Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, RETALIATION—11th Cir.: Jury verdict upheld in favor of deputy fired for statements in EEOC charge, (Aug 26, 2026)

By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

“Undoubtedly, many aspects of Title VII litigation changed in the forty-four years between Pettway and Nassar, but Pettway was not premised on the lack of but-for causation, later required by Nassar.”

Finding its 1969 precedent was not abrogated by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Nassar, the Eleventh Circuit held that a district court did not err in relying on that precedent to instruct a jury—in the trial of a deputy who alleged he was fired because of his EEOC charge—that an employer may not terminate an employee because of anything written in their EEOC charge regardless of whether the employer believes the charge is false. Nor did the district court err in denying the sheriff’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law based on insufficient evidence of causation, said the court, finding the evidence sufficient to create a jury question as to whether the deputy’s charge was the but-for cause of his termination (Ellis v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, No. 25-13267 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2026)).

EEOC charge. The plaintiff was hired by the sheriff’s office in 2007 as a community service officer, a civilian position, and promoted in 2010 to detention deputy. In 2021, he filed an EEOC charge alleging the sheriff’s office discriminated and retaliated against him because of his disability and religion and because of his need for reasonable accommodations. The charge further stated that he had “never had any issues at work until [he] received word that [he] was going to receive a substandard performance evaluation,” and once he heard that, he told his superiors he had a “debilitated state of mind,” which caused him to struggle at work. The charge also stated that he started as a detention officer in 2007, not 2010.

In May 2022, the sheriff's office initiated an investigation and suspended the deputy without pay for falsifying the EEOC charge and publicly disparaging the office. Its internal investigation revealed that the deputy had a drinking problem, which the deputy claimed, in a pre-disciplinary hearing, contributed to the charge error regarding his start date as a detention officer.

Termination. The deputy was terminated in August 2022. The notice of discipline form did not mention his drinking but instead explicitly stated that his false statements in his EEOC charge motivated his termination. He subsequently sued the sheriff in his official capacity.

At trial, the sheriff’s office presented testimony from a chief deputy that the deputy violated rules against publicly disparaging the office by including three false statements of fact in his EEOC charge and by failing to provide his correct address. The chief deputy also testified that the deputy lied multiple times throughout the internal investigation, causing a loss of trust and that “there’s no recovering from that.”

He also testified that detectives are required to “interview all identifiable witnesses before they interview the accused.” The detective who investigated the deputy, however, confirmed in writing that she had interviewed every available witness despite not interviewing two employees identified as problematic in the deputy’s EEOC charge. Nor did the chief deputy initiate an investigation into the detective for making false statements. The detective also did not investigate whether the individuals the deputy complained of in his EEOC charge were acting in a discriminatory manner and instead focused on his inaccuracies in his charge. The chief deputy also testified that he never recommended terminating anyone for not updating their address.

Jury instructions. In discussing jury instructions, the sheriff objected to the district court’s proposed instruction that the law does not permit an employer to consider the contents of an employee’s EEOC charge in deciding to terminate the employee. Based on the Fifth Circuit’s 1969 Petway v. Am. Cast. Iron Pipe Co. decision, however, the district court instructed the jury that “An employer may not terminate an employee because of anything written in an EEOC charge, regardless of whether an employer believes the content of the EEOC charge is true or false.”

Jury verdict. After trial, the jury found the sheriff terminated and retaliated against the deputy because of his EEOC charge and awarded him $125,000 for lost wages and $125,000 for mental and emotional anguish. The sheriff moved for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial and the district court denied both motions.

Pettway and Nassar. On appeal, the sheriff argued that the district court erroneously relied on Pettway in instructing the jury because the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar abrogated Pettway and its progeny. In Pettway, said the court, the former Fifth Circuit held that an “[e]mployee can suffer no detriment by virtue of having filed charges with EEOC which also contain false or malicious statements. By utilizing EEOC machinery he is exercising a protected right.”

The sheriff, however, argued that the Supreme Court’s requirement of but-for causation in Nassar directly conflicted with Pettway. But Nassar, the Eleventh Circuit, observed, “did not discuss Pettway or the ‘precise issue’ of the scope of protection afforded to those filing an EEOC charge such that it could be said that Nassar ‘demolish[ed]’ Pettway’s rationale.” Rather, Pettway “answered the narrower and materially different question of whether an employer may fire an employee for making ‘false’ or ‘malicious’ statements in an EEOC charge.”

Rejecting the sheriff’s attempt to stretch Nassar to disregard Pettway, the appeals court found the district court did not abuse its discretion when it relied on Pettway to instruct the jury.

Sufficiency of the evidence. The sheriff next argued that the district court erred in denying his motion because he articulated legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons—the deputy’s drinking and lying during the HCSO’s internal investigation—for terminating him and the deputy failed to show those reasons were pretextual. The court first noted that while the sheriff couched his appellate arguments in the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework, in Title VII retaliation cases McDonnell Douglas “plays no role at trial” and is “inapplicable on post-trial motions.” Instead, said the court, the question is whether the defendant intentionally retaliated against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s protected activity.

Direct evidence of causation. Turning to the trial evidence, the court found direct evidence of but-for causation. The sheriff’s notice of discipline form specifically stated that the deputy was terminated because his “EEOC Charge of Discrimination publicly criticized [the HCSO] in writing, and [the deputy] knowingly utilized false information to make the claim,” and under Pettaway, an employer may not terminate an employee because of anything written in their EEOC charge regardless of whether the employer believes the charge is false.

Further, two deputy chiefs testified that the deputy’s EEOC charge was the driving force behind the investigation and his termination.

While the sheriff presented evidence of legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for terminating the deputy, the jury’s job, said the court, was not to decide whether those reasons were “were well-grounded.” Rather, its job was to determine whether those reasons “actually motivated” the termination.

Here, the court pointed out that the sheriff’s office did not mention those reasons in its termination notice and there was testimony at trial that no one had expressed concern about his drinking before the investigation. Thus, the jury had a sufficient evidentiary basis to find that while these may have been “well-grounded” reasons to terminate the deputy, they did not actually motivate his termination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the sheriff’s JMOL motion.

The case is No. 13267.

Judge: Per curiam.

Attorneys: Kevin Kostelnik (Sniffen & Harmon) for Jeremy Ellis. Tracey K. Jaensch (FordHarrison) for Sheriff, Hillsborough County Florida, and Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office.

Companies: Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office

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