Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES—N.D. Ill.: City police officer, discharged without notice and hearing, establishes municipal liability, (Mar 24, 2025)

By Nadine E. Roddy, J.D.

The summary judgment evidence demonstrated that the mayor, who fired the officer, was the final policymaking official regarding personnel decisions.

A city police officer was entitled to summary judgment on his Section 1983 due process claim against the city after the mayor discharged him without providing notice and opportunity to be heard, a federal district court in Illinois has ruled. However, the officer failed to raise material fact questions on his age and disability discrimination claims (Hawkins v. City of Harvey, No. 21 C 04777 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2025)).

Injured officer. A discharged police officer brought a civil rights and employment discrimination suit against the City of Harvey, Illinois, alleging due process deprivations under Section 1983 as well as age and disability discrimination under the ADEA and the ADA. He claimed that, after roughly a decade on the job and at the age of 56, he injured his knee while on duty and was placed on leave of absence. Thereafter, the city allegedly repeatedly denied him the opportunity to return to work and surreptitiously terminated him based on his age and injury.

New administration’s ‘ghost payroller audit.’ The summary judgment evidence showed that a year or so after his injury, the officer attempted to return to active duty with the aid of the police chief, who endeavored to locate an appropriate position for him. About this time, the newly elected mayor instructed the city’s HR director to terminate several employees, including the officer. The new administration, with the mayor’s approval, performed a “ghost payroller audit”—under which employees were instructed to pick up their next payroll check in person at the HR department in City Hall. The audit was an attempt to identify workers who were being paid without working and to help the city transition to a new online pay system.

Termination without notice. The officer, who was not notified of the in-person pick-up requirement in a timely fashion, was one of the employees who did not show up to claim his check. As a result, the mayor terminated him but did not inform him of this action. The officer only learned of his termination from the HR director and the city manager some eight months later, after submitting doctors’ certifications and completing a fitness-for-duty examination.

In the ensuing lawsuit, both parties moved for summary judgment.

Due process deprivation. The court noted that, according to the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services, to establish a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the plaintiff suffered the deprivation of a constitutional right, and (2) the municipality’s official custom or policy caused the deprivation. Further, to show a procedural due process violation based on a protected property interest, a plaintiff must establish (1) a cognizable property interest, (2) a deprivation of that property interest, and (3) a denial of due process. The court then found that the officer had sufficiently shown all three.

There was no dispute that the Illinois statutes, Municipal Code, and the applicable labor contract limited the ability of the city to discharge the officer, and thus he had a protected property interest in continued employment. In addition, no genuine dispute existed that the officer had been deprived of this interest; indeed, the city readily admitted that the mayor “decided to terminate Plaintiff’s employment with the City.” Also undisputed were the facts that the officer received no notice, no statement of reasons, and no opportunity to be heard before he was terminated. The court rejected the city’s argument that the officer was nevertheless not deprived of due process because the termination had been a “random and unauthorized” act.

Official policy or custom. To show that a municipal policy gave rise to the harm, a plaintiff must show that the injury was committed (that is, authorized or directed) at the policymaking level of government. The court agreed with the officer that the mayor in this case was an official with final policymaking authority regarding personnel decisions, including those affecting civil service employees, under the city’s Municipal Code. The city council was not involved in the termination of individual employees, and thus it did not review the mayor’s personnel decisions. The court concluded that no disputes of material fact existed relating to liability on the Section 1983 Monell claim, and that the officer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

ADEA, ADA claims. As to the officer’s age and disability discrimination claims, the city maintained that the officer was terminated for a nondiscriminatory reason and that the mayor was not even aware of the officer’s injury or protected class status. Because the officer had not presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the city’s “ghost payroller” reason was a pretext to fire him on account of his age or a disability, these claims could not survive the employer’s motion for summary judgment.

The case is No. 21 C 04777.

Judge: Gettleman, R.

Attorneys: J. Mark Fisher (Schiff Hardin) for Terence Hawkins. Mitchell Reid Paglia (Ancel Glink) for City of Harvey Police Department.

Companies: City of Harvey Police Department

Cases: PublicEmployees Discharge Discrimination DisabilityDiscrimination IndividualRights IllinoisNews