims targeted Facebook’s decisions regarding the display, prioritization, and moderation of user-generated content. These activities, the court held, fall squarely within traditional publishing functions protected by Section 230.

The court further explained that attempts to recast publishing-related claims as design defects cannot circumvent statutory immunity. It observed that the plaintiffs’ theory depended on the content of third-party posts and on the platform’s role in organizing and amplifying them. As a result, the claims necessarily treated Meta as a publisher, bringing them within the scope of Section 230.

Product liability and design claims. The plaintiffs argued that their claims should survive because they challenged Facebook as a defective product rather than a publishing platform. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that the alleged defects—encouraging harmful posts through engagement incentives, amplifying inflammatory content, and failing to provide adequate reporting mechanisms—were inherently tied to the dissemination of third-party speech. The court distinguished Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021), where claims involving a speed filter feature did not depend on user-generated content. In contrast, the plaintiffs’ claims in this case arose directly from third-party posts and their distribution on Facebook. The court held that product liability claims cannot proceed where they effectively seek to impose liability for the publication of user content.

Material contribution. The Ninth Circuit also examined whether Meta materially contributed to the alleged illegality of the content, thereby removing Section 230 protection. Relying on Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), the court held that providing neutral tools for user-generated content does not constitute development of unlawful content. It found that Facebook allowed users to post content voluntarily and did not require or direct them to create harmful messages. The platform’s algorithmic system, which promoted content based on user engagement, did not alter the substance of the posts or contribute to their illegality. Accordingly, Meta did not materially contribute to the unlawful content, and the third prong of the Section 230 test was satisfied.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on a “social rewards” theory, under which features such as likes, shares, and comments allegedly incentivized harmful content. It concluded that these features reflected user engagement rather than directives from Meta and did not transform the platform into a content developer. The court emphasized that Section 230 protects platforms even when their design facilitates user interaction that may lead to harmful outcomes, so long as the platform does not create or develop the unlawful content itself.

Algorithmic recommendations. Addressing the plaintiffs’ argument that Facebook’s algorithm constituted Meta’s own content, the court reaffirmed that recommendation systems are part of the platform’s publishing function. Citing Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019), the court held that algorithmic recommendations facilitate the communication of third-party content and therefore fall within Section 230 immunity. It concluded that Facebook’s engagement-driven algorithm, even if designed to prioritize certain types of content, did not transform Meta into a speaker or creator of that content.

Conclusion. The Ninth Circuit held that all of the plaintiffs’ claims depended on treating Meta as the publisher of third-party content and were therefore barred by Section 230. It concluded that Facebook’s design and algorithmic features did not remove the platform from statutory immunity, and that Meta did not materially contribute to the alleged unlawful content. The court affirmed the dismissal of the action, reinforcing the broad scope of Section 230 protection for online platforms in cases involving user-generated content and algorithmic amplification.

Concurring opinions. Although the panel reached a unanimous result, two concurring opinions highlighted reservations about existing precedent. Judge Berzon, joined by Judge Fletcher, agreed that circuit precedent compelled the outcome but criticized the expansive interpretation of Section 230, arguing that the term “publisher” had been stretched beyond its traditional meaning to encompass algorithmic recommendations and content amplification. She suggested that such activities may constitute a platform’s own expressive conduct rather than third-party publishing and urged reconsideration of the court’s precedent en banc. Judge Nelson issued a separate concurrence, also questioning the breadth of Section 230 immunity and expressing skepticism about applying the statute to product liability claims. He further emphasized that Section 230, as federal law, would prevail over conflicting state or foreign law under the Supremacy Clause.

The Case is No. 24-1672.

Judge: Nelson, R.

Attorneys: Roger J. Perlstadt (Edelson, Pcarent Fox LLP) for Jane Doe 1. Patrick James Fuster (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP) for Meta Platforms, Inc.

Companies: Meta Platforms, Inc.

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