Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS—N.D. Cal.: Teacher, fired for refusing to use student’s preferred pronouns, cannot advance claims, (May 28, 2025)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

There was nothing to suggest that the school district, its administrators, or its board members exhibited any hostility towards the teacher’s religious beliefs prior to terminating her employment.

A teacher’s claims alleging First Amendment violations of her freedom of speech and religion after she was terminated for refusing to use a student’s preferred pronouns, could not survive a motion to dismiss, ruled a federal district court in California. The court determined that the school district had sovereign immunity as it operated as a state entity. Further, the individual named defendants had qualified immunity as there was no clearly established law putting them on notice that they had violated the teacher’s First Amendment rights. Finally, the court found the teacher’s speech was not protected and her complaint did not plausibly allege religious hostility (Ramirez v. Oakland Unified School Dist., No. 24-cv-09223-LB (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2025)).

The teacher in this case is a devout Catholic who believes that it is against her religion to use pronouns that differ from a person’s “divinely-intended gender.” She primarily taught Spanish-language classes to kindergartners at a dual-immersion school from 2017 to 2024.

Pronoun request. In August 2022, a student asked the teacher to use male pronouns when referring to the student, even though the student’s appearance suggested to the teacher that the student was biologically female. The teacher discussed the request with the student’s mother, who confirmed that the teacher should use male pronouns. The teacher believed that she could not comply with the request due to her Catholic faith.

Classroom change. After multiple complaints from the student’s parents, the teacher met with them and the principal and vice principal of the school. At this meeting, the parents again requested that the teacher use the student’s preferred pronouns. The administrators informed the teacher that California law and district policy required her to comply with the request. The administrators suggested that the student be transferred to a different classroom and the parents agreed. However, the student did want to transfer classrooms and had to be physically intercepted at the door and brought to the new classroom.

Outrage, reprimand. On October 4, 2022, parents, teachers, and members of the public petitioned the school to take action against the teacher. On October 7, the teacher was directed by an administrator to use masculine pronouns. On October 20, the teacher was issued a formal written reprimand for misgendering the student and insubordination for refusing to comply with district policy. After investigating complaints against the teacher, it was recommended that she be terminated.

Accommodations. Following a pre-disciplinary hearing, the teacher was offered accommodations, including calling transgender students by their first name, calling them by their last name, teaching another grade level, and teaching at a different school.

Finding these accommodations unacceptable, the teacher instead asked for training on how to use gender-neutral Spanish. Her request was denied and she was suspended with pay in January 2023. The following month, members of the district’s board voted to terminate her for violating the California Education Code and Oakland Unified School District Board Policy.

Subsequently, the teacher filed this lawsuit alleging violations of her right to free speech and free exercise of religion against the school district, as well as several school employees and board members in their individual capacities. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims.

Sovereign immunity. As a threshold matter the court was tasked with determining whether the school district was protected by sovereign immunity. When looking to sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit considers three factors to determine whether an entity is an arm of the state: “(1) the state’s intent as to the status of the entity, (2) the state’s control over the entity; and (3) the entity’s overall effects on the state treasury.” Kohn v. State Bar of California, 87 F.4th 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2023). The court applied each factor in turn.

State intent. Considering whether California intended the district to be an arm of the state, the court found that it had. State law characterizes school districts as state entities, observed the court. In addition, the district performs a state function: overseeing and facilitating the education of California’s children.

In response, the teacher pointed to sections of the California Education Code that describe the powers of governing boards and their locally elected members. However, explained the court, the fact that locally elected officials have some power to manage the district does not mean that the district is a local entity.

“To the contrary, as evidenced by the same statutes, the officials’ powers—and the districts they manage—flow from state authority,” said the court. Accordingly, the first Kohn factor favored a finding of sovereign immunity.

State control. As to the second factor, the court found that it too favored sovereign immunity because the district is controlled by the state. The court was unmoved by the teacher’s argument that local board members have control over the day-to-day administration of their districts, noting that it was ultimately the state that has “total control” over public school funding and “centralized control” over other decisions for public schools, such as textbook use.

Effect on state treasury. Finally, with regard to the third factor, the court found that it also favored a finding of sovereign immunity because the state is responsible for funding the district and paying its debts and judgments. Because all three factors indicated the district is a state entity, the court found that it had sovereign immunity.

Qualified immunity. Next, the court considered whether the individual named defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, ultimately determining that no binding, analogous precedent put the defendants on notice.

Freedom of speech. According to the teacher, the defendants violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The defendants argued that the speech was not constitutionally protected because it was performed in accordance with the teacher’s official duties.

As a threshold matter, the court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have addressed whether a teacher’s use of a student’s pronouns is protected speech. Courts in other circuits that have considered analogous cases have reached mixed results.

Given the lack of analogous, controlling precedent and conflicting out-of-circuit law, a reasonable school official would not have known that the alleged conduct violated the teacher’s freedom of speech, said the court, finding the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Free exercise. Turning to the teacher’s claim that the defendants violated her constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, the court again found no binding, analogous precedent that would put the defendants on notice that their alleged conduct violated that right.

In an effort to show that she suffered discrimination, the teacher pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civ. Rights Comm'n, 584 U.S. 617 (2018). However, the court here found that Masterpiece was not particularized to the facts of this case. There, the Supreme Court set aside the Commission’s order based on overt hostility towards the baker’s religion. Here, in contrast, one defendant asked the teacher what it was about her faith that prevented her from teaching transgender students. The court determined that this did not evince hostility to the degree of that found in Masterpiece, particularly because it was asked in the context of providing accommodations.

Analogous out-of-circuit cases again only muddied the waters, observed the court. As such, the school officials were not on notice that their conduct would violate the teacher’s right to free exercise of her religion, and they were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Failure to state a claim. Finally, the court considered whether the complaint stated a claim on which relief could be granted, beginning with the teacher’s freedom of speech claim. Here, the court found the alleged speech was not protected. Further, it determined that the teacher’s argument that the speech in question was compelled failed both legally and factually.

The government may insist that an employee deliver any lawful message when the speech is part of the employee’s official duties, explained the court. Here, the district’s adoption of anti-discrimination policies regulated teachers’ official duties: specifically, how they are to interact with students to facilitate learning. Further, the court noted that even the existence of compelled speech was suspect because the teacher was offered accommodations that would enable her to continue teaching her students. Her mere non-compliance with district policy did not convey a message warranting First Amendment protection, said the court, finding she had failed to state a freedom-of-speech claim.

With regard to her free exercise claim, the teacher did not contest that the district’s policy was facially neutral. Rather, she contended that school officials were impermissibly hostile towards her religious beliefs when enforcing the policy. The court was not moved, observing that the district had merely enforced its facially neutral policy. “And,” continued the court, “if mere enforcement is evidence of hostility, facially neutral and generally applicable laws would not be enforceable against those with religious beliefs, contrary to decades of First Amendment jurisprudence.”

The case is No. 24-cv-09223-LB.

Judge: Beeler, L.

Attorneys: Cameron Lee Atkinson (Atkinson Law) for Mirella Ramirez. Katherine A. Alberts (Leone Alberts & Duus) for Oakland Unified School District.

Companies: Oakland Unified School District

Cases: IndividualRights CoverageLiability Discharge Discrimination ReligiousDiscrimination PublicEmployees CaliforniaNews