Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, STATE-LAW CLAIMS—Colo. Sup. Ct.: Colorado recognizes a narrow self-defense public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, (Jun 18, 2026)
Law Firms Mentioned:Littler Mendelson | Rathod Mohamedbhai
Organizations Mentioned:Circle K Stores, Inc. | Circle K Stories, Inc. | Littler Mendelson, PC
By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.
The right to self-defense “is not a right that is left at the door when a person enters the workplace.”
Recognizing a self-defense public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, a divided en banc Colorado Supreme Court, answering a question certified to it by a federal district court, found that both section 18-1-704, C.R.S. (2025) and article II, section 3 of the Colorado Constitution establish a public policy in favor of self-defense and this right to self-defense belongs to all people, including employees. Stressing the narrow scope of the exception, the state high court explained that it applies only when an employee lawfully exercises the right in response to an unprovoked attack at work (Moreno v. Circle K Stores, Inc., No. 22-cv-02327-NYW-STV (Colo. Sup. Ct. June 15, 2026)).
This case arose when a Circle K employee was fired for violating its “Don’t Chase or Confront” policy after she extended her arms toward an individual who approached her with knives and demanded that she give him free cigarettes. She sued the company, claiming she was wrongfully discharged in violation of Colorado public policy because she was exercising her right to self-defense and trying to protect herself from being attacked.
Prior decisions. A federal district court in Colorado, concluding that the state’s statutory and constitutional right to self-defense does not give rise to a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, granted summary judgment to Circle K. Reversing, the Tenth Circuit found fact issues as to whether the employee had used self-defense and whether Circle K had fired her for doing so.
Certified question. On remand, the district court found disputed issues of material fact as to both questions and denied summary judgment. The employee then moved to certify to the state high court the legal question of whether Colorado recognizes self-defense as a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. The district court granted the motion.
Martin Marietta. The state high court, having accepted review of the question, noted that it first recognized a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in 1992 in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz. This exception, said the court, generally allows an at-will employee to pursue a claim for wrongful termination if their employer fires them for violating a clearly expressed public policy.
Sources of public policy. The General Assembly, observed the court, “has statutorily recognized the right to self-defense since the days of the Colorado territory.” Pursuant to section 704, its modern form, the court continued, “a person may justifiably use force against another to defend themselves ‘from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose.’” Further, Article II, section 3 of the state constitution sets out “natural, essential[,] and inalienable” rights that include “the right of enjoying and defending [one’s life].”
Both provisions, said the court, clearly express a public policy in favor of the right to self-defense. In addition, the statutory provision mandates how a person may defend themselves—they must reasonably believe they will imminently be subject to unlawful physical force; the use of force must be reasonably necessary; and deadly force is only permissible under certain circumstances. Moreover, self-defense is unjustified if the person asserting the defense was the initial aggressor or if the use of force is based on the victim’s gender identity or sexual orientation.
As to the constitutional provision, despite its brevity, the court found it provides a common understanding of when it’s appropriate to exercise the right of self-defense and Colorado jurisprudence lays out the boundaries of this constitutional right. The language of article II, section 3, the court observed, “identifies a ‘clear mandate’ bound by our case law, giving notice to employees and employers as to what conduct is permissible and what is not.” Accordingly, the court found both provisions present a clear public policy in favor of self-defense.
Public right. Finding next that the right to self-defense is a public right, the court explained that it is “an essential, inalienable right expressed in this state’s constitution—one that has been statutorily recognized for longer that Colorado has been a state.” Moreover, even though it’s possessed and exercised by individuals, it’s necessarily public.
While Circle K relied on the Sixth Circuit’s 2014 Hoven v Walgreen Co. decision, which held that under the U.S. and Michigan Constitutions, Michigan’s self-defense and concealed-carry statutes and a jury instruction were insufficient under Michigan law to create an exception to at-will employment, the court found the holding in that case inapplicable here given the limited extent of the Michigan statute and Michigan’s prohibition on using constitutional provisions as a source of public policy.
Job-related right. The court next turned to whether the termination of an at-will employee for exercising the right to self-defense constitutes termination based on the employee’s exercise of a job-related right. In Martin Marietta, said the court, it explained that one of the elements to consider in determining if the termination of an at-will employee violates public policy is whether the action directed by the employer “would undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating to the employee’s right or privilege as a worker.” Here, the court observed, “a provision need not specifically regulate or even mention employment to give rise to an employee’s rights or privileges as a worker” because the exception is rooted in a broader principle: the long-standing rule that “a contract violative of public policy should not be enforced.”
“Based on that fundamental concept,” said the court, “we have recognized that the essence of the exception is that an employee will have a cognizable claim for wrongful discharge if their discharge would be ‘detrimental to the public good.” A broad unifying principle in public policy cases, the court continued, is that an employer may not use termination to penalize an employee for exercising a constitutional or statutory right that reflects an important, clearly expressed public policy that affects the public. Applying that principle here, the court concluded that “an employer may not lawfully terminate an employee for properly exercising their essential, inalienable right to self-defense if the employee suffers an unprovoked attack at work.” Put another way, the court wrote, “the right to self-defense is job-related insofar as the need to lawfully defend oneself from an unprovoked attack can occur at work.”
Constitutional provisions as source of public policy. Addressing Circle K’s contention that article II, section 3 cannot be a source of a public-policy exception because it only protects against governmental, rather than private, actions, the court agreed that constitutions are, by definition, restraints on governmental, rather than private, power. “But this conclusion—i.e., limiting sources of public policy in this specific context to only those that restrain private, rather than public, action—would effectively abrogate long-established precedent,” the court stated, reiterating that “Colorado law recognizes that constitutional provisions may serve as the basis of public-policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine.”
Dissent. Dissenting, Chief Justice Marquez, joined by Justice Hood, argued that “the majority misapplies (and effectively rewrites) our test for public-policy exceptions established in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz.” The majority’s holding, she asserted, “appears to be grounded in its concern that no person should be forced to choose between their job and their personal safety. Yet Circle K Stores, Inc.’s ‘Don’t Chase or Confront Policy’ demands no such choice. Because the majority answers the legal question without wrestling with important underlying facts, including the purpose and narrow scope of the employer policy at issue here, the majority’s opinion makes broad pronouncements with implications for the at-will employment doctrine that reach well beyond this case.”
“I not only disagree with the majority’s reasoning that a constitutional provision can be the source of a claim for termination in violation of public policy against a private employer, but I also fear that the practical implications of today’s ruling will tie employers’ hands and ultimately undermine workplace safety.”
The case is No. 22-cv-02327-NYW-STV.
Judge: Berkenkotter, M.
Attorneys: Virginia Hill Butler (Rathod Mohamedbhai) for Mary Ann Moreno. Thomas W. Carroll (Littler Mendelson) for Circle K Stores, Inc.
Companies: Circle K Stories, Inc.
Cases: StateLawClaims Discharge TortClaims CoverageLiability ColoradoNews