Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PROCEDURE—D.C. Cir.: School teacher revives Section 1983 claim despite failing to exhaust administrative remedies, (Aug 19, 2026)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

“…under longstanding Supreme Court and circuit precedent, a plaintiff need not exhaust state or D.C. remedies before bringing a section 1983 claim in federal court.”

Reversing a district court’s dismissal of a District of Columbia school teacher’s Section 1983 claim, the D.C. Circuit determined that although D.C. law provides an alternative administrative scheme for the teacher to contest his suspension, he was not required to exhaust these D.C. law remedies before bringing his Section 1983 claim in federal court. Further, the appeals court found that the district court had relied on inapposite circuit and D.C. Court of Appeals decisions in reaching its determination, and had conflated exhaustion with the merits. “Only Congress, not judges, may require the exhaustion of administrative remedies for a section 1983 claim brought in federal court,” explained the court (Mpoy v. Burst, No. 24-7120 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 18, 2026)).

Suspension. In August 2021, the teacher in this case was indefinitely suspended from his position in the D.C. Public Schools (DCPS) allegedly without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. He subsequently filed a pro se lawsuit in federal district court against the D.C. mayor and two DCPS officials.

Dismissal. The teacher’s complaint raised a procedural due process claim under Section 1983 as well as claims under D.C. law. The district court dismissed the Section 1983 claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the District’s Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA).

Having dismissed the Section 1983 claim, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the D.C. law claims, resulting in this appeal. The court appointed an amicus to argue on the teacher’s behalf.

Patsy. In challenging the dismissal of his Section 1983 claim, the teacher relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, which held that “exhaustion of state administrative remedies” is not “a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to [section] 1983” in federal court. 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). In response, the appellees conceded error and moved to vacate the motion below. The court nevertheless denied the motion and heard oral argument, mindful of its duty to independently examine confessed errors before disturbing a final judgment.

According to Patsy, “Only Congress, not judges, may require the exhaustion of administrative remedies for a section 1983 claim brought in federal court,” said the court. Because no federal statute requires the teacher to exhaust administrative remedies under D.C. law, the district court had erred in dismissing the Section 1983 claim on exhaustion grounds.

Incompatible. Because Section 1983 makes no reference to exhaustion at all, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, most notably in Patsy, that the Section 1983 remedial scheme is incompatible with judge-made exhaustion requirements, observed the appeals court.

This circuit, continued the appeals court, has also squarely held that this settled rule governs Section 1983 claims against D.C. officials, and so a plaintiff bringing such a claim in federal court “need not exhaust his local remedies.” Tri Cnty. Indus., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 457, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Because Section 1983 treats the District the same as a state, requiring exhaustion of D.C. law remedies is likewise incompatible with the text and design of Section 1983, explained the court.

Further, the appeals court noted that although the CMPA provides an alternative administrative scheme for the teacher to contest his suspension, he was not required to exhaust these D.C. law remedies before bringing his Section 1983 claim in federal court.

Inapposite decisions. In reaching a contrary result, the lower court relied on inapposite circuit and D.C. Court of Appeals decisions. In one such case, National Treasury Employees Union v. King, the appellate court stated that “exhaustion is required” for constitutional claims that are “premised on the same facts” as statutory claims and where the “administrative process is fully capable of granting full relief.” 961 F.2d 240, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1992). However, the court pointed out that the claims at issue in that case were federal claims for which Congress had provided an administrative review scheme that implicitly required exhaustion.

Another case relied on by the district court, Johnson v. District of Columbia, 552 F.3d 806 (D.C. Cir. 2008), affirmed the dismissal of several claims, including Section 1983 claims, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the CMPA. However, the court noted that Johnson made clear that the plaintiff had waived any challenge to the district court’s conclusion that her Section 1983 claims had to be exhausted under the CMPA. The court had merely assumed, without deciding, that exhaustion was required and did not otherwise reach the issue.

Preemption? As part of its reasoning, the district court also stated that the teacher’s Section 1983 claim was “statutorily preempted by the CMPA” and cited other district court decisions holding that the CMPA’s remedial scheme implicitly precludes federal court jurisdiction over employment-related claims brought under Section 1983. “Whether framed in terms of preemption or preclusion, this reasoning is wholly at odds with section 1983 and settled precedent,” said the court here.

While the court noted that it was true that the D.C. Court of Appeals has held that the CMPA implicitly precludes the jurisdiction of local D.C. courts over covered claims until after administrative proceedings are completed, the CMPA cannot preclude federal court jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims. This, explained the court, is a determination that may be made only by Congress, and Congress has withheld authority from the D.C. Council to alter the procedural framework by which Section 1983 claims are resolved in federal court.

“It would be extraordinary for a federal court to conclude that a state law administrative review scheme precludes federal court jurisdiction over section 1983 claims,” said the court, and so it was too for the CMPA.

Merits. Finally, the district court had asserted that going through the CMPA administrative process would cure the teacher’s alleged due process violation. However, the court here found that this reasoning improperly conflated exhaustion with the merits.

Whether the CMPA’s procedures might satisfy due process goes to the merits of the teacher’s Section 1983 claim, not to the question of whether failure to exhaust forecloses that claim, explained the court. The merits of the teacher’s due process claim do not affect the longstanding rule that Section 1983 claims brought in federal court are not subject to an exhaustion requirement.

Based the above, the appeals court determined that the district court erred in dismissing the teacher’s Section 1983 claim for failure to exhaust remedies available under D.C. law. Thus, the dismissal of that claim was reversed, and the dismissal of the teacher’s D.C. law claims was vacated because the appeals court’s reversal eliminated the district court’s grounds for declining supplemental jurisdiction.

The case is No. 24-7120.

Judge: Rao, N.

Attorneys: Bruno K. Mpoy, pro se. Marcella Coburn, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, for John Burst.

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