Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS—9th Cir.: Yoga teachers obtain preliminary injunction against San Diego beach instruction prohibition, (Jun 5, 2025)

By Jason Albright, J.D.

“Teaching yoga is protected speech,” the appeals court found, and “[t]he City’s prohibition on teaching yoga in shoreline parks is content based….”

Two San Diego yoga instructors are entitled to a preliminary injunction in their First Amendment suit challenging a city ordinance that defined teaching yoga as a “non-expressive activity” and prohibited yoga instruction to four or more persons at any of the city’s shoreline parks or beaches, the Ninth Circuit held. Teaching yoga is protected speech, San Diego’s prohibition is content based, and the instructors showed that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied challenge to the prohibition, the appeals court found (Hubbard v. City of San Diego, No. 24-4613 (9th Cir. June 4, 2025)).

Yoga on the beach. The plaintiffs are two yoga instructors who offer free yoga classes in shoreline parks located within the City of San Diego, California. Anyone can participate in their classes, and they accept, but do not require, donations from participants.

Philosophical underpinnings. Yoga is “a diverse set of spiritual, philosophical, and physical disciplines,” according to the appeals court. And during their classes, the plaintiffs raise “an idea or philosophy” for their students to “reflect on throughout class.”

Foundational texts. The two instructors, in turn, rely on “foundational yoga texts... that instruct yogis on how to live a better[,] more fulfilled life.” These foundational texts cover various concepts, including how “to be of service to others, to be free of negativity and selfishness, to be truthful, [and] to practice gratitude and non-harm.” The two instructors also teach their students to practice “mindfulness” through poses and breathing exercises.

Ordinance No. 21775. In 2024, San Diego adopted Ordinance No. 21775. The ordinance amended the San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC), defined teaching yoga as a “non-expressive activity,” and prohibited the teaching of yoga in shoreline parks and beaches without the city’s permission.

SDMC provision. Under SDMC Section 63.0102, “[e]xcept expressive activity authorized” by Section 63.0502, “it is unlawful to carry on or conduct commercial activity, to provide any service, or to... require someone to... pay a fee before providing a service, even if characterized as a donation, without the written consent of the City Manager” in public parks and beaches. “Services” are defined as “activities involving... the provision of intangible items to a group of four persons or more at the same time that cannot be returned once they are provided.” The SDMC then provides a list of “[e]xamples” of services, which “include[s] massage, yoga, dog training, fitness classes, equipment rental, and staging for picnics, bonfires or other activities.”

Excluded from “expressive activity.” Under Section 63.0502, in turn, “[e]xpressive activity means all forms of speech and expressive conduct,” but “does not include,” among other things, “teaching yoga.”

Warned by rangers. On May 8, 2024, one of the instructors arrived at her usual teaching spot in a shoreline park and encountered San Diego park rangers who informed her that the city “does not allow any yoga classes to occur (even for free) on any shoreline park in the area.” The rangers also told her that returning to the park to teach would be a criminal offense. When she inquired about obtaining a permit to teach yoga at shoreline parks, city employees responded that they “do not issue permits for fitness at any shoreline park.”

Infraction tickets. Then, on May 18 and June 1, 2024, San Diego park rangers stopped the named plaintiff after he taught yoga classes in a shoreline park and issued him infraction tickets. The June 1 ticket listed two violations: (1) “use of public parks and beaches regulated, yoga” in violation of SDMC § 63.0102(c)(14); and (2) “set up any exhibition, give lecture” in violation of SDMC § 63.0102(c)(15).

Lawsuit. On June 3, 2024, the two instructors filed a complaint, asserting that the ordinance violates the First Amendment facially and as applied to their teaching. On July 1, 2024, they filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.

Decision below and appeal. The district court denied their motion on July 12, 2024, concluding that the two had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because they failed to “establish[] that the activity of teaching a yoga class is... protected speech under the First Amendment.”

