Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, PROCEDURE—8th Cir.: Employee who hadn’t visited MN for work for almost two years can’t bring suit under state’s anti-bias law, (Apr 10, 2025)

By Marjorie Johnson, J.D.

The statute defined an employee as one who “resides or works in this state,” and she never resided in Minnesota and hadn’t visited the state for work since the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In granting summary judgment against a plaintiff who sued her former employer for disability discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), a federal district court did not err in finding that she did not satisfy the MHRA’s requirement that she be an “employee” under the Act because she did not have any physical presence in Minnesota for almost two years before she was fired, the Eighth Circuit concluded. The statute defines an employee as “an individual who is employed by an employer and who resides or works in this state,” and after a careful statutory analysis, the appeals court concluded that “works in this state” required at least some degree of “physical presence” in the state, rejecting the employee’s urging that a “contact-based” test be adopted. It denied her request to certify the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court (Kuklenski v. Medtronic USA, Inc., No. 24-1310 (8th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025)).

Pandemic prompts remote work. The employee started working for the Minnesota-based employer in 1999. She never resided in Minnesota but occasionally traveled to the state for work until the COVID-19 pandemic prompted the company to order all its employees to work remotely in early 2020. As a result, she did not travel to Minnesota for work at any time after February 2020.

Fired following medical leave. Beginning in June 2021, she went on medical leave. After three months of approved leave, she sought another three months in early September 2021. However, the employer did not keep her job open for her after the initial three-month leave expired and filled her position in October 2021. In December 2021, she was formally terminated.

Lawsuit. She filed this lawsuit asserting that the employer terminated her in violation of the MHRA. The district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that she was not an “employee” under the MHRA since she did not have any physical presence in Minnesota for almost two years before she was fired.

“Employee” under MHRA. The MHRA defines an employee as “an individual who is employed by an employer and who resides or works in this state.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 15. Because the employee never resided in Minnesota, at issue was whether the “works in this state” language meant that she was required to have had some degree of physical presence within Minnesota. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet answered this question.

Dictionary definition. Because the Minnesota legislature did not separately define “works” or “in” when it added the definition of “employee” to the MHRA in 1987, the Eighth Circuit considered the dictionary definitions to determine whether the legislature’s intent was clear.

Quoting reputable dictionaries, the appeals court explained that the word “works” means “to perform work or fulfill duties regularly for wages or salary” or “[t]o be employed; have a job.” Relatedly, “work” is defined as “the labor, task, or duty that is one’s accustomed means of livelihood.” The word “in” is defined as “a function word to indicate inclusion, location, or position within limits” or “[w]ithin the limits, bounds, or area of.” Applying these definitions the appeals court concluded that one who “works in” Minnesota “perform[s]” “the labor, task, or duty” of employment “[w]ithin the limits, bounds, or area of” the state.

Statutory context. The statutory context of the statutory language at issue supported this reading since the neighboring verb in the statute is “resides,” which is also limited by the word “in.” The dictionary meaning of “reside” is “[t]o live in a place permanently or for an extended period” or “to dwell permanently or continuously.” Putting this together with the definition of “in,” one who “resides... in” Minnesota lives “[w]ithin the limits” of the state either “permanently or for an extended period” of time. Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 15.

Physical presence required. “The plain meaning of this phrase requires some degree of physical presence in Minnesota,” the Eighth Circuit concluded. “Thus, reading ‘works in’ alongside the parallel phrase ‘resides... in’ supports interpreting ‘works in this state’ to also require physical presence in Minnesota.” Indeed, the statutory purpose supported this interpretation given that the statute expressly states: “It is the public policy of this state to secure for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination,” because “[s]uch discrimination threatens the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of this state,” emphasized the Eighth Circuit.

Virtual appearance insufficient. The employee argued that “in” need not be defined by physical boundaries since for example, a lawyer may appear “in” court virtually, and a presidential candidate can run “in” a state without physically setting foot inside its state’s boundaries. The Eighth Circuit was not swayed, explaining that while the word “in” can be interpreted in that way in those circumstances, the common meaning of “works in this state,” as applied to her lawsuit was that she be physically present “[w]ithin the limits, bounds, or area of” Minnesota.

Absence not temporary. The Eighth Circuit also rejected her contention that her past visits to Minnesota established that she “works in” the state. While the statute’s definition of employee may not necessarily exclude a person who works both in and outside the state or require that a person be physically present in Minnesota at the time of the discriminatory conduct, the undisputed fact that she had not traveled to Minnesota for almost two years before her termination did not support a finding that her absence from the state was temporary.

Contact-based approach rejected. The appeals court also rejected her “contact-based” approach, by which she claimed the court should consider her contacts with Minnesota beyond physical presence—such as the fact that her supervisors and clients were based in the state. Because the statute required physical presence in Minnesota, she could not satisfy the “works in” requirement by relying on non-physical-presence contacts with the state.

Denies certification to higher court. Finally, the Eighth Circuit denied her request to certify to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question of how to define employee under the MHRA, concluding that the case did not present a close question of state law.

The case is No. 24-1310.

Judge: Kelly, J.

Attorneys: Kyle Patrick Hahn (Halunen Law) for Jan Kuklenski. Avery Bennett (Littler Mendelson P.C.) for Medtronic USA, Inc.

Companies: Medtronic USA, Inc.

Cases: StateLawClaims EmployeeStatus DisabilityDiscrimination Discrimination Procedure Covid19 CoverageLiability ArkansasNews IowaNews MinnesotaNews MissouriNews NebraskaNews NorthDakotaNews SouthDakotaNews