Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, LABOR—UNIONS, UNION MEMBERS—S.D. Fla.: Employee’s breach of contract and retaliation claims against union survive summary judgment, (Jul 29, 2026)

By Nicholas Kaster, J.D.

The issue is not whether the union’s interpretation of the facts and contract language was correct, but whether it was arbitrary.

An employee’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of fair representation (DFR) against a longshoremen’s union survived summary judgment, a federal district court in Florida has ruled. The employee claimed that the union retaliated against him for repeatedly reporting a co-worker for insubordination. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that some of the complaints that the employee filed constituted “charges” that the union was obliged to investigate and adjudicate and that its failure to do so constituted a breach of its bylaws. The court also found that there were genuine issues of material fact precluding entry of judgment as a matter of law on the DFR claim.

The court, however, granted the union’s motion for summary judgment on the employee’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (Matthews-Pace v. International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, Local 1416, No. 25-60995-CIV-DAMIAN/Strauss (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2026)).

Port of Miami. The employee worked as a longshoreman at the Port of Miami since 1997 and currently works as a Header. His work at the Port of Miami consists of helping to load and unload cruise ships and supervising the same.

Complaints about subordinate. The employee submitted eight written complaints to the executive board of his Longshoremen’s Union local describing a subordinate’s repeated absences and work performance issues, including allegedly walking off the job and failing to follow instructions.

Suspension. On July 15, 2024, approximately five months after he made his last complaint about the subordinate, the union suspended the employee as Header based on a report that he had neglected to instruct and respond appropriately in a timely manner to a situation requiring immediate attention at the port. The suspension lasted until the matter was heard by the Labor Relations Committee (LRC), which unanimously decided to suspend the employee as Header until October 31, 2024 (though he was able to continue working as a longshoreman during his suspension).

Other alleged retaliation. The employee alleged that subsequently the union continued to retaliate against him in other ways, including issuing a grievance against him, suspending him, and taking him off jobs.

Claims. The employee contended that the union breached its bylaws by failing to discipline his subordinate after he complained of her misconduct and by filing allegedly unfounded grievances against him in retaliation for his complaints. Specifically, the employee asserted claims for breach of bylaws, breach of DFR, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The union moved for summary judgment, arguing that the employee could not establish a prima facie case for any of the claims.

Breach of contract. As a preliminary matter, the union contended that the employee never properly invoked the disciplinary process under the union bylaws by filing his complaints/charges (1) in writing, (2) within thirty days of the occurrence or act, and (3) with the Secretary-Treasurer. Thus, according to the Union, because the employee never satisfied the conditions precedent to initiate the disciplinary process, no obligation arose for the union to breach. The court disagreed. The record showed that the employee wrote eight complaints against the subordinate and that the complaints were all sent well within the thirty-day requirement, most within 24 hours of the incident. The first four complaints were addressed to the Executive Board. The latter four complaints were all transmitted to the email address of the Secretary-Treasurer. This conduct was more than sufficient to create a fact issue as to whether the employee satisfied the requirements to invoke the disciplinary process under the bylaws.

The union then argued that it did not breach the bylaws by failing to refer the complaints to the Trial Board for action because none of the conduct that the employee complained of constituted a breach of the bylaws. While the employee did not specifically refer to bylaw provisions in his complaints, he argued that the conduct he complained of was conduct that contravened provisions of the bylaws, including refusal of a member “to carry out a needed operation or task when requested to do so by the Business Agent” and failure of a member “to report for work at a specified time after giving a Header his card.” When the entire record is viewed in the employee’s favor, said the court, a reasonable jury could find that some of the complaints the employee filed constituted “charges” that the union was obliged to investigate and adjudicate and that its failure to do so constituted a breach of the bylaws. The union also argued that the record did not show any damages resulting from any alleged breach. However, the court found that the prospect of nominal damages was sufficient for the employee’s breach of contract claim to survive summary judgment.

Breach of DFR. A union breaches its duty of fair representation where its actions are “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,” explained the court. To demonstrate bad faith, a plaintiff must show that the union “acted with any sort of improper motive or purpose.” As it pertains to how a union assesses or settles a grievance, the underlying merit of the grievance has little impact on whether the union breached its DFR. The issue is not whether the union’s interpretation of the facts and contract language was correct, but whether it was arbitrary.

Here, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact precluding entry of judgment as a matter of law on the DFR claim. In July 2024, after receiving approximately eight complaints from the employee about the subordinate’s work performance and ignoring each one, the union suspended him for failure “to instruct and respond appropriately in a timely manner to a situation requiring immediate attention at the Port.” Only the employee opted to provide a factual narrative of what happened to precipitate that suspension, stating: “I didn’t do anything wrong that day. I asked my subordinate to take something out, and she refused it, and they suspended me.” Then, when the issue came before the LRC, it summarily ratified the union’s suspension and extended the term of punishment through October 1, 2024. While the LRC does have a veneer of independence because it is made up of both representatives of the employers and of the union, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the LRC actually undertook a review of the charges against the employee, said the court. Put differently, the record does not show the absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to whether the union arbitrarily ignored a meritorious grievance, processed the one against the employee “in a perfunctory fashion,” or that its treatment of the employee was so far outside the realm of reasonableness so as to be irrational.

A reasonable jury could agree with the employee’s assertion that the LRC was merely a “hanging squad” based on its perfunctory approval of the union’s grievances in this case without making any written findings or conclusions, nor setting forth any procedure followed to ensure fundamental fairness. The court concluded that there was sufficient factual matter in the record, when construed in the employee’s favor, for a jury to find that the union ignored the grievances against the subordinate, inexplicably failed to take some required step, or gave the grievances merely cursory attention, when the union disciplined the employee. Thus, the court ruled that the employee’s claim survived summary judgment.

IIED. The employee’s IIED claim did not fare as well. To succeed on a claim for IIED under Florida law, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless, that is, he or she intended the behavior when he or she knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely result; (2) the conduct was outrageous, that is, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.

The court found that, as a matter of law, the conduct the employee identified was not sufficiently atrocious nor utterly intolerable such that it could be considered “outrageous” for purposes of an IIED claim.

The case is No. 25-60995-CIV-DAMIAN/Strauss.

Judge: Damian, M.

Attorneys: Joseph W. Gibson, Jr. (Joseph W. Gibson, Jr., Attorney at Law) for Samuel Matthews-Pace. Howard S. Susskind (Sugarman, Susskind, Braswell, & Herrera P.A.) for International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, Local 1416 and International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, Local 1526/1526A.

Companies: International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, Local 1416; International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, Local 1526/1526A

Cases: Labor UnionsMembers ContractClaims TortClaims FloridaNews