Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS—6th Cir.: Fired teacher’s due process claim revived, court erred requiring proof of actual injury, (May 14, 2025)

By Tulay Turan, J.D.

A Section 1983 claimant may obtain damages for the kinds of injuries compensable in tort law.

Reversing a district court’s judgment in favor of the Shelby County, Tennessee, Board of Education on a terminated teacher’s Section 1983 claim, the Sixth Circuit ruled, in an unpublished opinion, that the court erred in finding she had not proven action “under color of law” and took too narrow a view of the kinds of injury that are cognizable in a procedural due process claim. However, the court affirmed the lower court’s denial of backpay damages on her state-law claim because it could not provide an extra-statutory monetary remedy. It also affirmed the court’s ruling that the teacher failed to prove the Board’s reason for terminating her was pretextual (Williams v. Shelby County, Tennessee, Board of Education, No. 22-5591 (6th Cir. May 12, 2025, unpublished)).

The Shelby County, Tennessee, Board of Education hired the teacher in 2002 and granted her tenure a few years later. In 2015, as part of an age and race discrimination settlement with the teacher, the Board offered her a job as an adult advisor at the Messick Adult Center via the Adult Education Program.

Complained, harassed. Soon after the teacher started at Messick, she told the principal and the Board that she believed the center was violating state rules related to the ethical use of grant funding. She alleged the principal and other school employees harassed her after she voiced these complaints.

Grant revoked. Halfway through her first schoolyear, the state revoked the grant that funded the Adult Education Program, and the Board superintendent terminated the entire program. Under a Tennessee statute called the Tenure Act, when a school conducts a reduction-in-force, the decision must be made by the school board itself and certain high-performing teachers must be put on a “list for reemployment.”

Here, the Board did not ratify the teacher’s termination until several years after she was fired. It also did not add her to the reemployment list immediately after terminating her employment in 2016.

Prior procedures. In January 2017, the teacher filed this action against the Board. She raised five claims, including retaliation under Title VII and the First Amendment, retaliatory termination under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA), a claim under the Tennessee Tenure Act, and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her procedural due process rights. She also raised a First Amendment “Prior Restraint of Speech” claim but abandoned it early in litigation.

The Board moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim, the TPPA claim, and the Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim. The district court denied summary judgment on the Tenure Act claim, holding that a reasonable jury could find the Board violated the Act by failing to ratify her termination. It also granted summary judgment on certain categories of her Title VII claim but allowed others to proceed to trial.

Correction to summary judgment record. Soon after the district court’s summary judgment ruling, the Board notified the court that the Board’s counsel had inadvertently omitted relevant evidence from the record. The Board explained that it had ratified the teacher’s termination in October 2018, which was several months before the district court ruled on the motion. The Board’s counsel did not learn of the ratification until after the order was filed. Around the same time, the staffing manager testified in his deposition that the Board had not added the teacher to the reemployment list when she was terminated.

Certified question. Given those admissions, the district court concluded the Board had likely violated the Tenure Act, but it was unsure of the remedy under state law. The court thus certified to the Tennessee Supreme Court the question of whether a teacher is “entitled to back pay damages when the school board fails to act as the final decision-maker on her termination” “or when the board does not place a qualified teacher on a reemployment list.

Review declined. The Tennessee Supreme Court declined to accept the case. Forced to decide the issue itself, the district court held the teacher was entitled to backpay damages from the date she was fired until the date the Board ratified her termination in October 2018, but that she was not entitled to any further damages for the Board’s delay in placing her on the reemployment list.

Part of summary judgment reversed. Thereafter, the teacher filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider all the claims it had disposed of at summary judgment. It agreed to reverse its grant of summary judgment as to the Section 1983 claim but declined to reconsider her remaining claims.

Bench trial. The only claim that remained for trial was the teacher’s Section 1983 claim related to the Board’s failure to place her on a reemployment list. After a two-day bench trial, the district court granted judgment for the Board on that claim. The teacher appealed, arguing: (1) she should receive additional damages for her Tenure Act claim; (2) the district court’s grant of judgment for the Board on the Section 1983 claim should be reversed; and (3) the district court’s grant of judgment for the Board on the retaliation claims under Title VII and the TPPA should be reversed.

