Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, SUPREME COURT NEWS—U.S.: President has authority to fire FTC commissioner without cause, (Jun 29, 2026)

By Jeffrey May, J.D.

The President may remove his subordinates within general administrative control at will. “Anything left” of 90-year-old precedent Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S. was overruled.

“What text, history, and structure settle, our precedent confirms—the President may remove his subordinates at will”—the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a case challenging President Trump’s firing of FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter without cause. “[N]either Congress nor the courts may saddle [the President] with those with whom he cannot work,” the Court explained. The FTC Act’s protection of commissioners from removal other than for cause was “contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.” Following its holding in Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, which held that those who fell within the President’s “general administrative control” must be removable by the President at will, the Court rejected a later precedent, Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S., 295 U. S. 602, which held that an exception existed for the FTC (Trump v. Slaughter, Dkt. No. 25-332 (June 29, 2026, Roberts, Ch.J.)).

The case arose in the context of the firing of Slaughter and another FTC commissioner by President Trump in March 2025. The President pointed to Article II of the Constitution as a basis for removal. At that time, there was a two-to-two Republican/Democratic split on the Commission. Slaughter sued. A federal district court issued an injunction, but the Supreme Court stayed the order and granted review. The questions presented were: (1) whether the statutory removal protections for FTC members violate the separation of powers and, if so, whether Humphrey’s should be overruled; and (2) whether a federal court may prevent a person’s removal from public office, either through relief at equity or at law.

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. explained that the FTC’s for-cause removal provision for FTC commissioners “is contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.” The removal power of the President can be traced to the framers of the Constitution, according to the Court. Early presidents also put the removal power into practice. Further, the Court’s 1926 decision in Myers v. U.S. “reaffirmed the President’s power to fire his subordinates at will.”

While a Supreme Court decision nine years after Myers, Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S., held that President Franklin Roosevelt lacked the authority to fire an FTC commissioner, the majority concluded that Humphrey’s was far out of step with more recent cases. Thus, the Court overruled Humphrey’s.

“If anything more is left of Humphrey’s, we overrule it, the Court said. Humphrey’s has for decades been a result in search of a rationale.”

The power of the FTC. The Court went on to explain how the FTC's tasks were “the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law”—precisely the President’s constitutional role. Among the tasks identified by the Court: the agency has the power to promulgate substantive rules that carry the force of law; it investigates to ensure compliance and enforces through in-house adjudication; and it files civil suits on behalf of the United States in federal court.

“Subordinates who exercise the President’s power are subject to removal by him,” the majority concluded. “Then, and only then, can they remain accountable to the President, and the President to the people.”

Functions outside the Executive Branch. The majority avoided providing a list of what agencies fell within the President’s executive power for removal purposes. However, it did point to the unique role of the Federal Reserve Board, noting that the President’s removal power was not unlimited. In a separate opinion delivered on the same day, in Trump v. Cook, the Court blocked the President’s firing of Lisa Cook—a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Cook alleged that her attempted removal was not “for cause.”

In that case, a federal court restored Cook to her position after her purported firing, and the government sought a stay. The Supreme Court denied the President’s request for a stay of the injunction. The Court refused to “transform the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection into at-will employment—an interpretive leap out of step with the statute Congress enacted and our Nation’s tradition of central banking protected from political interference.”

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented in Trump v. Cook. He also did not join in the majority decision’s position that the Trump v. Slaughter decision was limited in scope.

Power of independent agencies. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote separately, addressing the impact of the decision on the separation of powers. According to his concurring opinion, now that the President exercises direct control over both independent and executive agencies, constitutional constraints are needed to be placed on these agencies that have been delegated “so much legislative and judicial power.”

Dissent. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, Justice Sonia Sotomayer wrote: “The text of the Constitution, along with its history, the longstanding practices of the political branches, and the precedents of this Court, make clear that Congress may limit the causes for which the heads of Commissions like the FTC can be removed by the President.” The “grievously wrong” and “destabilizing” majority decision and rejection of Humphrey’s Executor “upends” the separation of powers, Sotomayer explained.

