Cybersecurity Policy Report, FDD Scholar: Sector-Specific Remedies Needed to Block Chinese Tech Dominance, (Nov 6, 2025)
The Chinese government’s effort to dominate various technology sectors can’t be effectively addressed by company-specific sanctions or export controls, according to Nathan Picarsic, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).
Company-specific remedies to address supply chain threats force the U.S. government to play “Whac-A-Mole” by trying to knock down “Hidden Huaweis” that emerge unexpectedly, Mr. Picarsic said today in an FDD commentary.
“There are countless Hidden Huaweis. Moreover, defeating just the actual Huawei, the one in plain sight, proved a Sisyphean task for the US government. A new tack is needed. That tack should involve sector-level action in critical and high-risk domains—rather than trying to chase down every Hidden Huawei within them,” according to the commentary, which was written for Force Distance Times.
“Even when the US government designates Chinese entities as risks, those entities, and their supply chains, are adept at finding alternative routes into the US market. Common tactics include localization of assembly, joint ventures, and distribution and re-seller partnerships,” Mr. Picarsic noted.
“No entity-focused defenses will change this dynamic. The threat from China stems from an industrial policy that doesn’t necessarily pick winners but does pick sectors. The result is sector-level vulnerabilities for the United States—that the entity-level tools Washington has deployed to date do not address,” he said.
He recommended that the U.S. government start by scrutinizing the “connectivity” sector—including modems, routers, Wi-Fi hotspots, and fixed wireless access (FWA) equipment—and blocking the aspirations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to dominate that sector.
The FCC, he observed, “has taken steps to address component-level challenges and a broadened set of connectivity risks, including in subsea cables.”
“The Wi-Fi and FWA product spaces present similar vulnerabilities and dynamics,” he added. “Adding PRC-linked actors across those entire sectors to the Commission’s Covered List would, finally, propel a response commensurate with the nature of China’s connectivity threat.”
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