The yoga instructors timely appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

Protected speech. Beginning with a consideration of the instructors’ likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim, the appeals court first found that yoga is speech protected by the First Amendment. The First Amendment’s protections for speech encompass situations in which a teacher’s “speech to [students] imparts a ‘specific skill’ or communicates advice derived from ‘specialized knowledge,’” and because the ordinance targets teaching yoga, it plainly implicates the instructors’ First Amendment right to speak.

“[S]peech and expressive movements.” “The practice and philosophy of yoga,” the Ninth Circuit elaborated, “‘date back thousands of years,’ deriving ‘from ancient Hindu scriptures.’” And the “practice of yoga ‘teaches students to attain spiritual fulfillment through control of the mind and body.’” In short, “[a] person who teaches yoga is communicating and disseminating information about this philosophy and practice through speech and expressive movements.” Analogizing their instruction with vocational training classes, the appeals court observed that the instructors’ classes “aim to impart a specific skill and communicate advice derived from specialized knowledge.”

Content-based restriction. Because the parties did not dispute that San Diego’s shoreline parks are traditional public fora, the court turned next to the issue of whether the instruction ban is a presumptively unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech. The Ninth Circuit found that it was.

The plain language of the ordinance, the appeals court observed, “defin[es] regulated speech by particular subject matter,” “draw[ing] distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.” The ordinance states that “it is unlawful... to provide any service, or to... require someone to... pay a fee before providing a service, even if characterized as a donation,” and specifically identifies “yoga” as an activity that constitutes a “service.” And though the ordinance excludes “expressive activity” from its prohibition, it specifically states that “[e]xpressive activity does not include... teaching yoga.” This was “the very definition of a content-based restriction on speech,” said the appeals court.

No compelling interest or narrow tailoring. Given the content-based nature of the ordinance, it could be upheld only if the city met its burden of proving that the ordinance “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” The ordinance failed both of these tests as well, according to the Ninth Circuit.

To defend its prohibition on teaching yoga, the city cited its “important governmental interests” in “protecting the enjoyment and safety of the public in the use of” its shoreline parks, but it provided “no explanation as to how teaching yoga would lead to harmful consequences to these interests, or even what those consequences might be.”

Underinclusive. The ordinance also “fail[s] as hopelessly underinclusive,” observed the appeals court. “The Ordinance does not prohibit teaching various other subjects to four or more people in shoreline parks, including those that, like yoga, potentially involve physical movement. Nor does the City even attempt to explain how teaching yoga presents a greater threat to public safety and enjoyment than teaching other subjects.”

Fails strict scrutiny. “Because the City has demonstrated no plausible connection between [the two instructors] teaching yoga and any threat to public safety and enjoyment in the City’s shoreline parks, the Ordinance fails strict scrutiny,” concluded the Ninth Circuit. The instructors thus made a clear showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied First Amendment claims.

Remaining Winter factors. Finally, considering the remaining factors outlined in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), the appeals court concluded that a preliminary injunction was appropriate. It was undisputed that the two instructors cannot teach yoga in any shoreline park under the ordinance, and because they demonstrated the existence of a colorable First Amendment claim, they made a clear showing that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.

They also made a clear showing as to the last two Winter factors. “Where, as here, the party opposing injunctive relief is a government entity, the third and fourth factors—the balance of equities and the public interest—‘merge.’” Thus, the fact that the two instructors “have raised serious First Amendment questions compels a finding that... the balance of hardships tips sharply in [their] favor.” And finally, “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.”

Reversed and remanded. The district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction was thus reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction in favor of the two yoga instructors on their as-applied challenge to the ordinance.

The case is No. 24-4613.

Judge: Thomas, H.

Attorneys: Bryan William Pease (Pease & Ijadi) for Steven Hubbard. Manuel Arambula, Office of the San Diego City Attorney, for City of San Diego.

Companies: City of San Diego

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