In the dissent’s view, the “case should have begun and ended with this Court’s unanimous decision from almost a century ago”—Humprey’s. Further, it was noted that Congress “with minimal objection (and no vetoes) from over a dozen Presidents, has constructed the Executive Branch in reliance upon Humphrey’s and its progeny.

Noting the impact of the decision, the dissenters listed “independent commissions [that were] now likely to become purely executive agencies,” including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Chemical Safety Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Merit Systems Protection Board. It took the position that the FTC and other agencies “will be transformed in ways that those who created them never could have expected and actively sought to avoid, fundamentally recalibrating the balance of power in this country in the process.”

The case is Dkt. No. 25-332.

Attorneys: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice. Amitabh Agarwal, Protect Democracy Project, for Rebecca Kelly Slaughter. Trisha B. Anderson (Hecker Fink LLP) for Bipartisan Former Chairs of the FTC.

... Trump’s efforts to stay Cook injunction thwarted by High Court

By John M. Pachkowski, J.D.

The Supreme Court has denied an attempt by President Trump to stay an injunction preventing him from firing Fed Governor Lisa Cook.

In a 5-4 opinion, written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court has denied an application filed by President Trump to stay an injunction preventing him from firing Federal Reserve Board Governor Lisa Cook for cause under the Federal Reserve Act. The Court noted that it decided this application on the narrow ground that the president failed to afford Cook the procedural protections to which she was entitled by statute since without those protections, she could not properly dispute the charges the president laid against her (Trump v. Cook, No. 25A312 (U.S. June 29, 2026)).

The case arose from an August 20, 2025, social media post by Federal Housing Finance Agency Director, William Pulte accusing Cook of falsifying bank documents and property records to acquire more favorable loan terms in 2021, by claiming two homes simultaneously as her principal residence. This then prompted a social media post by the president stating “Cook must resign, now!!!” and a subsequent letter, posted to Truth Social, from the president informing Cook that she was “hereby removed” from the Fed’s Board of Governors, “effective immediately.” This action precipitated a lawsuit by Cook against the president, as well as then-Fed Chair Jerome Powell and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors challenging her firing and requiring the Fed’s Board to let her remain as a member while the litigation proceeded (see Banking and Finance Law Daily, Aug. 26, 2025).

Judge Jia M. Cobb, of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, ruled that the president’s action likely violated the Federal Reserve Act’s “for cause” requirement and Cook’s due process rights. Judge Cobb also held that the statute’s protection limits removal to a Governor’s in-office conduct and performance of statutory duties and does not extend to alleged pre-tenure misconduct. The district court also determined that Cook was entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond before removal (see Banking and Finance Law Daily, Sept. 10, 2025). Shortly after the district court’s decision, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denied the Trump Administration’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal stating that the administration did not satisfy due process. While the majority declined to explore the meaning of “for cause” removal on an emergent basis, the minority compared it to “good cause” and removal for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” (see Banking and Finance Law Daily, Sept. 16, 2025). The president then filed an application with the Court, under its interim docket or “emergency docket” seeking to stay the injunction and allow the president to fire Cook (see Banking and Finance Law Daily, Sept. 19, 2025).

Interpretive leap. In denying the stay application, the Court’s majority ruled that the Trump Administration had not shown that it is likely to prevail on the legal arguments advanced in its stay application and accepting the administration position would “transform the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection into at-will employment—an interpretive leap out of step with the statute Congress enacted and our Nation’s tradition of central banking protected from political interference.”

Citing an English case from 1615, the Court noted that common law principles precluded the administration’s position that a president’s determination of “cause” is wholly unreviewable because the Federal Reserve Act “commits the determination of cause to” the president alone.

Unique historical status. The Court also dismissed the administration’s argument that even if the president’s determination is judicially reviewable, “cause” sets a very low bar—one that the president easily cleared. In dismissing this argument that Court noted that any definition of “cause” must reflect the Federal Reserve’s unique historical status and role and counsels a substantial threshold for “cause.” It should be noted that the unique historical status and role was raised in another “firings” case—Trump v. Wilcox—in which the Court stated, “The Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.”

The case is 25A312.

Judge: Roberts, J.

Attorneys: D. John Sauer, U.S. Department of Justice, for Donald J. Trump. Abbe David Lowell (Lowell & Associates, PLLC) for Lisa D. Cook.

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