IP Law Daily, SUPREME COURT NEWS: U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari in three trademark cases, (Oct 7, 2025)

By Linda O’Brien, J.D., LL.M.

Certiorari denial leaves intact Federal Circuit rulings on no right to jury trial, constructive use date, and color mark functionality.

In its order list released on October 6, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in four trademark infringement cases, declining to review decisions on whether jury-trial right applies in trademark-infringement actions seeking monetary relief, on the statutory right to a constructive use date, and on the importance to intellectual property holders regarding the intersection between expired utility patents and trademark protection. The petitions were filed by Cirrus Design, Thomas D. Foster, APC, and CeramTec GmbH. (Cirrus Design Corporation v. Great Western Air, LLC, Dkt. No. 25-18 (U.S. cert. denied Oct. 6, 2025); Thomas D. Foster, APC v. Stewart, Dkt. No. 25-144 ((U.S. cert. denied Oct. 6, 2025); CeramTec GmbH v. CoorsTek Bioceramics LLC, Dkt. No. 25-217 (U.S. cert. denied Oct. 6, 2025).

Cirrus Design Corporation v. Great Western Air, LLC. In its petition for certiorari, Cirrus Design had asked the High Court to clarify whether the jury trial right applied in trademark infringement actions seeking monetary relief in the form of the infringer’s profits. Cirrus Design Corporation, a personal airplane manufacturer was involved in a trademark suit with Great Western Air, LLC d/b/a Cirrus Aviation Services, a charter airline. Both parties had demanded a jury trial. Shortly before the jury trial was scheduled, Great Western withdrew its jury demand and argued that Cirrus Design’s request for the monetary remedy of profits was equitable and carried no jury-trial right. Relying on the Ninth Circuit precedent, the district court agreed and struck Cirrus Design’s jury demand, concluding that the Seventh Amendment did not afford the right to a jury calculation of profits because disgorgement was an equitable remedy and the issues of profit determination could not be traditionally tried by a jury. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s order.

The issue in the petition was a question about whether parties in infringement cases forfeit their right to a jury trial when they seek an accounting of profits as the monetary remedy instead of damages. Cirrus Design claimed that the Ninth Circuit erred by denying a jury and argued that its decision defied the Supreme Court’s precedent in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), neglected centuries of common law practice, and forced the trademark owners to “sacrifice their constitutional rights in order to exercise their statutory right to recover profits.”

Thomas D. Foster, APC v. Stewart. In a second case, in its petition, Thomas D. Foster, APC, which was denied registration of the mark US SPACE FORCE, asked the Court to clarify whether the Federal Circuit improperly considered government developments that postdated a trademark application date to support a refusal under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, despite the applicant's statutory right to constructive use based on the application’s filing date. Thomas D. Foster, APC, a California professional corporation, sought to register the mark US SPACE FORCE in connection with license plate frames, collectible coins, posters, bags, pillows, beverage containers, toys, and other goods. The examining attorney refused registration under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act based on false suggestion of a connection with the U.S. Space Force, a branch of the United States military. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the registration denial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision.

Foster petitioned the Supreme Court to review the decision of the Federal Circuit, arguing that the decision permitted the government to deny trademark registration based on post hoc determinations of association with political figures and institutions, despite its earlier filing date and no actual connection. Foster contended that this undermines the constitutional limits on viewpoint discrimination and granted impermissible deference to administrative interpretations in violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

CeramTec GmbH v. CoorsTek Bioceramics LLC. In a third case, CeramTec GmbH, a manufacturer of ceramics, including hip-joint components, led advances in ceramic production methods and a shifting from pure alumina ceramics to those made of a composition known as “zirconia-toughened alumina” (ZTA). CeramTec obtained U.S. Patent No. 5,830,816 (the ’816 patent) for the composition of its ZTA ceramics. CeramTec’s product practicing this patent—Biolox Delta—contained chromia which made it pink. Recognizing that its pink product had enormous value as a brand identifier, CeramTec secured trademark protection for the color pink as applied to ceramic hip-joint components. CoorsTek initiated cancellation proceedings before the TTAB seeking to cancel the marks. The TTAB ruled in CoorTek’s favor, concluding that CeramTec’s trademarks on the color pink as applied to hip-joint components were functional. The TTAB’s functionality analysis relied on CeramTec’s expired utility patents, which the TTAB concluded were “strong evidence that the color pink for ceramic hip implant components is functional” under the decision in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). The Federal Circuit affirmed.

In its petition for certiorari, CeramTec GmbH has asked the High Court to clarify that TrafFix is not a tool for companies to siphon a competitor’s reputational advantages. The petition argued that there was a circuit split over a recurring question of vital importance to intellectual property holders regarding the intersection between expired utility patents and trademark protection. The petition alleged that without the Supreme Court’s intervention, the Federal Circuit’s decision will incentivize forum shopping, with parties seeking to invalidate trademarks filing a challenge before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) rather than in the Third, Fourth, or Seventh Circuits.

The Cases are Dkt. No. 25-18, Dkt. No. 25-144, andDkt. No. 25-217.

News: Trademark USPTO FedCirNews