IP Law Daily, PATENT—N.D. Tex.: Producer of restaurant report software failed to establish non-infringement as a matter of law, (Jan 29, 2014)
Law Firms Mentioned:Thompson & Knight LLP | Zelle Hofmann Voelbel & Mason LLP
Organizations Mentioned:B-50.com, LLC | InfoSync Services, LLC | Thompson & Knight, LLP | Zelle Hofmann Voelbel & Mason, LLP
By Thomas Long. J.D.
Patent holder B-50,LLC (“B-50”) could go forward with claims against software provider InfoSync Services, LLC for infringing a patented method of generating custom reports on restaurant information, the federal district court in Dallas has decided (B-50, LLC v. InfoSync Services, LLC, January 27, 2014, Fitzwater, S.). InfoSync’s motion for summary judgment was denied.
B-50 held U.S. Patent No. 6,633,851 (“the '851 patent”), which recited “[a] method of generating custom reports based on restaurant point-of-sale data transferred between multiple remote computing devices and a central computing device.” B-50 asserted that InfoSync’s accused product, called “RVW,” performed all the steps of claim 1 of the '851 patent and that InfoSync had engaged in contributory infringement and inducement of infringement. InfoSync moved for summary judgment, arguing that B-50 could not show infringement because B-50 could not prove that RVW directly infringes claim 1, particularly elements 1(b) (third indented paragraph) and 1(d).
Claim 1(b). The third indented paragraph of claim 1(b) stated:
displaying on a page one or more operative data-entry fields configured to process a selection operation from the restaurant-industry user that specifies one or more dates or date ranges, wherein the operative data-entry fields are substantially only those required to obtain the dates or date ranges associated with the at least one specified report format[.]
In a previous claim construction order, the court construed “operative data-entry fields” to mean “places on a screen where the restaurant-industry user may enter data for a selection operation.” The court declined to construe “substantially only those required to obtain” because the term had an ordinary meaning, in the court’s view.
According to InfoSync, RVW did not infringe claim 1 because RVW did not display the “operative data-entry fields.” InfoSync argues that the phrase “substantially only” in the above-referenced paragraph required that there be an individual page containing the operative data-entry fields described in that paragraph, and that the display of any of the operative data-entry fields described elsewhere in claim 1(b) on the same page meant the limitations in claim 1(b) were not met. Essentially, InfoSync argued that claim 1(b) required an individual page containing the date-range fields, and nothing else. Because RVW included a page with date-range fields as well as fields for restaurant selection and report format, InfoSync argued that B-50’s infringement claim failed.
In the court’s view, InfoSync had not established non-infringement as a matter of law. First, the court disagreed with InfoSync’s argument that the only reasonable interpretation of the third indented paragraph of claim 1(b) was that the only operative data-entry field displayed on the page was the date-range field. The first clause of claim 1(b) (third indented paragraph) required that a page display one or more operative data-entry fields that are configured to allow the user to enter specific dates or date ranges, and that cause the generated report to contain data only from the dates the user specifies. The second clause could be read to further require that the data-entry fields displayed are substantially only those required for the particular report type that the user selects. Other portions of claim 1(b) included “on page” limitations that recited that information described in the claim must be “displayed on one or more pages.” Therefore, InfoSync’s proposed construction was not supported by the claim language, the court said.
Second, after considering claim 1 in relation to dependent claim 19, the court determined that InfoSync’s proposed limitation was not present in claim 1(b). Claim 19 recited the method of claim 1, with the only meaningful difference being claim 19’s limitation that the data-entry fields described in claim 1 be displayed on different pages. Under, the doctrine of claim differentiation, the presence of a dependent claim that adds a limitation raises a presumption that the limitation was not found in the independent claim. This presumption was at its strongest when the limitation in question was the only meaningful difference between the claims. InfoSync did not provide evidence to rebut this presumption, according to the court.
Third, the specification and drawings provided evidence that InfoSync’s interpretation was incorrect. Various figures and the text of the specification indicated that, depending on the report requested, there could be multiple data-entry fields on a page.
Claim 1(d). In the court’s prior order, the court construed the disputed term “to view or obtain” in claim 1(d), which stated, “enabling the restaurant-industry user to view or obtain the generated custom report using the Internet.” Adopting a proposed construction offered by InfoSync, the court decided that “to view or obtain” meant “to either view or obtain, but not both.”
InfoSync moved for summary judgment on the ground that its RVW product enabled the user, in every instance, to view and obtain the generated custom report. Therefore, InfoSync argued, RVW did not contain the “either view or obtain, but not both” limitation of claim 1(d).
The court concluded that its earlier construction should be revised, and based on its revised construction of “to view or obtain,” that InfoSync was not entitled to summary judgment. The claim and specification did not define the word “or,” the court said, nor did they indicate that B-50 used the word in a specialized fashion. Based on dictionary evidence and Federal Circuit precedent, the court determined that the word “or” could be construed as both exclusive (“A or B but not both”) and inclusive (“A or B, or both”). The inclusive use of “or” was more common than the exclusive use, the court noted.
After examining the claim language, the specification, and the patent’s drawings, the court concluded that “or” as used in claim 1(d) should be construed in its inclusive sense. The claimed method enabled users to view a report using the Internet, to obtain a report using the Internet, or to do both in whatever order the user chose. Nothing in the claim or specification and drawings indicates that users must choose one or the other, but not both.
Therefore, a reasonable jury could find that RVW directly infringed the '851 patent, and InfoSync’s motion for summary judgment was denied.
The case is Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-1994-D.
Attorneys: Richard G. Urquhart (Zelle Hofmann Voelbel & Mason LLP) for B-50.com, LLC. Megan Dredla Hoyt (Thompson & Knight LLP) for InfoSync Services, LLC.
Companies: B-50.com, LLC; InfoSync Services, LLC
Cases: Patent TechnologyInternet TexasNews