IP Law Daily, PATENT—Fed. Cir.: Dismissal of complaint challenging refusal of reduced filing fees due to erroneous micro-entity certification affirmed, (May 14, 2026)

By Carolin Dennis, B.Sc., LL.B., LL.M.

The district court correctly dismissed the complaint brought by inventors for failure to demonstrate the ownership interest needed to establish Article III standing.

In a non-precedential disposition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint brought by three inventors contesting the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) refusal to grant them reduced filing fees. The Federal Circuit determined that the complaint inadequately alleged their Article III standing to sue (Nesarikar v. USPTO, No. 26-1167 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2026)).

Background. Ashlesha, Anika, and Abhijit Nesarikar are named inventors on U.S. Patent Application No. 18/069,288 (’288 application). The Nesarikars are also the named inventors on four patent applications filed between March 2018 and September 2022. On December 21, 2022, they first filed U.S. Patent Application No. 18/069,263 and then filed the ’288 application, making the ’263 application at least the fifth application filed prior to the ’288 application naming the Nesarikars as inventors.

When the Nesarikars filed the ’288 application in late 2022, they certified that they qualified as a “micro entity” under 35 U.S.C. § 123 and paid only the discounted application fees that come with such status. Micro-entity status is available only to an applicant who has not been named as an inventor on more than four earlier applications but not counted against that limit are applications that the applicant is obligated to assign based on prior employment. The USPTO informed the Nesarikars that their micro-entity certification appeared to be erroneous because they were named on more than four previous applications. The Nesarikars responded that the certification was correct because they were obligated to assign the earlier applications, and the ’288 application itself, as a result of prior employment. However, they did not provide a copy, or even quote the language, of the alleged obligation, and the USPTO refused to accept their representations as sufficient for micro-entity status for the ’288 application. The USPTO ceased examining the ’288 application until the correct fees were paid. The Nesarikars did not pay the requested fees, and the application became abandoned.

The Nesarikars then brought suit against the USPTO in the district court challenging the denial of micro-entity status for the ’288 application, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act as one cause of action, and seeking injunctive relief. They attached to the complaint their statements to the USPTO that they were obligated to assign the ’288 application as a result of previous employment. The USPTO moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Nesarikars’ assignment-obligation representations meant they had not shown the injury necessary to establish their Article III standing to maintain the suit. The district court ruled that the Nesarikars had failed to carry their burden that they maintained any rights to the ’288 application and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

The Nesarikars timely appealed arguing that the district court legally erred by refusing to take as true their allegation that, notwithstanding their alleged obligation to assign the ’288 application, they currently own it. They also contended that the district court improperly required evidence at the pleading stage, ignored the presumption that a patent application’s named inventors own the application, and disregarded ownership of other patent applications or other interests (such as reputational interests) that support their standing.

Article III standing. The Federal Circuit noted that the Nesarikars, who argued that they sufficiently alleged ownership of the ’288 application, did not meet their burden at the dismissal stage. The Nesarikars’ complaint and exhibits contain repeated assertions by the Nesarikars that they were obligated to assign their rights in the ’288 application. However, those representations were insufficient to “clearly” support the Nesarikars’ ownership of the ’288 application to prevent a dismissal without prejudice. Moreover, the Nesarikars did not meaningfully make an argument about a concrete financial interest apart from ownership, which in any event would meet a pleading objection very similar to the one regarding ownership.

The Federal Circuit found that the actions of and communications with the USPTO that are the subject of this lawsuit indicated that the Nesarikars set themselves the challenge of asserting that for standing purposes, they had a sufficient interest in the ’288 application despite an obligation to assign, while not defeating their claims about assignments of earlier applications on which their 35 U.S.C. § 123(b) position depends. In these circumstances, the district court rightly insisted on more specifics to support standing to invoke Article III jurisdiction. However, the Nesarikars made only conclusory statements about the nature of the supposed assignment obligation, unsupported by any evidence and not even purporting to identify the assignment’s terms, the assignee, or when the agreement takes effect or was executed. The Nesarikars argued that they were entitled to rely on a legal presumption that patent applications are owned by the named inventors, but such a presumption does not require a different result here. The Federal Circuit found that the “general rule” that named inventors, rather than their employers, own their inventions does not operate in this case, where the Nesarikars represented, consistent with their effort to secure reduced application fees in the USPTO, that an agreement “contrary” to that general rule existed.

Additionally, the complaint referred only to the ’288 application, so it was not erroneous for the district court to refuse to consider whether the Nesarikars have standing to bring claims not raised related to applications not mentioned until after the USPTO moved to dismiss. The Nesarikars’ asserted reputational interests, and other non-ownership interests also did not support standing. In addition, the Nesarikars did not allege concrete, particularized reputational interests, or identified authority covering the different circumstances here.

Lastly, aside from their arguments about their Administrative Procedure Act claims, the Nesarikars contended that their complaint sufficiently alleged Article III standing for claims under the Privacy Act, and the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that no Privacy Act claim was found in the complaint, even if it is construed liberally, so the question of Article III standing to assert the claim did not arise here. The Paperwork Reduction Act claim invokes 44 U.S.C. § 3512, which provides that “no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a covered collection of information.” Again, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court and determined that Nesarikars’ had no such interest in the ’288 application.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Nesarikars’ complaint inadequately alleged their Article III standing to sue, and dismissal was warranted.

The Case is No. 26-1167.

Judge: Per Curiam.

Attorneys: Ashlesha Nesarikar, pro se. James Garland Gillingham, U.S. Attorney's Office, for the USPTO.

Cases: Patent FedCirNews USPTO