Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, REMEDIES, DAMAGES—N.D.N.Y.: Preliminary injunction granted after law firm’s proposed ad rejected by airport authority, (Jan 20, 2026)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

The ad’s tagline, “When HR called it harmless flirting hellip;We called it EXHIBIT A,” was initially considered to be accusatory and inaccurate, and was later rejected for being false and disparaging.

Granting a law firm’s motion for a preliminary injunction after the Syracuse Regional Airport Authority rejected the firm’s proposed billboard ad, a federal district court in New York determined that the authority’s refusal to display the ad was viewpoint-based and unreasonable. The court also rejected the authority’s mootness argument wherein the authority argued that by revising its policy while this motion was pending, any reason to grant injunctive relief was negated. The court noted the suspect timing of the revision and the fact that its renewed rejection rested on the same grounds under either policy only underscored that the request for injunctive relief was not moot (Megan Thomas Law, PLLC, v. Syracuse Regional Airport Authority, No. 5:25-cv-01114 (AJB/ML) (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2026)).

In late June 2025, an employment law firm emailed the Syracuse Regional Airport Authority expressing interest in advertising at the airport. Subsequently, the parties contracted to display a billboard advertisement for six months, beginning in August.

Ad policy. Advertisers are beholden to the authority’s ad policy. At the time the parties entered into their agreement, the policy was brief, prohibiting ads that were “inappropriate, immoral, offensive, or objectionable” and those with “political [or] religious messages.”

Rejected. According to the authority, the ad’s tag line, “When HR called it harmless flirting hellip;We called it EXHIBIT A,” was potentially disruptive and was an accusatory and inaccurate statement. As such, the authority refused to display the ad.

Following the ad’s rejection, the law firm filed this action alleging breach of contract and violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The law firm then moved for a preliminary injunction.

Updated ad policy. Two weeks after the motion for a preliminary injunction was filed, the authority changed its ad policy. It now lists 14 types of prohibited content, including ads that are disparaging or are “false, misleading, or deceptive.”

After instituting this change, the authority sent the law firm a letter stating that it had reconsidered the ad and rejected it once more, finding the tag line to be false and disparaging. Less than one week later, the authority moved to dismiss the motion for a preliminary injunction.

Protected speech. First, the court addressed the merits of the law firm’s claims, beginning with First Amendment principles. The court noted that the speech contained in the ad plainly qualified as free speech. To determine whether the First Amendment protected this speech in particular, the court directed its attention to the nature of the forum in which the speech is being restricted.

Ultimately, the court found that forum designation at this stage of the proceedings was unnecessary, noting that even under the standards applicable to a nonpublic forum, the law firm had sufficiently established a likelihood of success on the merits.

Falsity. Turning to the authority’s renewed rejection of the ad under its current policy, the court first addressed the authority’s claim that the ad was rejected for being false, misleading, or deceptive. Although the clause appeared constitutional on its face, the problem lied in how the clause was applied in this instance, explained the court.

According to the authority, “[t]he proposed slogan falsely implies that conduct considered to be ‘harmless flirting’ is necessarily actionable harassment.” “That,” said the court, “is nonsense.” The tagline does not claim, suggest, or falsely imply any such position, continued the court, at least no more than Chick-fil-A’s authority-approved tagline “falsely implies” that chicken dinners will always make a person happy or that cows can speak.

At most, the court found that the law firm’s tagline suggested that there were situations where conduct labeled “harmless flirting” could be actionable harassment. No reasonable person could believe that the firm was stating that the use of the term “harmless flirting” automatically granted anyone a valid legal claim. Thus, the application of the falsity clause to the law firm’s ad was plainly unreasonable.

Disparagement. Next, the court considered the authority’s contention that the ad was rejected because it violated the policy’s disparagement clause. In Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218 (2017), the Supreme Court considered a federal statute barring registration of trademarks “which may disparage... persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” The Court found the provision unconstitutional, explaining that it violated the Free Speech Clause as “[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”

Finding Matal compelling, courts have since applied its reasoning to transit authorities that prohibit ads under similar restrictions. In this instance, the authority’s disparagement clause discriminates, on its face, on the basis of viewpoint, and thus justifies Matal’s “uncompromising rule,” said the court.

In the best of situations, continued the court, a government actor can clearly explain why it believes speech it seeks to restrict to be disparaging. Here, the authority repeatedly throws around the label “disparaging,” but says little about why, how, or of whom, observed the court. Because the authority’s disparagement clause was facially invalid, it could not serve as a constitutionally valid basis for rejection of the law firm’s ad.

Previous policy. So too is the result even under the authority’s former ad policy. None of the provisions that might justify refusing the ad were constitutional, said the court. The ad was neither political nor religious in nature, and the authority’s ban on “immoral” content was also facially unconstitutional. As such, the court found it evident that the authority’s refusal to display the ad under its former ad policy was also viewpoint-based and unreasonable.

Mootness. While the motion for a preliminary injunction was pending, the authority revised its policy and, in so doing, argued that this change negated any reason to grant injunctive relief as the rejection the law firm complained of was purportedly made under its previous policy.

According to the authority, its rejection of the ad under the revised policy “sufficiently alters” the circumstances of this case to warrant denial of the injunctive relief. However, it also contended that “[t]o be clear, the Authority’s rejection of the Firm’s proposed advertising has always been based on the disparaging nature of its tag line[.]” In the same breath, it also treats the tagline’s “incorrect or misleading” nature as a new rejection rationale, observed the court.

“The Authority’s position stated baldly: heads we win, tails, plaintiff loses,” said the court. The authority is entitled to change its policy, explained the court, but its suspect timing and the fact that its renewed rejection rested on the same grounds under both policies only served to underscore that the request for injunctive relief was not moot.

Relief. Having established that the law firm was entitled to relief at the preliminary injunction stage, the court considered what type of relief was appropriate. In its motion, the law firm sked the court to allow it to post the ad immediately pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement. The court agreed that this was an option, although another option might be to allow the authority a chance to revise its policy again, excising any constitutional infirmities. Accordingly, the court gave the parties an opportunity to address this issue more fully before specifying what preliminary injunctive relief it would order.

The case is No. 5:25-CV-01114 (AJB/ML).

Judge: Brindisi, A.

Attorneys: Megan Katherine Thomas (Megan Thomas Law) for Megan Thomas Law, PLLC. Lindsey H. Hazelton (Hancock Estabrook) for Syracuse Regional Airport Authority.

Companies: Megan Thomas Law, PLLC; Syracuse Regional Airport Authority

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