No backpay damages. Analyzing the Tenure Act based on how it predicted the Tennessee Supreme Court would interpret it and relying on state court precedent, the Sixth Circuit ruled the Act does not permit backpay as a remedy for a school board’s mere failure to put an excessed teacher on a reemployment list. The Act does not state that a school board must award backpay when it fails to put an excessed teacher on a reemployment list. It does, however, expressly permit backpay damages in different circumstances. “This suggests that when the Tennessee Legislature intends to authorize backpay damages, it does so expressly,” the court wrote.

In addition, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently applied these principles to deny backpay damages when the Tenure Act did not expressly authorize them. In a case where the school board held a pre-termination hearing later than required by the Act, the Tennessee Court of Appeals awarded the teacher backpay for the delay. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed explaining that the timing provision carried “no specific penalty for noncompliance” and judges “are not at liberty to rewrite statutes.”

Here, as in that case, the Tenure Act provides “no specific penalty for noncompliance” with the reemployment-list provision. Also, the remedy the teacher asked this court to craft—backpay for the time she was not on the reemployment list—was “not contained in the Tenure Act.” Thus, the court concluded it could not provide an extra-statutory monetary remedy.

The court rejected the teacher’s reliance on two state court of appeals cases that were decided before the Tenure Act was amended. Those cases awarded backpay “in the context of the school board’s failure to give a teacher the preference for reemployment provided for under the previous version” of the statute. However, the Tenure Act “no longer” provides the same “preference to teachers on the reemployment list.”

Due process. Turning to the teacher’s Section 1983 procedural due process claim, the court reversed the district court’s judgment for the Board. The district court held the claim failed for two independent reasons: (1) the teacher had not proven action “under color of law;” and (2) the teacher failed to prove the Board’s alleged unconstitutional actions caused her “injury” because she could not show that the Board would have “re-hire[d] her" if it had placed her on the reemployment list sooner.

Action under color of law. After explaining that the Board itself is a municipal entity subject to suit under Section 1983, the court noted the issue was whether the teacher’s exclusion from the reemployment list resulted from an action taken by an official whom the Board vested with “final authority” over the reemployment list. The court agreed with the teacher’s argument that the Board superintendent had final authority over the reemployment list and that he caused the teacher’s exclusion from the list.

The court found there was ample evidence the Board vested the superintendent with final authority over all decisions related to the reemployment list. The Board’s reduction-in-force policy had a section titled “Preferred List for Employment,” which began by reciting verbatim the current text of the Tenure Act’s reemployment list provision. It then stated that the superintendent “shall be responsible for developing administrative rules and regulations to implement” the statutory text. In addition, the policy did not provide a mechanism for any other municipal employee to oversee or review the superintendent’s actions regarding the reemployment list.

Exclusion from list. In addition, the superintendent wielded that final authority in a way that caused the teacher’s exclusion from the list. The Board’s former staffing manager testified at trial that the teacher was not on the list in 2019 in part because the Board did not “have the vacancies filled that we needed,” so the superintendent decided... not to have any individuals put on that list in addition to what we already had.” As such, the court said, that decision was not a “rogue” act outside the superintendent’s legal mandate, but rather “a deliberate choice by the official who had ‘final authority to establish policy with respect to the action ordered.’” That was sufficient to support municipal liability under Section 1983.

Proof of injury. Turning to the district court’s finding that the teacher failed to prove that her exclusion from the reemployment list proximately caused injury to her, the Sixth Circuit found the district court took too narrow a view of the kinds of injury that are cognizable in a Section 1983 action. Further, the district court wrongly held that a plaintiff’s failure to prove injury in a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim requires granting judgment for the defendant.

