Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES—Ind. App.: Prison matron is entitled to same compensation as jail commander, (Aug 31, 2026)

By Nadine E. Roddy, J.D.

The state statutory scheme granted the County Sheriff “complete hiring authority” over the position of prison matron, which authority included the setting of “rank, grade, and position.”

A trial court’s grant of summary judgment for a prison matron who brought suit for back pay under Indiana statutes was affirmed by the Indiana Court of Appeals. Construing state statutes together, the court ruled that they conferred upon the Sheriff the sole authority to establish rank, grade, and position of the jail commander and the matron, and that the Sheriff in this case had designated the two positions as equivalent (Posey County Council v. Cross, No. 25A-MI-2804 (Ind. App. Aug. 25, 2026)).

Prison matron. The appeal arose from a dispute about the salary of an Indiana county’s prison matron. The County Sheriff’s Department employed both a jail commander and a matron. When the Sheriff took office in 2019, at the request of the County Council he created an organizational chart depicting the Department’s structure. The chart reflected that the matron was below the chief deputy sheriff in rank but that she headed one of the three Department sections depicted on the chart. The chart listed no specific ranks, but the matron and the jail commander were side by side on the chart.

“Sheriff’s school.” In 2020, the Sheriff appointed a new matron to succeed the outgoing appointee. From the time she was appointed through July 2023, the Council set the new matron’s salary using a matrix system that did not reflect her position as being equal in rank, grade, or position to that of the jail commander. At “Sheriff’s school” in December 2022, she learned from other matrons that matrons are statutorily entitled to the same pay as equally ranked Sheriff’s Department employees. When she returned to work, she informed the Sheriff, who then began notifying the Council of its statutory obligation.

Salary ordinance. The Council, however, continued to pay the matron less than the jail commander. In July 2023, the Council passed a salary ordinance setting the jail commander’s salary at $60,743 plus longevity pay but setting the matron’s salary at $50,235 with no provision for longevity pay.

In January 2024, the matron filed a complaint for mandate against the Council, and the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. Granting the matron’s motion and denying the Council’s, the court found no material fact issue as to whether the matron held the same rank, grade, or position as the jail commander; thus, the matron was statutorily entitled to the same pay. The Council filed a timely appeal.

Who decides rank? The Council argued that only the county fiscal body possessed the authority to declare a matron to be of the same rank, grade, or position as the jail commander, and that the two positions were not equivalent in any way. The matron countered that she was entitled by Indiana Code § 36-8-10-5 (Matron Statute) to the same salary as the jail commander because the Sheriff had equally ranked the two positions. The Matron Statute provides in relevant part that “[e]ach sheriff shall appoint a prison matron for the county …. the sheriff has complete hiring authority over the position of prison matron …. The prison matron [is] entitled to the same salary that other members of the department of the same rank, grade, or position are paid.” After finding that the undefined phrase “complete hiring authority” was ambiguous, the court of appeals gleaned from a series of amendments to the statute that the legislature had intended the phrase to include the authority to rank/grade the department’s appointees and employees.

The in pari materia rule of statutory construction supported this interpretation of the Matron Statute. When read together with Indiana Code § 36-8-10-10(a) (Approval Statute), which addresses temporary administrative ranks or positions established and appointed by the Sheriff, and Indiana Code § 36-2-5-3 (Compensation Statute), which gives the Council the final word on the relative worth of each position within the Sheriff’s Department, it became clear that the legislature intended to end the shared authority of the Sheriff and Merit Board, and to leave to the Sheriff alone the hiring/ranking authority for the matron and chief deputy positions. Thus, it was the Sheriff, rather than the Council, who possessed the authority to determine the “rank, grade, or position” of the matron.

Laches/waiver arguments unavailing. The court then held that, contrary to the Council’s contentions, neither the doctrine of laches nor that of waiver barred the matron’s claim. Although the matron was appointed in 2020, she did not know she had the right to higher pay until other matrons shared that information with her at Sheriff’s school in December 2022. And once she learned of her right, she acted promptly by notifying the Sheriff, and then by filing suit when the Sheriff’s efforts proved futile. Any prejudice to the Council from the matron’s “delay” was self-inflicted, the court found.

The case is No. 25A-MI-2804.

Judge: Weissmann, L.

Attorneys: Chad J. Sullivan, Joshua A. Claybourn, and James L. Baker (Jackson Kelly) for Posey County Council. Erin Bauer (Barber & Bauer) for Kim Cross.

Companies: Posey County Council

Cases: PublicEmployees SexDiscrimination PayDiscrimination Discrimination StateLawClaims IndianaNews