IP Law Daily, PATENT—Fed. Cir.: Phone notification suppression lacked inventive concept; infringement suit against Google fails, (May 5, 2026)

By Karen Servidea, J.D.

Patent claim recited “generic and well-known” components “ordered in a conventional fashion” and thus was patent ineligible.

A patent-holder’s claim relating to notification suppression on cell phones was ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because it was directed to an abstract idea and lacked an inventive concept, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has determined. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the patent-holder’s suit alleging that features in Google Android phones to prevent distracted driving infringed its patent (TJTM Technologies, LLC v. Google LLC, No. 25-1218 (Fed. Cir. May 5, 2026)).

Plaintiff TJTM Technologies, LLC, owns U.S. Patent No. 8,958,853 (‘853 patent), relating to “a mobile device including functionality for suppressing user notifications of communications received by a mobile device.” The specification discloses a mobile phone having an inactive mode that suppresses notifications of incoming communications, such as calls, texts, and emails, and automatically notifies the sender with an away message. Representative claim 1 includes recitations relating to automatically initiating a process to place a mobile device in inactive mode in response to the pairing of the device with a vehicle.

The patent-holder filed suit against Google in a federal district court, alleging that features implemented in its Android phones to prevent distracted driving infringed the ‘853 patent. Google filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted, applying the two-step framework from Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Under the first step, the district court found that the representative claim was directed to the abstract idea of “screening notifications.” Under the second step, the court determined that the claim lacked an inventive concept. The district court granted the patent-holder leave to amend its pleadings to address the second step. After the patent-holder filed an amended complaint, Google filed another motion to dismiss. In considering that motion, the district court found that the components in the representative claim were generic and well-known, and combined in conventional fashion. It thus held that the patent-holder’s allegations were insufficient to withstand Google’s patent-eligibility challenge and dismissed the case.

No change to underlying technology. On appeal, the patent-holder contended that the district court erred in its Alice step one analysis. The district court had determined that the claim described “screening notifications” for mobile devices. For support, the district court noted that the specification highlighted the problem of distracted driving and that its proposed solution was to suppress communications.

Before the Federal Circuit, the patent-holder asserted that mobile devices can cause distracted driving and that its patent “addresses this technological problem with a technological solution.” According to the patent-holder, its claim thus was analogous to claims in cases in which the Federal Circuit determined that claims “directed to a technological solution to a technological problem” were not directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

The Federal Circuit rejected the patent-holder’s position. It explained that representative claim 1 describes the method of mobile devices pairing with vehicles to automatically enter inactive mode. “While the method may improve a user’s experience via a mobile device automatically entering inactive mode, that extra user benefit alone does not amount to a ‘technological improvement’ under our precedent.” The court found the invention to recite “a different mode of operation for a mobile phone without reciting any change to the underlying mobile phone technology.” Accordingly, the court held that the patent-holder failed to show that the claims of the ‘853 patent are directed to anything other than an abstract idea of adding a communication-suppression function to a phone.

Lack of inventive concept. The patent-holder also argued that the district court erred in its Alice step two analysis. Specifically, the patent-holder asserted that the court incorrectly found that the claim limitations, which the holder described as a specific combination of steps that achieve the patent’s intended result of preventing distracted driving, are ordered in a conventional fashion. The district court had concluded that the representative claim recites “generic and well-known” components “ordered in a conventional fashion.”

The Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court and rejected the patent-holder’s contentions as merely conclusory allegations that the claim recites an inventive concept. The court found that the patent-holder failed to explain “how or why” the claim’s sequence of placing a communication device in inactive mode, detecting an incoming communication, suppressing a user notification, and transmitting an away message to the communication sender, “is anything more than a description of the abstract idea of suppressing notifications on a cell phone.” The court then noted that merely applying an abstract idea to a particular technological environment is not enough to transform the underlying idea into something patent eligible.

Explaining that conclusory allegations as to an inventive concept are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss, and that it had reviewed the remainder of the holder’s arguments and found them unpersuasive, the court affirmed the decision of the district court.

The Case is No. 25-1218.

Judge: Chen, R.

Attorneys: Blair V. Kittle (Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP) for TJTM Technologies, LLC. Jonathan Irvin Tietz (Perkins Coie LLP) for Google LLC.

Companies: TJTM Technologies, LLC; Google LLC

Cases: Patent FedCirNews