Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PROCEDURE—D.D.C.: District court denies stay of summary judgment declaring Slaughter is still an FTC Commissioner, (Jul 30, 2025)

By Justin Marcus Smith, J.D.

The district court said it must discharge its independent duty to rule on a stay motion before it, regardless of the intervening and independent effect of the July 22 D.C. Circuit administrative stay.

In litigation over the “firing” of FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia appeared to criticize the Trump Administration for not waiting for a decision on a motion to stay its July 17 summary judgment for Slaughter, pending appeal, before seeking emergent relief from the United States Court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court said the Trump administration briefly mentioned the motion for a stay at the district court level, but the administration “neglected” to inform the D.C. Circuit that district court briefing was ongoing. In any event, the district court said it was obligated to rule on the stay motion before it. In denying the stay, the district court reasoned that the Trump administration did not have a likelihood of success on the merits because it could not rely on a recent Supreme Court order pertaining to National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and Merit Systems Protection Board litigation. The NLRB and Merit Systems matters turned on different facts and did not implicate, as the instant matter does, Humphrey’s Executor, 29 U.S. 602 (1935). The district court said it would not intrude on the Supreme Court’s prerogative to overrule Humphrey’s Executor, if that is what the High Court will do. The court also said the Trump administration did not show irreparable harm given the present Republican makeup of other FTC Commissioners. In the balance of the equities and public interest, Slaughter’s fate as Commissioner was not a typical loss of employment case. Accordingly, the court said it could not grant the Trump administration the requested relief without contravening the public interest, including the public interest in FTC independence (Slaughter v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-00909-LLA (D.D.C. July 24, 2025)).

Background. As previously reported, on March 18, 2025, President Trump purportedly fired FTC Commissioners Slaughter, a 2018 Trump appointee, and Bedoya by email without any stated legal cause. The putative firing this year left the Commission with only Chair Andrew N. Ferguson and Commissioner Melissa Holyoak, both Republicans, as sitting commissioners. With the departure of former Chair Lina Khan, the firing, at the time, left the FTC with only two of a possible five commissioners.

Slaughter and Bedoya filed a district court complaint alleging their firings were without cause, unlawful, and without legal effect. They moved for summary judgment such that the district court would declare the President’s removal decision unlawful and that they were still Commissioners.

On July 17, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of Slaughter. The district court declared the firing unlawful and without legal effect. The district court enjoined Ferguson, Holyoak, FTC Executive Director David Robbins, and others from removing Slaughter from her lawful position as FTC Commissioner, or otherwise interfering with her right to perform her duties in that rule. The court said its injunction would continue until the expiration of Slaughter’s term or a hypothetical lawful removal by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office as specified in 15 U.S.C. § 41.

On July 22, on the Trump and Justice Department appeal and accompanying motion for an emergent stay pending appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington D.C. issued an order administratively staying the district court’s summary judgment order. Attorneys at Clarick Gueron Reisbaum LLP and the Protect Democracy Project prepared Slaughter’s brief in opposition to Trump administration’s emergent motion for a stay. Slaughter’s brief urged that the government could not show a likelihood of success on the merits given binding Supreme Court [case law]; the Trump administration could not plausibly claim irreparable harm in connection with Commissioner Slaughter’s service on the FTC pending appeal; and, in fact, her continued service is in the public interest. The appellate court’s short order explained the administrative stay was only meant to give the court an opportunity to consider Trump’s motion. It was not to be construed as a ruling on the merits.

The district court said the Trump defendants had only “briefly mentioned” before the D.C. Circuit that they had sought a stay from the district court. The district court continued that the Trump defendants “neglected to inform the Circuit that briefing on the motion was ongoing, nor did they assert that seeking a stay in the district court would be ‘impracticable,’ Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2)(A)(i).” The district court said the parties completed their district court briefing on the stay question “yesterday,” in apparent reference to Wednesday, July 23.

Stay denied. The district court perceived that the Trump administration argued for a likelihood of success on the merits of a stay by relying on the Supreme Court’s recent stay of two district court orders. The stay of those two orders enabled members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and Merit Systems Protection Board to continue serving in their appointed roles. See Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (2025) (staying Wilcox v. Trump, 775 F. Supp. 3d 215 (D.D.C. 2025), and Harris v. Bessent, 775 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2025)). The district court said it disagreed the Trump administration’s reliance on Wilcox and Harris for two primary reasons.

First, although the Wilcox and Harris stays acknowledged that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise considerable executive power, the Supreme Court did not mention the FTC and did not once cite to Humphrey’s Executor, 29 U.S. 602 (1935). The instant court said Humphrey’s Executor is at the heart of this matter, and given that it spoke directly to FTC Commissioner removal protections, the instant said court would “not usurp” the Supreme Court’s prerogative to overrule it.

Second, the Supreme Court’s stay order was an initial assessment of two complicated cases without the benefit of full briefing and argument. The instant district court said the Supreme Court expressly did not decide the ultimate question of whether the NLRG and Merits Board fall within a recognized Presidential removal exception. The instant court continued that it would “not turn a preliminary determination (about agencies not at issue here) into a license to contravene Supreme Court precedent that has stood for almost a century.”

The court said the Trump administration failed to show irreparable harm. Again, reliance on Wilcox was misplaced. The court said it agreed with Slaughter that the Wilcox and Harris facts were quite different and involved political makeup questions not at issue here. Allowing Slaughter to continue serving would not upend the present Republican -dominated makeup of the Commission. Slaughter could not fundamentally alter the course of the agency. Potential recusals of Republican members were conjectural and could not satisfy the demanding standard for irreparable harm.

In the balance of the equities, the court said the Trump administration made no effort to contest the court’s harm analysis with respect to Slaughter. The court said Slaughter’s case is not a typical loss-of-employment situation because it involves questions of how to protect consumers, with serious implications beyond Slaughter, including the very independence of the FTC and its ability to execute the will of Congress. The court said it could not grant the Trump administration relief without contravening critical public interest.

The Case is No. 1:25-cv-00909-LLA.

Judge: Alikhan, L.

Attorneys: Aaron Crowell (Clarick Gueron Reisbaum LLP) for Rebecca Kelly Slaughter. Alexander William Resar, U.S. Department of Justice, for Donald J. Trump.

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