First, the district court improperly held the teacher could prove injury only by showing that her exclusion from the list caused the Board to fail to re-hire her. Section 1983 authorizes damages for injuries “according to principles derived from the common law of torts,” the appeals court noted. These include “not only out-of-pocket loss,” but also “other monetary harms,” as well as “impairment of reputation,” and “mental anguish.”

Here, the teacher argued that exclusion from the reemployment list cost her “an important edge in finding another job.” She asserted that the Board chooses to provide teachers on the list with certain hiring opportunities and that her exclusion cost her these opportunities. The Board did not dispute that it offered these benefits to teachers on the reemployment list. In addition, neither the district court nor the Board had explained why such a loss of opportunity would not be a cognizable injury in a Section 1983 case.

Not required to prove actual injury. Second, the court explained that even if she could not prove injury stemming from her alleged due process violation, that was still not a reason to grant judgment for the Board. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff is not required to prove actual injury to succeed on a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim. If a plaintiff proves a procedural-due-process violation but cannot prove actual injury, the district court must still enter judgment for the plaintiff and award nominal damages, the court said.

No retaliation. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the teacher failed to prove that the Board’s reason for terminating her was pretextual. The teacher argued the Board’s stated reason for her termination was pretextual because she was the only full-time tenured teacher to be terminated after the grant was revoked. She asserted that other full-time tenured teachers at Messick “continue[d] collecting a paycheck” from the Board even after the Adult Education Program was cut.

The teacher’s argument rested on an incomplete understanding of the record, according to the appeals court. When the Board lost its grant, it eliminated all teaching positions in the Adult Education Program, i.e., all teaching positions at Messick. At the time, several full-time tenured teachers worked at Messick, but she was the only one who worked at Messick exclusively. The other full-time tenured teachers split their time between Messick and other schools. When the Board cut the Adult Education Program, those teachers lost their positions at Messick but kept their jobs elsewhere in the district. The teacher did not have a job elsewhere in the district. That is why other tenured teachers “continue[d] collecting a paycheck” from the Board even after the grant was revoked. The record showed the Board even-handedly eliminated all teaching positions within the Adult Education Program. She failed to provide any evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to that conclusion.

Cat’s paw theory fails. In addition, the court found the teacher failed to prove pretext under a cat’s paw theory because she failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the animus of two non-decisionmaker employees was a proximate cause of her termination.

Ultimately, the decision to terminate all teaching positions in the Adult Education Program was made by the Board superintendent, and there was no evidence the two employees had any role in that decision. In his deposition, the superintendent testified he relied on the “recommendation” of his “chief academic officer” to terminate the program. There was no evidence the two employees had anything to do with that particular decision. Thus, no reasonable jury could find that any retaliatory animus harbored by the two employees proximately caused her termination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling on pretext.

Proceedings on remand. The appeals court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the teacher’s Section 1983 claim to the Board based on the grounds it had identified but noted that unresolved issues remained. The district court expressly declined to decide whether the Board’s delay in placing the teacher’s name on a reemployment list amounted to a constitutional violation. It held only that she satisfied the first element of a procedural-due-process claim—that her entitlement to placement on the list was a property interest requiring protection under the Due Process Clause.

The court noted the district court failed to decide whether the teacher satisfied the latter two elements of her claim—whether the Board’s delay amounted to a “deprivation” of her property interest, and whether the Board failed to provide her “adequate process.” The parties did not brief these remaining elements on appeal, and, thus, the appeals court declined to analyze them here.

Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to analyze the remaining elements of the procedural-due-process violation and decide in the first instance whether she has proven a procedural-due-process violation. If the court finds she has done so, it should evaluate whether she is entitled to compensatory or mere nominal damages, the appeals court instructed.

The case is No. 22-5591.

Judge: White, H.

Attorneys: Colter Lawrence Paulson (Squire Patton Boggs) for Sonya P. Williams. Jamie Leigh Morton, Office of General Counsel, for Shelby County, TN, Board of Education.

Cases: IndividualRights PublicEmployees StateLawClaims Retaliation Discharge KentuckyNews MichiganNews OhioNews TennesseeNews