IP Law Daily, PATENT—Fed. Cir.: Dismissal of inventor’s complaints against USPTO for rejection of application affirmed, (Jun 26, 2026)

By Carolin Dennis, B.Sc., LL.B., LL.M.

The district court did not err in interpreting the inventor’s complaints and dismissing the inventor’s claims.

In a non-precedential disposition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting the motion to dismiss the inventor’s complaints and denial of his motion for summary judgment. The Federal Circuit determined that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was timely and there was no error in how the district court interpreted the inventor’s complaints (Sansone v. USPTO, No. 25-2017 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 24, 2026)).

Background. Stanley A. Sansone (Sansone) filed U.S. Patent Application No. 16/255,511 (’511 application) seeking a patent for a wearable thermal device. The patent examiner rejected all claims in the ’511 application, and Sansone appealed to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The PTAB affirmed the rejection, after which Sansone sought continued examination. During continued examination, the examiner issued a second non-final rejection of all claims. Following the examiner’s second final rejection, the PTAB affirmed the rejection. Sansone then filed a suit against the USPTO and its Director (collectively, defendants) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. After his original complaint was served, Sansone filed an “Amended Pleading, Opening Brief.” Sansone also filed his second “Opening Brief, Amended Pleading with Supporting Documents & Footnote References.”

The defendants moved to dismiss Sansone’s complaints under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Sansone opposed, arguing in part that the motion was untimely, and shortly after moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The district court concluded that Sansone’s complaints failed to adequately state a claim for relief or suffered from other deficiencies that warranted dismissal, and his action was dismissed. The district court also rejected Sansone’s assertion that the motion to dismiss was untimely, and denied his other pending motions, including a motion for summary judgment, which was found to be premature. Sansone timely appealed.

Timeliness of defendants’ motion. Sansone challenged the dismissal on the ground that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was untimely. According to him, the Department of Justice was served on April 11, 2024, but moved to dismiss on June 17, 2024, which was seven days late. However, the Federal Circuit found Sansone’s allegations inconsistent with the record. When filing a suit against the United States, including its agencies, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require service, in relevant part, on both the United States Attorney General and the local United States Attorney’s office. The United States Attorney General was served on April 11, 2024, but the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia was served on April 17, 2024. Therefore, the responsive pleading deadline was 60 days from April 17, 2024, once all necessary parties were served: June 16, 2024. However, since June 16 fell on a Sunday, responsive pleadings were not due until “the first accessible day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” That date was Monday, June 17, 2024—the date the defendants moved to dismiss. Therefore, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the motion to dismiss was timely. Additionally, since the timeliness of the defendants’ motion appeared to be Sansone’s only basis on appeal for why he is entitled to summary judgment, the Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment.

Misconstruction of complaints. Sansone made several arguments related to the district court’s alleged misconstruction and improper characterization of his complaints. Sansone explained that his references to various statutes were not to assert claims under those statutes but were included as “evidence that the agency’s actions were ultra vires, void, or taken without statutory authority.” He contended that his complaints, alleged “ultra vires administrative acts, violations of non-discretionary duties, and constitutional deprivations,” and so the district court’s dismissal rested on a flawed premise—by mischaracterizing his allegations, it analyzed and rejected his claims under legal standards that would not otherwise have governed them.

The Federal Circuit found that, while Sansone contended that he cited criminal and tort statutes only as evidence of the USPTO’s alleged ultra vires actions, rather than as bases for independent causes of action, that intent was not apparent from the face of his complaints. The Federal Circuit also noted that given Sansone’s pro se status, the district court was required to liberally construe his complaints and consistent with that obligation, it reasonably interpreted his complaints as asserting claims under the cited statutes insofar as Sansone intended to rely on them. Therefore, the Federal Circuit found no error in how the district court interpreted Sansone’s complaints.

Dismissal of complaints. The Federal Circuit found no error in the district court’s dismissal of Sansone’s criminal claims under various criminal statutes because the cited federal criminal statutes did not contain private rights of action and did not contain waivers of sovereign immunity. The same was true for the district court’s rationale for dismissing his civil rights, constitutional, and contractual damages claims. Next, turning to whether Sansone’s complaints were proper for dismissal under his interpretation, the Federal Circuit considered several “supporting documents” attached to and discussed in his complaints. Although Sansone made many allegations as to how the USPTO exceeded its authority, his allegations rested on inaccurate characterizations of the facts and misunderstandings of the law. Upon review of the documents attached to his complaints, the baselessness of his allegations was clear. For example, Sansone alleged that USPTO examiners unlawfully conspired to falsify the administrative record to reject his application. But the agency action Sansone labels as “falsifying the record” amounts to nothing more than the examiners making factual findings on the prior art that he disputes. The Federal Circuit noted that a party’s disagreement with an agency’s factual findings does not transform those findings into record falsification, nor does it demonstrate unlawful conduct. Sansone’s allegations predicated on 35 U.S.C. § 103, were also based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” premised on Sansone’s misunderstandings of § 103 and patent law. The remainder of Sansone’s allegations were either similarly frivolous with no arguable basis in law or fact or simply did not give rise to a plausible claim for relief.

Writ of certiorari. Lastly, the Federal Circuit declined to address Sansone’s request for a writ of certiorari arguing that portions of the Patent Act of 1836 and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 were unconstitutional because Sansone had not raised them in his complaints.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Sansone’s complaints and denial of summary judgment.

The Case is No. 25-2017.

Judge: Per Curiam.

Attorneys: Stanley A. Sansone, pro se. Sarah E. Craven for the USPTO.

Cases: Patent USPTO FedCirNews